*LICENSE: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International. Attribute to Timothy Smith.* --- **FLORIDA MODEL INSTRUMENTS FOR DATA CENTER DEVELOPMENT** # Open Legal Questions ## Release 2026.4 ### Answers from the sources, and the narrower questions left for counsel Release 2026.3 listed 51 legal questions that the text of a statute did not settle. Each has since been researched in the primary sources: the 2026 Florida Statutes and Laws of Florida, the Florida Administrative Code, federal statutes and regulations, published opinions, Attorney General opinions, and agency orders and guidance. This release states the answer the sources support and how firm it is, the change to an instrument the answer calls for, and the narrower question, if any, that is left for a lawyer or an agency. No licensed attorney has reviewed any instrument or any answer here, and no county has adopted any instrument or signed any agreement on these terms. Any one answer can be checked on its own. Questions 52 to 58 were added in Release 2026.4 and were researched in the same way. *Reading pass of 23 October 2026.* Before the questions go to counsel, the eleven that touch the Standards (2.1, 3.1, 3.2, 4.1, 5.1, 5.2, 6.1, 7.1, 17.1, 52.1 and 52.2) were read once more. Authorities read only second-hand were sought in the source itself. Decisions, Attorney General opinions and agency orders were searched again through 23 October 2026, and the legislative history of the acts of 2019 to 2026 they rest on was read where it could be found. Counsel 5.1 is now answered and leaves Part 2. Nine questions are narrower, 3.1 stays as it was with the Isaias facts added, and the record behind a larger substation setback, part of 7.1, belongs to the County rather than to counsel. Several answers are firmer, and one is weaker: a denial for subsidence risk (Question 52(b)) no longer carries a lean, because the decision it rested on could not be found or read. Of the 24 "(confirm)" marks in Questions 2, 3, 6, 7, 17 and 52, 14 were resolved by reading the source itself. The drafting changes the pass pointed to were approved and made the same day (Questions 2, 5, 7, 17 and 52), and sources that still could not be read are named in each entry's *Left open*. *Follow-up reading of 25 October 2026.* Most of the sources the reading pass could not reach were then read: the Fifth District's 2007 and 2001 decisions, the First District's 2018 and 2009 decisions, the federal rulings of 2024 and 2026 in the St. Johns County dispute and the Ninth Circuit decision of 1940, the appellate dockets in the Sixth and Fifth Districts, FEMA's declarations for Hurricane Isaias, the Florida Building Code's provisions on generators, Rule 25-6.115, and the water management districts' current handbooks and rules in their official text. The 2019 text of NFPA 110 still could not be read, since it requires an account with the publisher. The Leon County docket could not be searched without accepting the Clerk's terms of use, and the Flagler County written order was not found. Counsel 2.1 and 52.2 are narrower, 17.1 is narrower in part and asks one new point, the premise of 52.1 is brought up to date, and 2.1 and 3.1 move to the second tier. Question 52 now cites the district handbooks in the editions in force. The readings for Question 52 weaken two provisions. A 2009 First District decision says that district permitting "is all that is required to obtain approval for consumptive use of water in this state," so the Sec. 7(a)(1) rule now leans no where s. 373.262(2) does not apply, and a denial for subsidence risk under Sec. 8(f)(2) now leans no as well. In Question 17, withholding further development approvals under Standards Sec. 18(d) alone no longer carries a lean, since nothing read supports it without the owner's agreement. The drafting changes the reading pointed to in Questions 17 and 52 were made the same day; a fallback for Sec. 7(a)(1), and the other water and remedy changes recorded in Questions 1, 17 and 52, followed that night. *How to read an entry.* Each answer carries a strength: | Strength | Meaning | |---|---| | **Settled** | A statute's text or a binding decision answers it. | | **Mostly yes** or **Mostly no** | The sources point one way, but no decision is squarely on point. | | **Open, leaning yes** or **Open, leaning no** | The sources are silent or divided; the lean is a judgment. A lean may name the likely result instead, for example "leaning arbitration." | | **Open** | The sources are silent or divided, and no lean is given. | | **Not a legal research question** | The answer turns on a county's own facts, a study, a policy choice or an agency's decision. | | **Mixed** | The parts of the question have different strengths, given in the entry. | "Release 2026.4" marks a change the instruments make in this release in answer to the question; otherwise the entry says what the instruments already provided in Release 2026.3. "Counsel" points to a narrowed question in Part 2 and "Agency" to Part 3. "(confirm)" marks an authority read only through a secondary source, a citation not shown on the page read, or a case cited without its opinion being read; please check it against the official text. Quotations of Florida statutes are from the 2026 text. *Short names.* "Standards": Exhibit A to the Model Data Center Standards Ordinance, with its Technical Manual (Exhibit B) and Module M1 (Sec. 15A). "Fee Ordinance": the public safety and emergency power impact fee ordinance. "Agreement": the Model Host Community Development Agreement and its exhibits, including Exhibit "S." "M2": Module M2. "Lease": the Model Ground Lease. "Module": Module M3, Civic Compute Allocation, including its schedules. "Options": the Module M3 Options. "CBA": the Model Community Benefits Agreement. "Kit": the County Procedure and Records Kit. "In-Kind Test": the In-Kind Eligibility and Characterization Test. Statutes are Florida Statutes unless stated. *Corrections to Release 2026.3.* - **Question 3.** Release 2026.3 described Hurricane Isaias as an incident "which FEMA lists as a tropical storm incident" and asked how s. 252.422 applies to a storm that was not a hurricane where it made landfall. FEMA's label is accurate for its emergency declaration (EM-3655-FL), whose incident type is tropical storm, and its major disaster declaration of 27 October 2026 (DR-4955-FL) gives the incident type as hurricane; the National Hurricane Center records a hurricane landfall near Destin, Florida, with maximum sustained winds of 105 mph. The statute turns on the National Hurricane Center's classification, so that part of the question does not arise; what remains is whether FEMA's emergency declaration counts. - **Question 13.** *Morgran Co. v. Orange County* and *Lee County v. Captiva Civic Ass'n* have now been read in the opinions themselves, and their citations and holdings are confirmed (see Question 13). A motion for rehearing in *Captiva* was reported in July 2026; no ruling on it was found. *Law the answers rely on that is new or about to take effect.* | Law | Effect | Questions | |---|---|---| | Chapter 2026-64 (s. 125.022(1)), effective 1 July 2026 | Counties of 75,000 or more must offer a site plan program by 1 January 2027; an application filed through it is deemed complete if no notice issues in 5 business days, and can be deemed approved; a substantially similar program a county already had on 1 July 2026 is not affected | 5, 17 | | Chapter 2026-161 (ss. 163.3164, 163.31801), effective 1 January 2027 | Rewrites the Impact Fee Act: a "plan-based" demonstrated-need study, a definition of "impact fee," new increase limits and a new subsection (15) on overpayments | 9, 10, 11, 16 | | Chapter 2026-168 (Chapter 617), effective 1 July 2026 | Rewrites much of the nonprofit corporation law; derivative suits move to ss. 617.0741 to 617.0747, and ss. 617.08091, 617.1434 and 617.1435 are new | 45 | | Chapter 2026-52 (s. 119.0715), approved 23 April 2026 | Deletes the scheduled 2 October 2026 repeal of the trade secret exemption, so trade secrets an agency holds stay confidential and exempt | 18 | | Chapter 2026-120 (s. 119.0725), approved 10 June 2026 | Rewrites the exemption for critical infrastructure and technology security information; scheduled for repeal on 2 October 2031 unless saved | 18 | | Chapter 2026-65 (ss. 163.326, 288.075, 366.043, 373.203, 373.239, 373.262), approved 7 May 2026; ss. 163.326 and 373.203 effective that day, the other sections 1 July 2026 | Large load tariffs must keep each large load customer's full cost of service off other ratepayers, and a public utility may not knowingly serve a foreign entity that would otherwise qualify as a large load customer; a large load customer is not an "electric substation" under s. 163.3208; a data center's location information under s. 288.075 is confidential for at most 12 months; a district may not permit a large-scale data center's water use that local zoning and the plan prohibit, must require reclaimed water where the statute's conditions are met, and may not approve such a permit without a hearing | 3, 7, 18, 20, 52, 58 | | Chapter 2026-45 (s. 377.8161, numbered s. 377.816 in the act; ss. 125.01(1)(g), (h) and (r), 166.021(2) and 166.201), effective 1 July 2026 | No governmental entity may enact or enforce, or require anyone else to enact or enforce, a policy to support a net zero policy, including as a contract condition; it also bars using public funds for net zero purchasing preferences, for preferences based solely on the type or source of fuel, or for dues, fees or contributions to a private organization that adopts one, requires its members to adopt one or commit to support one, or uses the funds to advocate for one, and bars charges to advance one and greenhouse gas caps and trading; each governmental entity files a yearly affidavit of compliance with the bar on charges, and the county and city powers of ss. 125.01(1)(g), (h) and (r), 166.021(2) and 166.201 are made subject to the section's prohibitions | 55 | | Chapter 2026-179 (s. 125.01055(7)(a), (d), (n) and (o); s. 333.03), effective 1 July 2026 | Amends the county affordable housing provision; a county must still allow qualifying affordable multifamily housing "in any area zoned for commercial, industrial, or mixed use" | 56 | | Chapter 2026-66 (ss. 288.860(2), 692.201(3)), effective 1 July 2026 | A state agency, political subdivision or public school that may spend state-appropriated funds or levy ad valorem taxes may not participate in any agreement with, or accept any grant from, a foreign country of concern, its subdivisions or an entity it controls (the 2025 text barred only agreements of narrower kinds), and such agreements in force on 1 July 2026 were terminated that day; the act also amends the definition of "foreign country of concern" in s. 692.201(3) | 29, 58 | | Section 28, Chapter 2025-190 | Unchanged in 2026; the three declarations it names together list all 67 counties | 3, 56 | | Rule 69A-60.005, F.A.C. (Florida Fire Prevention Code, 9th Edition), proposed to take effect 31 December 2026; final adoption not confirmed | Would move the incorporated NFPA 110 from the 2019 to the 2022 edition, and NFPA 37 from the 2021 to the 2024 edition (as read in the notice of proposed rule) | 6 | | 15 C.F.R. 744.11(a)(1) | The rule extending the Entity List to entities 50 percent owned by listed entities is stayed only until 9 November 2026 | 34 | | Rule 12A-1.108, F.A.C. | Still states the former 15-megawatt threshold for the data center sales tax exemption; the statute requires 100 megawatts | 35, 40 | | Workforce Pell final rule, 34 C.F.R. 690.90 to 690.97 (May 2026) | Program approval and earnings tests; limits on written arrangements with ineligible organizations; no Pell where non-Federal grant or scholarship aid meets the cost of attendance | 28 | | *Sheetz v. County of El Dorado* | The remand decision was ordered depublished on 12 November 2025, and certiorari was denied on 15 June 2026 | 10, 15 | --- ## Summary *The answer in brief describes the instruments as published in Release 2026.3. The "2026.4 change" column says whether this release changes them in answer, and each entry gives the details.* | No. | Question | Answer in brief | Strength | 2026.4 change | Left open | |---|---|---|---|---|---| | 1 | County acts that would draw the County in | No listed act alone makes the CBA a County condition; an approval, its terms or its timing turning on the agreement does; a CBA payment is not consideration for an approval | Mostly no (each act alone; payment as consideration) | Made | Counsel 1.1 | | 2 | Copies, disclosures and rehearing | Filing a delivered copy is not considering it; the letter disclosure is not consideration while no one relies on the terms; an authorized, timely rehearing motion tolls rendition as to every existing party, the bracket alone does not | Mostly yes; Settled (an authorized motion tolls as to every existing party) | Made | Counsel 2.1 (narrowed) | | 3 | Adoption timing | Section 28 reaches all 67 counties until 1 Oct 2027 and reaches the Fee Ordinance and the Standards; Agreement terms and a County lease probably not; an owner joining the application probably meets both Section 28(2) tests, though covenants that work as procedures are not clearly saved; an emergency declaration probably counts under s. 252.422; Isaias made a hurricane landfall | Settled (coverage); Mostly yes (Fee Ordinance; owner co-applicant); Open, leaning no (Agreement); Open, leaning yes (s. 252.422); Mostly no (lease; s. 163.326(2); contract purchaser alone) | Made | Counsel 3.1; 3.2 (narrowed) | | 4 | Owners who sign nothing; ordinance challenges | A title holder who signs nothing keeps its s. 70.001 claim, which can ripen on enactment; Part II adoption very likely brings the Standards, Sec. 17 included, within ss. 57.112(6) and 125.675(5)(g)1.; the disposal and PFAS bans are the exposed provisions | Settled (claim); Mostly yes (exemptions) | Made | Counsel 4.1 (narrowed) | | 5 | Application information under s. 125.022 | All three items are permissible; no completion by lapse of time under (2), so a missed 30-day notice costs only the refund; under new subsection (1) (in force 1 July 2026, with the program due by 1 Jan 2027 in counties of 75,000 or more) a site plan the County designates for administrative review can be deemed complete and deemed approved, unless it is filed through a substantially similar program the County already had on 1 July 2026 | Mostly yes (items; a deficiency after a missed notice); Mostly no (subsection (2)); Settled (subsection (1), adverse only for designated site plans); Mostly no (a program the County had on 1 July 2026) | Made | Counsel 5.2 (narrowed) | | 6 | Generator limits and s. 366.032 | Gas and propane generators are protected "appliances"; the code exception does not reach a noise schedule; diesel is probably protected too; Exhibit "S" lacks the Sec. 10(e) fallback | Open, leaning no; Mostly yes (diesel) | Made | Counsel 6.1 (narrowed) | | 7 | Substations and on-site lines | A utility-owned substation gets only a "reasonable" setback (100 feet is a fallback, not a ceiling), permitted-use status and a 90-day clock; undergrounding the applicant's own lines is not preempted; Sec. 5(c)'s carve-out is too narrow | Mostly yes (substations); Mostly no (lines) | Made | Counsel 7.1 (narrowed); the County's record | | 8 | Inspection access | Not enforceable by penalty or forced entry against a refusing operator; entry needs consent, an inspection warrant (ss. 933.20 to 933.30) or an emergency; contractual consent is stronger but enforced through a court | Mostly no | Made | Counsel 8.1 | | 9 | What a fee may fund, including shelters | The list is illustrative, and little turns on it beyond the emergency communications (911) center the model fee ordinance names; emergency generation and storage at County facilities is fixed capital "infrastructure"; a school used as a County shelter is possible by agreement, but a data center's need and benefit nexus is the obstacle | Mostly yes; Open, leaning no (shelter nexus, a study question) | Made | Counsel 9.1 | | 10 | "Increase," pending applications and Sheetz | A category with its own Fee Unit funding facilities the general rate does not fund reads as a "new" fee; "current or pending" is unsettled; Sheetz adds little in substance but a federal claim s. 70.45 cannot exclude | Open, leaning no ("increase"); Open (pending); Mostly no (Sheetz) | Made | Counsel 10.1 | | 11 | Credits for in-kind contributions | Leased or utility-owned capability must be credited where the County required it, mainly in transition; timing of fair market value is unsettled (acceptance fits best); the credit may reduce either fee funding the same class; Agreement 10.8(c) conflicts with Fee Ordinance 4.2 | Open, leaning yes; Open (when value is fixed); public construction law for work credited against a fee: Open, leaning yes; for mitigation the developer funds: Open; contractor's bond for work on public property: Mostly yes | Made | Counsel 11.1, 11.2 | | 12 | Consideration for the recorded covenants | No recital is needed; actual consideration probably is, and the County's own promises supply it, but Section 10.4(b) disclaims any exchange; a recital of motives is not consideration | Mostly no (recital); Open, leaning yes (actual consideration) | Made | Counsel 12.1 | | 13 | Phase review within an envelope | Confirmation of a decision made, if the Board decides the Envelope and every discretionary permit at the Agreement's hearings; vesting answers the 1956 decision on zoning by contract only for the freeze; the three cases are confirmed | Mostly yes | Made | Counsel 13.1 | | 14 | Later standards, revalidations and fees | One hearing may serve every agreement; a revalidated rate is a term in force at execution; the waiver binds for Phases not begun; name subjects and fee categories in 10.8(a); later ordinances reach the Project only through Section 10.8; the gap before the Effective Date is covered, but Section 2.2(c)'s compliance wording needs repair | Mostly yes; Open, leaning no (specificity of item (3)); Open, leaning enforceable (Section 9.2) | Made | Counsel 14.1 | | 15 | The waiver, and the measure of an in-kind item | The waiver holds narrowly, for commitments stated at execution, and adds little beside the unwaivable s. 70.45 claim; no case decides the measure, so keep the higher-of rule | Mostly yes (waiver); Open, leaning cost (measure) | Made (optional) | Counsel 15.1 | | 16 | The Qualified Fiscal Agent | The Agent's independence does not by itself keep the payments outside the Act; their optional, project-specific character might, making them exactions under s. 70.45; a community foundation cannot hold them in a component fund; an open spending period and an agent fee on top need fixing | Mostly no (independence alone); Open, leaning no (foundation); Mostly yes (spending period, agent fee) | Made | Counsel 16.1 | | 17 | Operating obligations and remedies | In-kind maintenance, fuel and documented cost reimbursements are not an unauthorized tax (training is closest to the line); withholding further development approvals is defensible as an Agreement remedy, but not building permits on code-compliant plans; whether a liquidated amount may measure residents' loss is unsettled | Mostly no (tax; building permits); Mostly yes (other approvals, as an Agreement remedy); Open (the same under Standards Sec. 18(d) alone; certificates of occupancy not researched); Open, leaning no (liquidated amounts as drafted); Open (with the Release 2026.4 sole-recovery sentence) | Made | Counsel 17.1 (narrowed) | | 18 | Records the Developer files | Security and firesafety plans held by a County office are confidential and exempt; trade secrets are confidential and exempt under s. 119.0715, now permanent; ss. 366.093 and 425.045 do not reach a County record; both liability exclusions are enforceable against the Developer; take the utility contract redacted as the rule | Mostly yes; Settled (trade secret exemption; ss. 366.093 and 425.045); Open, leaning yes (layout drawings); Open (technology security); Mostly no (s. 288.075); Open (the County's live sound data during a dashboard delay) | Made | Counsel 18.1 to 18.5 | | 19 | Leased equipment and utility service | M2's lease form is likely not utility service under the Commission's fixed-payment lease orders; whether PW Ventures survives de novo review is open but not decisive; nominal non-ad valorem rent raises no debt issue | Mostly no; PW Ventures: Open; who holds the air permit for a leased engine: Open, leaning yes that it is part of the County's facility (confirm) | Made | Agency 19.1, 19.2 | | 20 | The measured impact behind emergency power | Which impact supports M2 is for the Technical Study; a county may use its own method; Chapter 2026-65 leaves little room for a grid-reliability nexus | Not a legal research question (study); Mostly yes (own method); Open, leaning yes (no grid nexus) | Made | The study | | 21 | Rent in kind and fair value | Section 125.35(1)(a) sets no cash or fair value floor, and without a pledge of credit a public purpose finding suffices; the weak point is "control retained" over a nonprofit Recipient | Mostly yes; Open, leaning yes (nonprofit Recipient) | Made | Counsel 21.1 | | 22 | Section 70.45 and lease terms | Rent bargained in a competitive award for a County leasehold is the price of an estate, not a condition on a property owner's use; a tenant owning the improvements may be an owner only for later regulatory conditions | Open, leaning no | Made (optional) | Counsel 22.1 | | 23 | Airport land and the County's right to cure | Rent in kind on grant-obligated airport land is diverted airport revenue; the County is already a CERCLA and Chapter 403 "owner," and doing the cure work can add operator status; s. 768.28 covers torts only | Mostly yes | Made | Counsel 23.1 to 23.3; Agency 23.1 | | 24 | Support letters from a charity, and the Community Payment | A letter on a commission vote on an ordinance or resolution is lobbying (small and permitted); not one to a planning or zoning board; under the account form the payment is the organization's restricted receipt in an exchange, not a gift | Mostly yes (lobbying); Open, leaning no (private benefit, unrelated income) | Made | Counsel 24.1, 24.2 | | 25 | A community foundation fund | Not a donor-advised fund; fixed purposes and a notice term fit the variance power; the payments are not gifts and are likely business expenses less any s. 162(e) share | Mostly no (donor-advised fund); Mostly yes (variance power; not contributions) | Not made; on request | Nothing for the instruments | | 26 | Binding later owners | A buyer, foreclosure purchaser or ground lessee that does not assume is bound only if the covenants run; in-kind delivery from site equipment may run, money and cloud-form duties likely do not; a senior mortgage's foreclosure likely cuts the CBA off | Open, leaning no | Made | Counsel 26.1, 26.2 | | 27 | No credit against public charges | The covenant binds the Developer, including against a later statutory credit unless that statute voids contrary agreements; no s. 163.31801(5)(a) credit arises for CBA benefits; the pay-over leans not a penalty, and is safer as a price term | Mostly yes (covenant); Open, leaning no (penalty) | Made | Nothing now | | 28 | The Instruction Share | No tax harm, no joint employment, public hosts may accept it, and it does not reduce Pell (including Workforce Pell), WIOA or Open Door aid | Mostly no (risk) | Made | Agency 28.1 | | 29 | A public college, university or school board as host | A college or university board may accept and operate the allocation by board action and charge its rate by contract, and a school board is its district's contracting agent; s. 287.138 applies but Chapter 287 purchasing rules do not; a state university may not indemnify a cloud provider | Mostly yes; Mostly no (university indemnity) | Made | Counsel 29.1, 29.2 | | 30 | Public records and resident data | A nonprofit host or operator is mostly not "acting on behalf of" the County; users' own data is mostly not a public record; retention schedules govern only records that exist; comparisons at a public host are open when made; s. 257.261 mostly does not reach sessions; s. 119.0701 probably does not reach the tenant | Mostly no (comparisons: Mostly yes; s. 119.0701: Open, leaning no) | Made | Counsel 30.1 | | 31 | Penalty rule, security and the Custodian | Conversion Payments are price or alternative performance, and default conversions at Replacement Cost pass the 1991 penalty test (Question 17); a full draw held as returnable security is outside the penalty rule; a pay-on-certificate bond for money duties is financial guaranty insurance; holding funds "in trust" needs trust powers; Custodian-held money is probably not public money | Mostly yes; Mostly no (bond; s. 660.41); Open, leaning no (public money) | Made | Counsel 31.1; Agency 31.1 | | 32 | Bankruptcy | The receivership trigger is an unenforceable ipso facto term after a filing; in-kind deliveries and Conversion Payments are probably "rent reserved"; compelled delivery in kind is unlikely; draws are probably credited against the cap; the new-lease covenant survives rejection; an FDIC receiver may repudiate a letter of credit; letter of credit draws are not stayed or preferential, but debtor-funded collateral is exposed, and a notice of default before a draw may itself be stayed | Mostly yes; Open (several points); Mostly no (issuer receivership) | Made | Counsel 32.1 to 32.4 | | 33 | Third-party beneficiaries and neutral decisions | Designated institutions are intended beneficiaries, including one known only by qualifications, with two drafting gaps; the disclaimer bars residents' and grantees' contract claims; document-only qualification decisions should be framed as arbitration | Mostly yes; Open, leaning arbitration (neutral decisions) | Made | Counsel 33.1, 33.2 | | 34 | Export controls | Receiving capacity does not make the Recipient an exporter, but knowledge-based support rules and strict-liability OFAC rules bind it; the lists are a policy above a legal floor; the screen is enough for the EAR but short of OFAC practice as drafted | Mostly no (duty from receipt); Open, leaning no (screen sufficient); Not a legal research question (lists) | Made | Counsel 34.1 | | 35 | Sales tax, the exemption, and "advanced service" | No tax on a gift or County purchase; recapture unlikely for retired equipment; recipient-owned hardware under 1 MW on site likely breaks the per-tenant rule; 100 MW is measured per contiguous data center; fee-based County capacity is an "advanced service"; a school board host is a governmental entity under s. 350.81, a state college most likely is, and a state university is not | Mixed; tenant rule not met: Open, leaning yes; "other consideration": Open, leaning no | Made | Counsel 35.2; Agency 35.1 to 35.4 | | 36 | Communications providers | County-paid conduit with a trench share avoids s. 337.401(3)(f); Agreement terms and cash lease rent are safe; a fiber Substitute Benefit from a dealer tenant to a public body is the risk | Mostly yes; fiber benefit an imposition: Open, leaning yes | Made | Counsel 36.1 | | 37 | Tax status of a Trust | A Trust funded mostly by one Developer leans private foundation; then paid dealings with the Developer are self-dealing; donated use of capacity is excluded from support; a college supporting organization fits poorly | Settled (rules); Mostly yes (self-dealing); result is a county fact | Moved | With the Trust documents | | 38 | Elections, amendments and member votes | An electronic ballot is not "mail"; s. 617.1002 is settled on its text; bylaw-conferred votes bind for dissolution, merger and secured borrowing but doubtfully for unsecured debt; "entitled to vote" means on the disposition; Bylaws 5.7 leaves a removal gap | Mostly no (e-ballot); Settled (s. 617.1002); Mostly yes / Open (others) | Moved | With the Trust documents | | 39 | The Oversight Panel, court-approved amendments, and enforcement | The articles may condition board action on Panel approval; Panel members' duties are unsettled; no freestanding court power to authorize a bylaw amendment; statutory enforcement routes exist with no County role | Mostly yes (approvals; enforcement); Open (duties); Open, leaning no (court power) | Moved | With the Trust documents | | 40 | Technical assistance advisements | Yes; each may request one on its own transactions, binding the Department only as to the requester and that transaction | Settled | Note added | Agency 35.1 to 35.4 | | 41 | Commitments and exchanges at cost | Unrelated business income for at-cost commitments to small businesses, with little tax; arguable for at-cost commitments and exchanges with exempt and governmental users | Mostly yes (small businesses); Open, leaning yes (exempt and governmental users) | Moved in part; Made | Counsel 41.1 | | 42 | The directed payment and public support | Yes under the account form: Developer payments count in full in total support but only up to 2 percent as public support; the Community Fund form avoids it | Mostly yes | Made | Counsel 42.1 | | 43 | Section 617.2104 and custodian accounts | Not while the Custodian holds an account as trustee for whichever Recipient is entitled; "donor" is undefined, likely the Developer, and of little effect | Mostly no; Open ("donor") | Made | Counsel 43.1 | | 44 | Holding a disputed amount | Yes; no rule requires a contractual stakeholder to use the court registry | Mostly yes | Made | Nothing | | 45 | Successor community organization; enforcement-only holder | A successor named in advance, or an enforcement-only institution, can hold the rights; the notice should be a present assignment, and mergers should be covered | Mostly yes | Made | Nothing for counsel | | 46 | The cloud form | Delivery is contract performance, not a gift; computing, storage and metered transfer are information services outside Chapter 202; the host can enforce the minimum cloud terms if both signers name it and the provider's no-beneficiary clause is displaced | Mostly yes; Mostly no (Chapter 202) | Made | Nothing for counsel | | 47 | The "advanced service" cross-reference | Still brings in "information service"; the pin cite has been stale since 2010 (now 47 U.S.C. 153(24)), but Florida reads the reference as of enactment | Mostly yes | Note added | Nothing | | 48 | A County Share credited against airport rent | Barred: a credit lowers cash rent for airport land while general government takes the computing, a prohibited subsidy; even uncredited, the County Share is airport revenue | Mostly yes | Made (same bar as Question 23) | FAA only for an airport-only use | | 49 | Cleanup claims and the cap | No Eleventh Circuit or Florida bankruptcy decision was found; the cap reaches only damages "resulting from the termination of a lease," so El Toro's reasoning should prevail | Open, leaning yes | Made | Counsel 49.1 | | 50 | Local lobbyist registration | Depends on each county's ordinance; turns on whether the writer is paid, retained or designated by a principal; risk highest in Miami-Dade, then Palm Beach, then Orange | Not a legal research question (county ordinance) | Made | County ethics body | | 51 | Weight of the Commission's declaratory statements | No deference; persuasive only by their reasoning; binding on the Commission only on the petitioner's facts | Settled | None | Nothing | | 52 | Well owner claims, withdrawal conditions and s. 373.217 | Part II "preempts the regulation of the consumptive use of water"; a County cut in a withdrawal rate, the Sec. 8(g) passby floor and a Sec. 18(c) curtailment of a withdrawal are that regulation, and s. 373.262(2) does not reach the rate or timing of a withdrawal; the claims process covers an impact district permit conditions already cover, and its burden shift, which no district rule read has, is the weakest part; the reuse statutes support the reclaimed water rule of Sec. 7(a)(2) for every Covered Facility, and s. 373.262(2) supports Sec. 7(a)(1) for groundwater a large-scale data center itself applies to withdraw | Settled (no County permit); Mostly no (rate, passby floor, curtailment; s. 373.262(2) and rate or timing); Open, leaning no (claims process and burden); Mostly yes (Sec. 7(a)(2); Sec. 7(a)(1) for a large-scale data center's own withdrawal; a private promise on cooling water); Open, leaning no (Sec. 7(a)(1) for groundwater a third party withdraws and for facilities outside s. 373.203(4); denial for subsidence risk); Open, leaning yes (reclaimed water in place of permitted groundwater under a reuse program); Open (the optional limit on potable water for evaporative cooling) | Made | Counsel 52.1, 52.2 (both narrowed) | | 53 | The automation transition term | Notice, a first right to new roles, paid retraining, a monitoring notice and human review are lawful private terms; severance by formula over the whole term may be an ERISA plan | Mostly yes; severance open | Made (Clause Bank 7.7(a) drafted; severance bracketed) | Counsel 53.1, 53.2 | | 54 | Complaints that give no name | The bar reaches a county's code enforcement officers and code inspectors, employees or agents, not the operator: an officer, or an inspector the county designates under s. 125.69(4), may not start an investigation, and an inspector may not start enforcement proceedings, by way of a complaint without the complainant's name and address, except on reason to believe in an imminent threat; inspections no anonymous complaint prompted, and what County staff observe for themselves, are unaffected; whether monitoring of an agreement whose terms include the Standards, prompted by an anonymous report, is itself barred or can lead to code enforcement or to the agreement's own remedies is open | Settled (operator); Open, leaning yes (forwarded complaints); Open (monitoring) | Made (Standards Sec. 17(e); Agreement Section 6.3(c)) | Counsel 54.1 | | 55 | The net zero law (s. 377.8161) | No provision sets or supports a net zero policy, or sets a greenhouse gas charge, cap or fuel preference; an engine fuel capability clause in Exhibit "S" requires no fuel; efficiency rules and pollution control are preserved; the County may not require a net zero policy of anyone, by contract or otherwise | Mostly no | Made (Exhibit "S" S-10.6(a) reserved) | Nothing for counsel | | 56 | Homes that come after a facility | The County may measure setbacks, the facade rule, the berm and the battery and fuel separations from what exists when each site plan is approved while the limits protect every home; it may likely ask applicants for homes inside a Sound Contour for a layout that addresses the facility's sound, if the rule is among its multifamily rules in every district; whether it may require sound-rated construction is unsettled | Mixed: Mostly yes (a); Open, leaning yes (b); Open (c) | Made (Standards Secs. 2, 3(d), 5(h), 9(c) and (e), 15(g), 19(b) and (c); Technical Manual Sec. B-9.4(d); Exhibit "S," Sections S-9.1 and S-9.3(b); Agreement Sections 1.1, 3.8(c), (d)) | Counsel 56.1, 56.2 | | 57 | Battery energy storage and the uniform firesafety standards | Energy storage systems must meet the State Fire Marshal's uniform firesafety standards, which apply NFPA 855 and the Florida Fire Prevention Code, and a county may not require more stringent ones; flood, karst, decommissioning and information rules are not firesafety standards, and a setback is safest on a compatibility record; a covenant of a development agreement is probably barred too, a lease term is unsettled, and a local authority may authorize, but probably not impose, an alternative | Mixed: Settled (ordinance); Mostly yes (rules not about fire); Open (setbacks); Open, leaning yes (agreement); Open (lease); Mostly no (imposed alternative) | Made (Technical Manual Sec. B-12.1; Standards Sec. 1(e)(2) and (j); Exhibit "S," Sections S-12.1, S-12.2(c) and S-24.1(c); Agreement Section 10.24(a); Lease Section 15.17) | Counsel 57.1, 57.2 | | 58 | Foreign entity screens | Since 1 July 2026 s. 288.860(2)(a) bars the County itself from "any agreement" with a foreign country of concern or an entity it controls, words that on their face reach a ground lease and a development agreement; control acquired after signing and the meaning of "controlled by" are unsettled; Part III of chapter 692 reaches the improvements a tenant owns, probably not the leasehold as such; s. 366.043(7) binds only a public utility, and the large load customer at a site of 50 megawatts or more includes each entity that has entered into a colocation or similar agreement there | Mixed: Settled (whom ss. 288.860(2)(a) and 366.043(7) bind); Open, leaning yes ("any agreement"); Open (control acquired later; "controlled by"; the whole site); Mostly yes (a tenant's improvements; leased cabinets); Open, leaning no (the leasehold; committed capacity) | Made (Lease Section 10.4; Agreement Sections 5.5 and 10.17(a); Module paragraph T-17(f)) | Counsel 58.1 to 58.7 | --- ## Part 1. Answers ### A. Questions that reach every instrument **1. County acts that would draw the County in.** *Answer.* **Mostly no** for each act alone; the county's own record decides. Section 70.45 reaches only an exaction "imposed or required in writing ... as a final condition of approval" (s. 70.45(7)), so none of the listed acts is a s. 70.45 exaction unless it ends in a written condition. Federal law is broader: under *Koontz*, a demand "must satisfy the requirements of Nollan and Dolan even when the government denies the permit and even when its demand is for money." The listed acts are evidence of such a demand. Holding or slowing a hearing until a CBA is signed is the clearest case, since it works as a denial until the applicant complies; a staff referral or a staff report mention shows the County took the agreement into account; a disclosure requirement signals that the answer matters; and one commissioner's statement becomes the County's condition only if the decision rests on it. **Mostly no**, a payment under the CBA is not consideration for an approval: the County is not a party and receives nothing, and ss. 838.015 and 838.016 reach only a benefit given to, or solicited by, a public servant. *Instruments.* Standards Sec. 16(a), (b) and Fee Ordinance Sec. 1.4 bar the County from considering, requiring or timing anything on such an instrument; Agreement Sections 10.2, 10.3(a); Kit Part A Sections 12(a), 13; CBA Sections 2.1, 2.2, 2.4, 14.4. Release 2026.4 writes the Drafter's Notes caution into Standards Sec. 16(b), so that no County officer or employee acting as such refers any person to the applicant, or the applicant to any person, for such an instrument to which the County is not a party, attends or facilitates its negotiation, reviews its drafts, or describes it in a staff report, agenda item or application form, except to record its receipt, filing, disclosure or disposition without stating its terms; the staff report certification in Kit Part A Section 12(a) now covers those acts. Release 2026.4 also adds Sec. 16(e): where a County development agreement provides a written denial of an application for the development as the remedy for an uncured default in an obligation that mitigates an impact, subsection (b) does not bar consideration of that default in deciding whether to make the denial or in the denial, subsection (c) does not apply to that consideration, and both otherwise apply (Question 17). *Left open.* Counsel 1.1. Whether a given record crosses the line is the county's own fact. **2. Copies, disclosures and rehearing.** *Answers.* (a) **Mostly yes**: the County may file a delivered copy, and filing is not "considering" it. Where a county has adopted the s. 286.0115 procedure, a written communication about pending quasi-judicial action "shall be made a part of the record before final action" (s. 286.0115(1)(c)2.); where it has not, the Third District's 1991 decision on ex parte contacts, 589 So. 2d 1337 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991), presumes an ex parte contact prejudicial unless the party defending the decision proves it was not, and one factor the court weighs is "whether the contents of the communications were unknown to opposing parties, who therefore had no opportunity to respond." Disclosure on the record before the vote is the practical cure in both cases, though under the 1991 decision it helps rebut the presumption rather than remove it. A county that adopts the alternative procedure of s. 286.0115(2) needs no disclosure, since "such nondisclosure shall not be presumed prejudicial to the decision of the decisionmaking body" (s. 286.0115(2)(c)). Sec. 16(b) bars considering and taking into account, not receiving or filing. (b) **Mostly yes**: a support letter's disclosure of an interest is not consideration of the agreement, and the last sentence of Sec. 16(d) works as written, with two gaps: "person" in s. 1.01(3) names no public body, and the cure fails once a decision-maker relies on the agreement's terms. (c) **Mostly yes**, if the code authorizes the request and it is timely. Under Fla. R. App. P. 9.020(h)(1), a "motion for rehearing," "if authorized and timely filed," tolls rendition, and under rule 9.020(h)(2)(A) the final order is then not rendered "as to any existing party" until the last such motion is withdrawn or disposed of by a rendered order (**Settled** on the rule's text). Authority can come from the tribunal's own rules: the First District applied the tolling provision "where the agency involved is authorized by rule or statute to entertain motions for rehearing" (*Department of Corrections v. Career Service Commission*, 429 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)), and the rule's committee note says that where an administrative agency's rules of practice give such a motion a different label, "the substance of the motion controls." A request limited to one ground is therefore a motion for rehearing in substance (**Mostly yes**). A timely request the ordinance authorizes is also "authorized" (**Mostly yes**): the Fifth District has held that "A motion can suspend rendition of an order only if the motion is authorized under the rules governing the proceeding in which the order was entered" (*City of Palm Bay v. Palm Bay Greens, LLC*, 969 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007)), and it denied tolling there because the owner conceded that "there is no specific rule or statutory authority for the rehearing or reconsideration of a local administrative agency decision" and the board's inherent authority to reconsider "does not transform a motion for rehearing into the kind of motion that suspends rendition." The decision also says that "A motion for rehearing does not suspend rendition of an administrative order because rehearing is not authorized in administrative proceedings." In context the sentence describes proceedings in which no rule provides for rehearing, and the decision approved a circuit decision that looked for a "statute, rule or code provision." No decision was found applying the test to a motion a county or city code authorizes. The bracket in Sec. 16(c) cannot postpone rendition by its own force, and a rehearing on the Board's own motion likely does not toll, since rule 9.020(h)(1) speaks of motions "filed" and a tribunal's inherent authority to reconsider an order does not make a motion "the kind of motion that suspends rendition" (969 So. 2d 1187). No decision was found on a rehearing the tribunal begins on its own motion. An order is rendered "when a signed, written order is filed with the clerk of the lower tribunal" (rule 9.020(h)), and a local rule can fix that filing event: the First District gave effect to a City of Jacksonville rule making the date a quasi-judicial ordinance is mailed to the applicant and affected parties its date of rendition, reading the rule as "another way of saying that the date of certified mailing serves the purpose of a 'filing' date and thereby sets finality and rendition on that date" (First District, 2018, 264 So. 3d 210, 213 to 214). Rendition then needs only that the signed, written order "be filed in some way with a designated person who performs a clerk-like function" (id. at 213). *Instruments.* Standards Sec. 16(c), (d) and Fee Ordinance Sec. 1.4; CBA Sections 3.4(b), 3.6 (letters go to the record, not to individual commissioners) and Exhibit E; Kit Part A Sections 9, 12. Release 2026.4 adds to Sec. 16(d) that receipt, filing, retention or publication of a copy of such an agreement, as chapter 119 or s. 286.0115 requires, is not consideration of it; reads "a person or public body" in its last sentence and excepts from that sentence's proviso the reliance on an agreement's terms that Sec. 16(e) allows; and replaces the rendition bracket in Sec. 16(c) and Fee Ordinance Sec. 1.4 with sentences making a timely request a motion for rehearing the ordinance authorizes, and stating that a rehearing on the Board's own motion does not postpone rendition. Those sentences also require each request to identify the statement, document or other evidence, in the record or in a public record, showing the consideration, and have the Board deny without rehearing a request that identifies none. The CBA disclosure stays. Release 2026.4 also has the Board decide each request under Sec. 16(c) and Fee Ordinance Sec. 1.4 by a signed, written order filed with the Clerk of the Board, since rendition runs from that filing, and states that a timely request is a motion for rehearing the ordinance authorizes whether or not it identifies evidence. *Left open.* Counsel 2.1, narrowed to two kinds of request: one the ordinance requires the Board to deny without rehearing because it identifies no evidence, and one by a person entitled to participate as a party who did not appear. Whether the ordinance's authorization makes a timely request "authorized" no longer goes to counsel, since the Fifth District's 2007 decision ties authorization to "the rules governing the proceeding in which the order was entered." **3. Adoption timing.** *Answers.* (a) **Settled** on the statute's text, with county coverage from FEMA's data: every county is covered. The three declarations Section 28 names together list all 67 counties (OpenFEMA, read 25 October 2026, lists 61 for Debby, DR-4806; 47 for Helene, DR-4828; and 51 for Milton, DR-4834, which also lists the Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida), so Section 28 bars every county from proposing or adopting a more restrictive or burdensome land development regulation or procedure before 1 October 2027. No 2026 act changed it: SB 840 passed the Senate 38 to 0 and died in a House subcommittee on 13 March 2026, HB 1465 died in the same subcommittee that day, and a Senate floor amendment that would have carried SB 840's text into HB 399 (Chapter 2026-7) was withdrawn the same day. No order enjoining the law, and no final judgment or appeal, was found in the consolidated challenge to it in Leon County circuit court; the docket was not read, so the court's rulings are not described here (confirm on the docket). (b) **Mostly yes**: the Fee Ordinance is reached, and a covered county may not even propose it. Section 163.3202(3) lists "impact fees" among land development regulations, and s. 163.3164(28) (numbered (27) until 1 January 2027) reaches "any other regulations controlling the development of land." On 7 August 2026 the Flagler County circuit court granted summary judgment for a home builders association on its claim that the City of Palm Coast's impact fee ordinances violate Chapter 2025-190, as the City's statement of that day reports ("City of Palm Coast Reviewing Next Steps Following Impact Fee Court Ruling"; Flagler County No. 2025 CA 000621). The written order, with the reasons the court stated, was not found (confirm). The City's statement adds, "The case remains ongoing." The City has appealed (Fifth District No. 5D2026-2585, notice filed 27 August 2026); the appeal is open, and no brief had been filed by 25 October 2026. A trial court ruling binds no other court. The Standards are reached the same way. (c) **Open, leaning no** for Agreement terms, and **Mostly no** for a lease of County land: neither is an ordinance regulating development or a County "procedure," and a lease is a disposition under s. 125.35. Because "rezoning" is in the definition, though, an ordinance approving an Agreement whose covenants apply unadopted Standards (Agreement Section 3.6(a)) carries risk (Open, leaning not barred where the owner initiates). Approval by resolution sits further from the definition, which begins "ordinances enacted by governing bodies" (s. 163.3164(28), numbered (27) until 1 January 2027); the Development Agreement Act requires two public hearings (s. 163.3225(1)) but, in the sections read, not an ordinance. Section 28(2) then saves the approval only where "The associated application is initiated by a private party other than the county or municipality" and "The property that is the subject of the application is owned by the initiating private party." A contract purchaser applying alone probably does not meet the second test (**Mostly no**): Section 28(2)(b) asks for ownership, while the Development Agreement Act, under which the agreement is made, distinguishes "a legal or equitable interest" (s. 163.3223); where the holder of legal title joins the application as a co-applicant, both tests are probably met (**Mostly yes**; no decision was found). A tenant on County land can never meet the test. Section 28(2) names plan amendments, land development regulation amendments, site plans, development permits and development orders but not procedures, so a covenant that adds a review step to later approvals is not clearly saved. (d) **Mostly no**: s. 163.326(2), created by Chapter 2026-65, preserves powers "granted by law" and lifts neither bar. (e) **Open, leaning yes**: an emergency declaration counts under s. 252.422(1). It is "a declaration by the President that an emergency exists" (42 U.S.C. 5191(a)), and FEMA's dataset of "all federally declared disasters" includes "all three disaster declaration types: major disaster, emergency, and fire management assistance." Section 252.34(2), which governs Part I of chapter 252 and so s. 252.422, defines a disaster by reference to "a declaration of a state of emergency by a county, the Governor, or the President of the United States," and federal tax rules read the like phrase "federally declared disaster" to include "an emergency declared under section 501 of the Stafford Act" (26 C.F.R. 1.165-11(b)(1)). Against that, Section 28 of the same act uses "the Federal Disaster Declaration" with DR numbers for the three major disaster declarations, as s. 215.5588(2) does for "the Federal Disaster Declaration (FEMA-1609-DR)." In 2026 the Senate passed SB 840, which kept the present words and added "and which was listed in a federal major disaster declaration pursuant to the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act"; it died in the House. A later bill that failed is weak evidence, but adding those words assumes the present words are broader. No decision, Attorney General opinion or Division of Emergency Management guidance was found. (f) **Isaias.** The National Hurricane Center records that Hurricane Isaias "made landfall near Destin, Florida" with maximum sustained winds of 105 mph. FEMA first issued an emergency declaration, EM-3655-FL (requested 8 October and approved 9 October 2026, the day of landfall; Public Assistance only; 27 counties from Escambia east to Baker, Columbia, Citrus and Levy; incident period 6 to 12 October 2026), which it labels a tropical storm incident (OpenFEMA data, read 25 October 2026 and last refreshed 20 October 2026). FEMA's press release of 9 October 2026 lists the same 27 counties, attributes the emergency to "Hurricane Isaias" from 6 October 2026, and limits emergency protective measures to direct federal assistance at 75 percent federal funding. On Florida's request of 15 October 2026, a major disaster declaration followed on 27 October 2026, DR-4955-FL, with Public Assistance in 15 counties (Bay, Calhoun, Escambia, Franklin, Gadsden, Gulf, Holmes, Jackson, Jefferson, Liberty, Okaloosa, Santa Rosa, Wakulla, Walton and Washington) and Individual Assistance in 8 of them (OpenFEMA data, read 5 November 2026). A county it lists that is "located entirely or partially within 100 miles of the track" is covered whatever the answer to (e). By an unofficial measurement from the positions in the National Hurricane Center's advisories, 13 of those counties lie at least partly within 100 miles of the track while Isaias was a hurricane, Wakulla is at the edge and Jefferson is outside; of the counties listed only in the emergency declaration, only Leon comes near, also at the edge (confirm each with the Center's Tropical Cyclone Report and best track, not yet published). For Isaias, then, (e) matters at most for Leon County. Section 252.422 turns on the National Hurricane Center's classification, so the open point is only (e). The bar in impacted counties runs to about 9 October 2027, about eight days past the Section 28 bar that every county already carries until 1 October 2027; which counties lie at least partly within 100 miles of the track while the storm was a hurricane is a county fact. *Instruments.* Kit Part E requires the County Attorney's written determination before any notice, and bracketed Standards Recital 7 records only the Board's determination that Section 28 and s. 252.422 do not prohibit adoption on the date of adoption; Agreement Recital A, Sections 2.1, 3.6(a); Lease Exhibit "O". Release 2026.4 states in Kit Part E and the Drafter's Notes that every county is covered, so no notice of either ordinance is given before 1 October 2027 unless the County Attorney determines in writing that it is not more restrictive or burdensome, and that s. 252.422 is then checked for each hurricane landfall in the past year, measuring the 100 miles from the track while the storm was a hurricane and treating an emergency declaration as counting; adds a bracketed timing recital to the Fee Ordinance and corrects Standards Recital 7, so that each covers proposing as well as adopting and records the County Attorney's written determination made before notice was first given; and, where Section 28 or s. 252.422 applies, has the holder of legal title join the application for the Agreement, each application for an Approval and each later application for the Project. Release 2026.4 applies the same timing to the model plan policy in Kit Part G, because Section 28(1) reaches "amendments to its comprehensive plan or land development regulations" alike (Question 52). *Left open.* Counsel 3.1, and 3.2, narrowed to covenants that work as procedures and to approval by resolution. The Leon County docket and the Flagler County written order were not read. Before the questions go out, check the National Hurricane Center's Tropical Cyclone Report and best track for Isaias (not yet published) and whether the Fifth District has decided the Palm Coast appeal (No. 5D2026-2585). **55. The net zero law.** *Answer.* **Mostly no**: no provision of these documents is a policy "to support a net zero policy." Chapter 2026-45, Laws of Florida, in force from 1 July 2026, created the section codified as s. 377.8161, Florida Statutes; the act numbered it s. 377.816, the number Hernando County Ordinance No. 2026-15, a 2026 moratorium on data centers, cites. A "net zero policy" is "any policy, program, or initiative designed to achieve a balance between total amount of greenhouse gas emitted into the atmosphere with an equal amount removed from the atmosphere" (s. 377.8161(2)(e)). A governmental entity, a county included, "may not enact or enforce, or require any person or legal entity to enact or enforce, a resolution, ordinance, rule, code, or policy to support a net zero policy, including as a condition of any contract or agreement between the governmental entity and a third party" (s. 377.8161(3)). The section binds governmental entities, not private parties. Read against it: (a) No provision sets a greenhouse gas target, an offset, a carbon charge or a fuel preference, and none sets up a greenhouse gas cap or an emission trading program (subsection (6)). The generator rules require no particular fuel or generating technology and restrict no fuel source (s. 366.032). Sec. 10 of the Standards governs only when non-emergency operation may occur and leaves the number of hours to the state or federal air permit and federal emission rules (Sec. 10(e)); Exhibit "S," Section S-10.3(b)(1), also limits routine maintenance and testing to a yearly number of hours set from the County's findings on the project's impacts (the Impact Findings). (b) The act also limits the county powers over comprehensive plans and over zoning and business regulations (s. 125.01(1)(g) and (h)), on which the Standards rest in part, and over taxes and assessments (s. 125.01(1)(r)), and makes like changes for cities (ss. 166.021(2) and 166.201). (c) Subsection (3) reaches the Agreement and a County ground lease alike, since each is a contract between the County and a third party. The impact fees and mitigation payments rest on the County's study of a measured impact, and the Lease's Base Rent on fair market rental value, with any rent in kind on top of it; no fee, payment or rent is set to advance a net zero policy, so none is a charge subsection (5)(a) bars. Each year a county attests to compliance with that bar in an affidavit to the Department of Revenue (subsection (5)(b)). (d) No instrument has the County buy anything with a preference for advancing a net zero policy or based on the type or source of fuel (subsection (4)(a) and (b)). (e) The Standards' energy rules are efficiency rules. Release 2026.3 requires the facility to meet the ASHRAE 90.4 Mechanical Load Component on a design and an annualized basis (Sec. 7(a)(4)); Release 2026.4, for reasons outside this question, replaces that requirement with reporting of that figure and of the facility's energy use (Sec. 7(d); Technical Manual Sec. B-7.5). Either serves the state energy policy of discouraging energy waste (s. 377.601(3)(a)), and the restrictions of the section do not prevent a governmental entity "from otherwise exercising its authority as provided by general law, including by implementing energy policies consistent with the energy policies set forth in s. 377.601" or local and regional air and water pollution control programs consistent with s. 403.021 (s. 377.8161(7)(c)). (f) The County is not a party to the private community benefits agreement and may not require one. A public institution that hosts the computing allocation or receives the Instruction Share, such as a state university, a Florida College System institution or a district school board, is a governmental entity (s. 377.8161(2)(b) and s. 215.985(2)(c); confirm), but none of its duties sets or supports a net zero policy. (g) Subsection (8) applies the section to "any proposed action by a governmental entity on or after July 1, 2026, that is not otherwise permissible by general law," words no court is known to have read (confirm). The act itself names no penalty or other means of enforcement beyond the yearly affidavit of compliance with subsection (5), which an authorized official signs under penalty of perjury (subsection (5)(b)). No court decision applying the section was found in a search through 31 October 2026 (confirm). *Instruments.* Every instrument; in particular Standards Secs. 1(e)(2), 7(a)(4) (Release 2026.3), 7(d), 10(e) and 16(a), (b); Technical Manual Sec. B-7.5; Exhibit "S," Sections S-10.1(d), S-10.3(b), S-10.4 and S-10.6; Fee Ordinance Secs. 2.1, 3.1 and 5.2; Agreement Sections 4.1, 4.2, 4.3(a), 4.6 and 4.7; Lease Sections 4.1 and 4.7; M2.1(a) and (c); CBA Sections 2.1 and 2.2; Module Section 1.11(a); Options Section 3.6(b). Release 2026.4 reserves Exhibit "S," Section S-10.6(a), which required each liquid-fueled emergency engine to be approved by its manufacturer for operation on paraffinic renewable diesel and stated that it neither required nor prohibited any fuel; the generator rules are fuel-neutral throughout. *Left open.* Nothing for counsel. Before release, search again for decisions applying the section, and confirm that the codified text of s. 377.8161 reads as section 1 of the act quoted here, that ss. 215.985(2)(c) and 377.601(3)(a) read in the 2026 text as cited, and that the codified texts of ss. 125.01(1)(g), (h) and (r), 166.021(2) and 166.201 cite s. 377.8161. **58. Foreign entity screens.** *Answers.* (a) **Settled** that s. 288.860(2)(a) binds the County, and not a tenant or a developer: "A state agency, political subdivision, or public school authorized to expend state-appropriated funds or levy ad valorem taxes may not participate in any agreement with or accept any grant from a foreign country of concern or its subdivisions, or any entity controlled by a foreign country of concern." A political subdivision has the meaning s. 1.01(8) gives it (s. 288.860(1)(d)), which includes "counties," and a county levies ad valorem taxes. A "foreign country of concern" is any of the seven the section names, "including any agency of or any other entity under significant control of such foreign country of concern" (s. 288.860(1)(a)), in the words of s. 692.201(3). Subsection (2) took its present words on 1 July 2026 (Sections 8 and 16 of Chapter 2026-66); the 2025 text barred only an agreement that constrained the public entity's freedom of contract, let the country direct or control the curriculum or values of a program in the state, or promoted an agenda detrimental to the safety or security of the United States or its residents. Paragraph (2)(b) terminated the agreements then in force "as of July 1, 2026." **Open, leaning yes** that "any agreement" reaches a ground lease of county land and a development agreement: the words are plain, the 2026 act struck the qualifiers, and the section narrows "agreement" in subsection (3)(a) alone, "For the purposes of this subsection only"; but the section is headed "International cultural agreements," and paragraph (2)(b) names "sister city agreements." (b) **Open** what becomes of an agreement whose tenant or developer, or a successor, comes under the control of a foreign country of concern after signing: "participate" reads as a continuing bar, but paragraph (2)(b) terminated only the agreements then in force, and the section says nothing of control acquired later or of recorded covenants. (c) **Open** what "controlled by" and "under significant control of" mean: s. 288.860 defines neither. Section 366.043(2)(a) defines "Controlled by" as "having the power to direct or cause the direction of the management or policies of a company," and presumes control at 25 percent of the voting interests or profits, but only "As used in this section." (d) **Mostly yes** that Part III of chapter 692 reaches the buildings, fixtures and other improvements a tenant owns, which are "real property" (s. 692.201(6)), where the land is within its reach: a foreign principal may not own or acquire agricultural land or any interest in it (s. 692.202(1)), or any interest in real property "on or within 10 miles of any military installation or critical infrastructure facility in this state" (s. 692.203(1)), a term that includes "An airport as defined in s. 333.01" that employs measures "designed to exclude unauthorized persons" (s. 692.201(2), (2)(j)), and the People's Republic of China and the persons tied to it may not own or acquire any interest in real property anywhere in this state (s. 692.204(1)(a)); each of the three bars excepts "a de minimus indirect interest," and, among other exceptions, ss. 692.203(4) and 692.204(2) let a natural person with a qualifying visa or a grant of asylum buy one residential property of up to 2 acres that is not on or within 5 miles of a military installation. **Open, leaning no** that Part III reaches a ground leasehold as such: none of its sections mentions a lease, and each of the three bars requires its affidavit "At the time of purchase" of "a buyer"; but "any interest" is broad, and the Department of Commerce rule reported to exclude a lease from an interest in real property, r. 73C-60.001(10), F.A.C., implements s. 692.203 alone (its text could not be read: confirm). (e) **Settled** that s. 366.043(7) binds only a public utility: "A public utility may not knowingly provide electric service to a customer that would otherwise qualify as a large load customer if that customer is a foreign entity." A public utility has the meaning of s. 366.02, without gas utilities (s. 366.043(2)(e)), so it excludes a rural electric cooperative and "a municipality or any agency thereof" (s. 366.02(8)), and a site that either of them serves is outside the bar. Each public utility's large load tariff must also "include provisions reasonably designed to prevent" that service (s. 366.043(3)(b)), filed for Commission approval by 1 October 2026 (s. 366.043(8)), so an approved tariff may bind the customer (the tariffs were not read: confirm), and "A customer may not separate an electrical load at a single location into multiple smaller connections to avoid being classified as a large load customer" (s. 366.043(4)). A large load customer has "an anticipated monthly peak load of 50 megawatts or more" at a single location, and the term "includes all customers or other entities that have entered into a colocation or similar agreement at a single location" that meets that load (s. 366.043(2)(d)). A "foreign entity" is an entity "Owned or controlled by the government of a foreign country of concern," or an organization formed under the laws of, or having its principal place of business in, such a country, or a subsidiary of one (s. 366.043(2)(c)). **Open** whether, where an entity colocated at such a site is a foreign entity, the bar reaches the utility's service to the whole site or only that entity's load. (f) **Mostly yes**, on the words, that a public or nonprofit institution that leases cabinets, power and cooling at a data center to house its own hardware has "entered into a colocation or similar agreement"; **Open, leaning no** for an entity that holds committed computing capacity on hardware another entity houses there and houses no equipment of its own. *Instruments.* Lease Sections 10.1(e), 10.3, 10.4 and 14.1(d), and Exhibit "C," paragraph 1(e), which attaches Agreement Section 5.5; Agreement Sections 5.5 and 10.17(a); Module paragraph T-17(f); In-Kind Test 8.9. Release 2026.4 has the Tenant (Lease Section 10.4) and the Developer (Agreement Section 5.5) represent that it is not a foreign country of concern, a subdivision of one, or an entity a foreign country of concern controls, in the terms of s. 288.860(1)(a) and (2)(a): a statement of fact, which holds however counsel reads the reach of the bar. The Tenant confirms it by annual certificate, and for the Developer it is a continuing covenant. Section 10.4 now also reaches the buildings, fixtures and other improvements on the Premises; Section 5.5, with Section 10.17(a), makes any transfer of the Project, the Agreement or control of the Developer to such a person a default; and Section 5.5 keeps the s. 366.043(2)(c) test beside it, since each reaches entities the other does not. Release 2026.4 also adds Module paragraph T-17(f), which bars the Recipient from housing hardware at the Project Site while it is a foreign entity as s. 366.043(2) defines it, or committing or exchanging capacity there to one, and requires its certification and the same certification from each person to which it commits or exchanges capacity. *Left open.* Counsel 58.1 to 58.7. County facts: which provider serves the site, which decides whether s. 366.043(7) applies at all. Before release, confirm r. 73C-60.001, F.A.C., and read the large load tariffs filed under s. 366.043(8). ### B. Data Center Standards **4. Owners who sign nothing; ordinance challenges.** *Answers.* (a) **Settled**: an owner holding legal title who signs nothing keeps its s. 70.001 claim; the Agreement's waiver (Section 10.1) binds only the party that signs it. Since Chapter 2021-203, a law "is first applied upon enactment and notice ... if the impact of the law or regulation on the real property is clear and unequivocal in its terms," and the owner "is not required to formally pursue an application for a development order" (s. 70.001(11)). A tenant operator that holds no legal title has no claim: "property owner" means "the person who holds legal title to the real property" (s. 70.001(3)(f)); a ground tenant that owns the improvements may be an owner as to them (Question 22). The provisions most exposed to a claim on enactment are the setbacks (Sec. 5(a)), the minimum site area (Sec. 5(d)), the floodplain bar (Sec. 11(a)), the groundwater cooling bar (Sec. 7(a)(1)), and Secs. 13, 17 and 18 as applied to existing facilities. (b) **Mostly yes**: adopting the Standards expressly as a land development regulation under Part II of Chapter 163 very likely brings them within s. 57.112(6) ("local ordinances adopted pursuant to part II of chapter 163") and s. 125.675(5)(g)1. ("Ordinances enacted to implement ... Part II of chapter 163 ... including zoning, development orders, development agreements, and development permits"). No decision construing either phrase was found. A city raised s. 57.112(6) on appeal for a speech ordinance placed in its land development code, as the appellant's reply brief describes the city's answer brief. The Sixth District affirmed per curiam without opinion on 13 February 2024. The same day it denied the appellant's motion for attorneys' fees and costs. This body did not state reasons for this decision. On 26 March 2024 it denied rehearing, certification and a written opinion (No. 6D2023-2152, from Charlotte County circuit court No. 21001014CA). This body did not state reasons for this decision. An affirmance without opinion is not precedent and does not show which ground prevailed. A court will look at substance, and the operational rules are the most exposed: Sec. 17's reports, project page and complaint duties enforce the Standards, which a county must "enforce" (s. 163.3202(1)), but the disposal ban of Sec. 13(a) and the PFAS ban of Sec. 12(d) regulate conduct and products more than "any aspect of development" (s. 163.3164(28), numbered (27) until 1 January 2027). The legislative history read supports reading the s. 125.675(5)(g)1. exemption by class; for s. 57.112(6), the 2019 House final bill analysis could not be read (flsenate.gov posts a placeholder). Senate staff in 2024 described current law as exempting "the entirety of growth policy, county and municipal planning, and land development regulations under part II of ch. 163, F.S."; a committee substitute then dropped the bill's narrowing of ss. 125.675 and 166.0411, and Chapter 2024-145 narrowed only the parallel exemption from the business impact estimate (s. 125.66(3)(c)7.), which is why the Standards, a county-initiated land development regulation, need the estimate their adopting ordinance recites. The words of s. 57.112(6) have stood since Chapter 2019-151 created the section (as subsection (5) until Chapter 2023-309 renumbered it), and s. 125.675 is unchanged since Chapter 2023-309 created it. The fee exclusion cuts both ways, because s. 57.112(2) awards fees "to the prevailing party," and the stay reaches only an action filed "no later than 90 days after the adoption of the ordinance" (s. 125.675(1)(a)). Neither exemption reaches a claim under s. 70.001 or s. 70.45. *Instruments.* The adopting ordinance adopts Exhibit A "as a land development regulation under Part II of Chapter 163" (Section 2) and amends the use table (Section 3); Standards Secs. 1(d), 19 protect vested rights and nonconforming status. Release 2026.4 adds a finding to adopting ordinance Section 1 that Secs. 12(d), 13 and 17 regulate the use of land under a development order, and a Drafter's Note that the exemptions turn on substance. *Left open.* Counsel 4.1, narrowed to Secs. 12(d) and 13(a) and to whether a court classifies each challenged provision or the ordinance as a whole. **5. Application information under s. 125.022.** *Answers.* (a) **Mostly yes**: all three items are permissible minimum information. Section 125.022(2)(a) sets no content limit, and subsection (4) bars only requiring an applicant to "obtain a permit or approval from any state or federal agency." Utility letters come from providers, not agencies, and a refusal plus a sworn statement can replace them; the reclaimed water item identifies permits that already govern the recharge use, so none must be obtained first; and the no-priority showing concerns private service terms. (b) **Mostly no** under subsection (2): it has no deeming language, so an application omitting a listed item does not become complete by lapse of time, and a County that missed the 30-day notice may still treat the omitted item as a deficiency (**Mostly yes**). Since Chapter 2026-64 the contrast is on the face of the section: subsection (1)(c) deems a program application "complete by operation of law without conditions" when the County misses its notice, while subsection (2) runs its decision periods from when "the county has deemed the application complete" (s. 125.022(2)(b)2., 3.). A missed 30-day notice costs a refund of "Ten percent of the application fee" (s. 125.022(2)(d)1.), the consequence Chapter 2025-177 chose, and neither that act's staff analysis nor the 2019 act's describes any other. An applicant that believes a request for more information is not authorized may have the County "proceed to process the application for approval or denial" (s. 125.022(2)(c)5.), and a denial must cite "the applicable portions of an ordinance, rule, statute, or other legal authority" (s. 125.022(2)(e)), here the County's written list of minimum information (s. 125.022(2)(a)). No decision was found, and waiver and estoppel were not researched. (c) **Settled** as to the deeming rules for a program the County creates under the new subsection (1) (Chapter 2026-64, effective 1 July 2026), and adverse only where the County designates the site plan for administrative review; a program the County already had on 1 July 2026 is rated separately at the end of this answer. Subsection (1) covers only applications "for permits as defined in s. 163.3169," that is, authorizations for "any site plan or development plan approval, or any subdivision approval, as defined in this section" (s. 163.3169(1)(j)), filed through the program that counties of 75,000 or more must offer by 1 January 2027: "If the county fails to issue the written notification within 5 business days, the application is deemed complete by operation of law without conditions," and if the County takes no final action within 45 days after a complete application is submitted and then "fails to respond within 10 days" to the applicant's written notice, "the application is deemed approved by operation of law without conditions" (s. 125.022(1)(a), (c), (d)). This does not reach a special exception. It reaches a later site plan application that carries the acoustic update (Sec. 9(e)) or the battery fire test data and decommissioning plan (Technical Manual B-4.1, items 8 to 10, as published in Release 2026.3) only if the County has "expressly designated" that kind of site plan "for administrative review and approval by local government staff or a designated administrative official," and only if the plan "does not materially increase density, intensity, traffic, infrastructure demand, environmental impacts, or significant offsite impacts" (s. 163.3169(1)(q)); the designation is the County's choice. A deemed approval does not "relieve the applicant of the obligation to comply with all other applicable federal, state, and local laws, regulations, and ordinances" (s. 125.022(1)(d)2.), so the limits of Sec. 9(a) still bind, but the County "may not review again" the plans precertified under subsection (1)(b)2. (s. 125.022(1)(d)1.). A deemed approval probably does not displace a special exception as such (**Mostly no**): nothing in the act or the House final bill analysis speaks to conditions of an earlier, separate development order. A County whose own program already existed on 1 July 2026 is in a different position: subsection (1) "may not be construed to affect or require the modification of a county program that makes available the same or substantially similar development preapplication consulting services" if that program "exists on or before July 1, 2026" (s. 125.022(1)(a)). For such a County, the deeming rules probably do not reach an application filed through that program (**Mostly no**): the clause bars construing subsection (1), which contains them, "to affect" the program, and no decision construing it was found. Whether a County's program offers "the same or substantially similar" services turns on its terms, a question for each County rather than for legal research; the clause counts among such programs "a program that requires mandatory preapplication meetings for specified types of developments." *Instruments.* Standards Secs. 1(e)(3), 4(b), 4(d)(4), 9(e), 15(b)(3), 15(g); Technical Manual B-4.1, B-4.4(c), B-7.3(c), B-7.8; Kit Part A Section 3. Release 2026.4 states in Technical Manual B-4.1(a) that, in a county of 75,000 or more whose Sec. 15(g) designates later site plans for administrative review (Option B), the items it requires with a site plan application are also the minimum information under s. 125.022(1)(b)1. for a site plan filed through the program, and adds the subsection (1) timeline to Kit Part A Section 3. Release 2026.4 also adds Sec. 15(g), in which the County states whether a later site plan for a Covered Facility is approved by a board and not designated for administrative review (Option A) or is designated for staff approval under s. 163.3169(1)(q) (Option B), and moves the acoustic update of Sec. 9(e) out of the site plan application to not less than [thirty (30)] days before the new equipment begins operating, with the equipment run only with the mitigation the update relies on (Technical Manual Secs. B-4.1, B-9.4, B-9.6). A deemed approval therefore cannot skip the acoustic update, and Kit Part A Section 3 applies the program timeline only under Option B. *Left open.* Counsel 5.2, narrowed to a county that chooses Option B of Sec. 15(g); Counsel 5.1 is answered in (b). The Kit's 30-day completeness step (Part A) stays. The clause saving a program a County already had on 1 July 2026 is not sent to counsel: its words point one way, and whether a County's program qualifies turns on that County's own facts. **6. Generator limits and s. 366.032.** *Answer.* **Open, leaning no.** On its text, s. 366.032(2) protects the use of a gas- or propane-fired generator, and its exception does not reach a county noise schedule. The section bars any local policy or action "that restricts or prohibits or has the effect of restricting or prohibiting the use of an appliance ... which uses the types or fuel sources of energy production which may be used, delivered, converted, or supplied by" the listed utilities and gas dealers, and an "appliance" is "a device or apparatus manufactured and designed to use energy and for which the Florida Building Code or the Florida Fire Prevention Code provides specific requirements." A stationary gas or propane generator is such a device, and Sec. 10(a) and (b) restrict its use. The exception covers only what is "necessary to enforce" those codes. The Fire Prevention Code incorporates NFPA 110, now in its 2019 edition (Rule 69A-60.005(2), F.A.C., as printed in a 2026 notice of proposed rule that would move to the 2022 edition on 31 December 2026; no final adoption is listed yet). As the Minnesota Department of Health's summary of the 2010 edition describes it, NFPA 110 sets how often, for how long and at what load generator sets are exercised and tested, and "does not establish a specific date and time of day for required testing." Summaries of the 2019 edition, and NFPA's public draft of the 2022 edition, likewise give only intervals, durations and loads (confirm against the 2019 text). The Building Code sets no testing schedule of its own. It applies NFPA 110 to installing the emergency and standby systems that it or the Fire Prevention Code requires, and leaves their maintenance and testing to the Fire Prevention Code (Florida Building Code, Building, 8th Edition (2023), Secs. 2702.1.3, 2702.4); Sec. 2701.1 also sends their use and maintenance to NFPA 70, whose testing sections were not read (confirm). Diesel units are probably protected too (**Mostly yes**): the clause reaches fuels the listed entities "may" use, and the Senate committee analysis of the companion bill read that reference to include "any fuel source" (CS/SB 1256, Rules Committee, 18 April 2023, n. 30). On its text the clause also reaches electricity, which electric utilities deliver and supply, so a rule that applies regardless of fuel is not outside it for that reason. That supports the all-units fallback of Sec. 10(e) rather than keeping the limits for some fuels. The sound limits of Sec. 9 can be met by enclosure and are a weaker target. No case, Attorney General opinion or Public Service Commission order construing the clause was found. Chapter 2023-285 added it, effective 1 July 2023; Chapters 2024-186 and 2025-42 extended the bar to community development districts and to boards, agencies, commissions and authorities of local governments without changing its terms; there is no 2026 amendment. The House final bill analysis presents the clause as a response to local restrictions on "gas-fueled stoves and heaters" and to all-electric building codes, and says nothing about generators or testing. *Instruments.* Standards Sec. 1(e)(2) disclaims violating s. 366.032; Sec. 10(d) accommodates code-required tests; under Sec. 10(e), if the statute "is held" to bar Sec. 10 for any unit, the hours and unit limits switch off for every unit while scheduling and notice continue. Agreement Exhibit "S," Sections S-10.3(b)(1) and S-10.5, set testing limits with no such fallback, and S-10.1(d) disclaims only restricting an appliance "because of the fuel it uses," which is narrower than the statute. Without a fallback, Agreement Section 10.12(a) would hold the Developer to "the closest lawful equivalent" of an invalidated limit. Release 2026.4 gives S-10.3(b)(1) and S-10.5 the Sec. 10(e) fallback; in S-10.1(d), refers instead to a restriction s. 366.032(2) is held, or determined under Sec. 10(e), to prohibit, with S-10.5 stating how the Part then applies; and lets Sec. 10(e) also take effect on a Board determination made on the County Attorney's written advice, on which the words "or is determined" in S-10.1(d) rely. *Left open.* Counsel 6.1, narrowed to whether a fuel-neutral limit on when units run and how many are tested at once restricts "the use of an appliance," directly or through an Agreement or Lease covenant. The 2019 text of NFPA 110 and the testing sections of NFPA 70 were not read. **7. Substations and on-site lines.** *Answers.* (a) **Mostly yes**: s. 163.3208 limits Sec. 5(a) as applied to a substation the utility owns. A county may adopt only "reasonable land development regulations ... addressing only setback, landscaping, buffering, screening, lighting, and other aesthetic compatibility-based standards" (s. 163.3208(3)), and a substation "shall be a permitted use in all land use categories ... and zoning districts within a utility's service territory," outside preservation, conservation and historic preservation areas (subsection (4)). Only where a county "has not adopted reasonable standards for substation siting in accordance with subsection (3)" do the subsection (4) defaults apply: in nonresidential areas, the criteria "applicable to other similar uses in that district, if any," and in residential areas a setback "of up to 100 feet between the substation property boundary and permanent equipment structures." Where a county has adopted siting standards, an application not granted or denied within 90 days after it is declared complete "is automatically approved" (subsection (8)(a)). Section 163.326(2), created by Chapter 2026-65, preserves the powers "granted by law with respect to large load customers" and provides that "A large load customer may not be considered an electric substation for the purposes of s. 163.3208," which takes the customer's own facilities out of the section, not the utility's substation; the House final bill analysis says nothing more. The 100-foot figure is a fallback, not a ceiling, and for a substation in a nonresidential district the fallback is the district's criteria for similar uses (**Mostly yes**). A bracketed setback above it must still be "reasonable" and compatibility-based, so it needs a record, and no decision construing "reasonable" in subsection (3) was found. That record cannot rest on need, load or quality of service, which a county "may not ... evaluate" (subsection (6)(b)), and should not rest on electrical safety, which is within the Commission's "exclusive jurisdiction" over safety standards for utility transmission and distribution facilities (s. 366.04(6)). (b) **Mostly no**: undergrounding the applicant's own lines is not preempted. *Florida Power Corp. v. Seminole County*, 579 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 1991), held that the Commission's jurisdiction "preempts the authority of the city and county to require FPC to place its lines underground," but the ruling "does not limit the ability of cities and counties to require developers of new subdivisions to place their electric power supply facilities underground." Rule 25-6.115(2), F.A.C., on charges for converting an investor-owned utility's overhead lines, contemplates such ordinances: "In the instance where a local ordinance requires developers to install underground facilities, the developer who actually requests the construction for a specific location is deemed the applicant for purposes of this rule." The rule was last amended effective 10 December 2020, which left subsection (2) unchanged, and was last reviewed on 16 September 2026. The Building Code does not apply to "zoning requirements, land use requirements" that do not govern design or construction (s. 553.73(13)), so Sec. 5(c) should govern location, not installation. *Instruments.* Sec. 5(a) and Exhibit "S," S-5.1(a), cover all "high-voltage substations." Sec. 5(c) "does not regulate any facility owned by a public utility," a term that excludes cooperatives and municipal utilities (s. 366.02(8)), and it reaches lines built for conveyance to a utility. Release 2026.4, in Sec. 5(a), gives an electric substation as s. 163.3208(2) defines it, owned by an electric utility as defined in s. 366.02(4), its own bracketed setback, makes it a permitted use to the extent s. 163.3208(4) provides, and has its application decided as s. 163.3208 provides; in Sec. 5(c), replaces "a public utility" with "an electric utility as defined in s. 366.02(4), Florida Statutes, or any line to be conveyed to one," and states that the subsection governs the location of lines, not their design or installation. Release 2026.4 also brackets the points the utility-owned substation setback is measured between: from the substation property boundary to its permanent equipment structures, as the s. 163.3208(4)(b) fallback runs, or from each residentially or agriculturally designated property line and Sensitive Receptor to the nearest permanent equipment structure, as the rest of Sec. 5(a) measures. *Left open.* Counsel 7.1, narrowed to two points of law: the test of "reasonable," and whether equipment sound may support a setback. Whether a given larger setback is reasonable is a judgment on facts for the County's own record, such as a planning department report like the one on which adopting ordinance Section 1 rests its common-control finding, with a finding on the setback added to Section 1 when the County fills the Sec. 5(a) bracket for a utility-owned substation. That record should describe the adjacent and surrounding uses (s. 163.3208(1)); the setbacks the County applies to similar uses in the same districts; the sound of transformers and cooling equipment at the nearest residential lot lines and Sensitive Receptors, with and without walls or enclosures; sight lines and lighting; and why the statutory fallback is not enough at the County's pattern of development. It should rest on nothing about need, load, service quality or electrical safety. Whether Sec. 5(c) must meet s. 553.73(4)(b), or is a land use requirement under s. 553.73(13), is a low-priority point now that Sec. 5(c) governs location only. **8. Inspection access.** *Answer.* **Mostly no**: the access duty cannot be enforced by penalty or forced entry against an operator that refuses. "[A]bsent consent, exigent circumstances, or the like," an administrative search requires an opportunity for precompliance review before a neutral decision-maker (U.S. Supreme Court decisions on administrative searches: 2015, 576 U.S. 409; 1967, 387 U.S. 523 and 387 U.S. 541). Data centers are not among the four industries the Court has treated as closely regulated, and Article I, Section 12 of the Florida Constitution is construed in conformity with the Fourth Amendment. Florida's inspection warrant statute fits the trigger: cause exists where "there is reason to believe that a condition of nonconformity exists" (s. 933.22); the affidavit states "that consent to inspect has been sought and refused" (s. 933.21); after a refusal, 24 hours' notice precedes execution except "to prevent loss of life or property" (s. 933.26); and willful refusal of a warranted inspection is a misdemeanor of the second degree (s. 933.27). Withholding permits for a refusal under Sec. 18(d) is likely invalid too. Consent written into a permit condition is doubtful (Open, leaning no); consent in a signed Agreement or Lease is stronger (Mostly yes), but it is enforced by court order after a refusal. *Instruments.* Standards Sec. 18(a), (b), (d); Agreement Section 6.1(d) reaches only compliance records; the Lease lets the County enter only to perform a cure under Section 14.4 (on reasonable notice, or in an emergency on such notice as is practicable), not to inspect. Release 2026.4 adds to Sec. 18(a) that if access is not given the County may apply for an inspection warrant under ss. 933.20 to 933.30, that refusing an entry no warrant authorizes is not a violation, and that nothing limits entry in an emergency; and adds to Agreement Section 6.1, as new subsection (e), a covenant consenting to entry for inspection on [twenty-four (24)] hours' notice, consistent with facility security protocols, enforceable by injunction, which Lease Exhibit "C" carries into the Lease. *Left open.* Counsel 8.1. **52. Well owner claims, withdrawal conditions and s. 373.217.** *Answers.* (a) **Settled**: a county may not require its own permit for a consumptive use, and an ordinance in conflict with Part II of chapter 373 gives way. Part II "shall provide the exclusive authority for requiring permits for the consumptive use of water" (s. 373.217(2)); a conflicting ordinance "shall be deemed superseded for the purpose of regulating the consumptive use of water" (subsection (3)); and "Other than as provided in subsection (3) of this section, Part II of the Florida Water Resources Act of 1972, as amended, preempts the regulation of the consumptive use of water as defined in this act" (subsection (4)). The section says nothing about land use. Chapter 373 does not define "consumptive use"; a district rule defines it as "any use of water that reduces the supply from which it is withdrawn or diverted" (Rule 40D-1.102(4), F.A.C.), and a Department of Environmental Protection rule the Senate staff analysis of Chapter 2026-65 cites uses nearly the same words, "any use of water which reduces the supply from which it is withdrawn or diverted," for its own chapter and its review of district rules (Rule 62-40.210(4), F.A.C.). Both point subsection (4) at rules whose object is the withdrawal. The decisions show a pattern rather than a holding on a county ordinance. A district need not consider local land use approvals: "Neither the statutes nor the rules regarding CUPs impose any requirements on the District related to compliance with a local government's comprehensive plan or land development regulations," and an ordinance "in conflict with the water management district's exclusive authority" is superseded (Fifth District, 2009, 5 So. 3d 775, affirming a district permit for water to be bottled after evidence on compliance with the county's plan and zoning was excluded as irrelevant). In 2001 the same court, on second-tier certiorari, quashed a circuit court order that had overturned that county's denial of a special use permit for a well to withdraw 100,000 gallons a day for sale as bottled water. The circuit court had erred in finding that "the concerns of the property owners and the County Commissioners about the roads and about the effect of the drought did not constitute evidence," since fact-based citizen testimony "could constitute substantial competent evidence" (Fifth District, 2001, 786 So. 2d 623). No preemption question was raised or decided, the opinion does not cite s. 373.217, and the Fifth District's 2009 decision does not mention it. The nearest holding concerns a state land use order. In 2009 the First District held that the Department of Community Affairs "acted in excess of its authority" when it issued notices of violation of a development of regional impact order, which had first prohibited freshwater wells and later allowed them only in certain circumstances, against irrigation wells the Northwest Florida district intended to permit. The "exclusive authority" s. 373.217 gives the districts "requires this Court to grant the petition and exclude the Department from the process of approving the wells in question," and "the preemption language of section 373.217 does in fact mean what it says and permitting by the water management district is all that is required to obtain approval for consumptive use of water in this state" (*Northwest Florida Water Management District v. Department of Community Affairs*, 7 So. 3d 1129, 1131 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)). On second-tier certiorari, which asks only whether the circuit court afforded procedural due process and applied the correct law, the Second District left in place a rezoning adopted on 24 May 2011 that the county had conditioned on the South Florida district's approval, saying that ss. 373.217 and 373.023 "indicate that the water impact will be addressed by SFWMD and that the County ensured compatibility by conditioning the Ordinance on SFWMD's approval" (*Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Hendry County*, No. 2D12-1657 (Fla. 2d DCA 23 January 2013), 106 So. 3d 19 (confirm reporter)); for an application filed after 1 July 2012, a county may not make a state permit a condition of its development order (s. 125.022(4); that a water management district is a "state ... agency" for this purpose was assumed, not researched). On that pattern the County decides whether and where a land use may occur, and the district decides whether, how much, when and on what mitigation terms water is withdrawn; how far a land use decision may rest on a withdrawal's effects is taken up in (b). (b) **Mostly no**: the County may not condition approval on "reduction of the withdrawal rate" (Sec. 8(f)(3)). A permit authorizes "the consumptive use of particular quantities of water" (s. 373.217(1)), so setting the rate is the regulation subsection (4) reserves; the Fifth District reads the section to preempt "other statutes ... that attempt to limit or qualify" a district's permitting authority (Fifth District, 2003, 864 So. 2d 455, holding s. 373.217 controlling over a Part I provision an applicant relied on to increase a permitted use), which holds with more force for an ordinance. District practice on subsidence varies. The Suwannee River district's handbook counts "Land collapse or subsidence caused by a reduction in water levels" among adverse impacts on existing offsite land uses (November 2025, Sec. 3.6(b)). South Florida's handbook protects offsite land uses from "Land collapse or subsidence caused by reduction in water levels associated with consumptive use" (December 2025, Sec. 3.6.2), and its standard conditions require that "The Permittee shall mitigate harm to existing off-site land uses caused by the Permittee's withdrawals," harm that includes the same subsidence (Sec. 5.1.11). Southwest Florida's standard condition has the permittee "mitigate any adverse impact to environmental features or offsite land uses as a result of withdrawals" (Rule 40D-2.381(3)(l), F.A.C.), with examples that do not name sinkholes or subsidence, and it issues a permit only on assurance that the use "Will not cause harm to existing offsite land uses resulting from hydrologic alterations" (Rule 40D-2.301(2)(f), F.A.C.). Rule 40D-2.381 was amended in 2011 with the Dover/Plant City frost and freeze rules; whether that amendment removed sinkhole or subsidence language was not confirmed (confirm). The Sec. 8(g) passby floor, and a Sec. 18(c) curtailment that reaches a withdrawal, fall the same way: districts set minimum flows and levels (s. 373.042), and Southwest Florida's standard conditions have the permittee "cease or reduce surface water withdrawal as directed by the District" when lake levels or stream flows fall below the minimums in Chapter 40D-8, F.A.C., and "cease or reduce withdrawal as directed by the District if water levels in aquifers fall below the minimum levels established by the Governing Board" (Rule 40D-2.381(3)(g) and (h), F.A.C.). Denial where no land-side measure removes the risk (Sec. 8(f)(2)) is **Open, leaning no**. It decides the land use rather than the quantity, and the 2001 Fifth District decision let stand a county's denial of a special use permit for a bottling well that rested partly on residents' fact-based testimony about the drought and the aquifer, but no one argued preemption, and the court decided only that the circuit court had reweighed the evidence. Against it, the First District said in 2009 that district permitting "is all that is required to obtain approval for consumptive use of water in this state," the Second District in 2013 accepted on second-tier review that "the water impact will be addressed by SFWMD," though there the county had chosen to rely on the district, and the South Florida and Suwannee River handbooks treat subsidence from a withdrawal as a harm the permit addresses (above). The answer is the same for a large-scale data center: s. 373.262(2) reaches a use the code and plan prohibit, not a denial on the facts of one application. (c) **Open, leaning no** for the Sec. 8(e) claims process. Subsection (3) supersedes only on an actual conflict: the Fifth District refused to treat s. 373.042 as superseded under it because "the District does not specifically set forth, nor have we found, a conflict between the provisions of section 373.042 and Part II of Chapter 373" (*Concerned Citizens of Putnam County for Responsive Government, Inc. v. St. Johns River Water Management District*, 622 So. 2d 520, 525 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)). That case concerned a statute, not an ordinance, and did not address subsection (4). A permittee can satisfy both regimes. But subsection (4) needs no conflict, and interference with existing legal uses is a Part II permit criterion (s. 373.223(1)(b); s. 373.262(2)(b)) that each district whose rules were read carries into its permits. Southwest Florida's standard condition, included in every permit: the permittee "shall mitigate any adverse impact to existing legal uses caused by withdrawals," including "A reduction in water levels which impairs the ability of a well to produce water," and "When adverse impacts occur or are imminent, the District may require the Permittee to mitigate the impacts" (Rule 40D-2.381(3)(k), F.A.C.). St. Johns River revokes a permit for interference "unless the interference associated with the permittee's consumptive use of water is mitigated by the permittee pursuant to a District-approved plan" (Rule 40C-2.381(2)(a)5., F.A.C.). South Florida's standard conditions include one for existing legal users: "The Permittee shall mitigate interference with existing legal uses that was caused in whole or in part by the Permittee's withdrawals, consistent with the approved mitigation plan" (handbook, December 2025, Sec. 5.1.9; Sec. 3.7.3 states the same duty and requires the mitigation plan). Suwannee River's handbook makes it a standard condition, applying "to all water use permits," that "The permittee must mitigate interference with existing legal uses caused in whole or in part by the permittee's withdrawals, consistent with a District-approved mitigation plan" (Rule 40B-2.381(2), F.A.C.; handbook, November 2025, Sec. 5.1(g)). An existing legal use includes one "existing and exempt from permit requirements" (Northwest Florida handbook, March 2026, Sec. 1.1; South Florida handbook, December 2025, Sec. 1.1). Suwannee River's definition covers "All uses of water which are exempt under chapter 373, F.S., or 40B-2, F.A.C., or which have a valid chapter 373, Part II, F.S., permit" (handbook, November 2025, Sec. 1.1, item 23), and South Florida's handbook states that "A use of water not permitted nor exempt pursuant to Part II of Chapter 373, F.S., is not an existing legal use" (December 2025, Sec. 3.7.1), so a domestic well is covered. St. Johns River's definition of a "Presently Existing Legal Use of Water" ("Those legal uses which exist at the time of receipt of the application for the consumptive use permit"; handbook, December 2025, Sec. 1.1(p)) reaches one by its terms. A County process with its own standard covers the same impact. The burden shift is the most exposed sentence. In the district rules read, the district decides attribution, or the standard is interference "caused in whole or in part by the permittee's withdrawals" (Suwannee River handbook, November 2025, Secs. 3.7 and 5.1(g); South Florida handbook, December 2025, Secs. 3.7.3 and 5.1.9) or harm "caused in whole or in part by the Applicant's withdrawals or diversions" (Northwest Florida handbook, March 2026, Sec. 3.7), and no district rule read presumes attribution from baseline testing. South Florida limits interference to an impact "that occurs under hydrologic conditions equal to or less severe than a 1-in-10 year drought event" (handbook, December 2025, Secs. 3.7.2 and 5.1.9); the definition Release 2026.4 adds to Sec. 8(e) has no drought limit and does not refer to the primary drinking water standards South Florida uses for water quality. Southwest Florida's handbook also has procedures, within the Dover/Plant City Water Use Caution Area, for permittees to investigate well complaints tied to crop protection pumping, for assigning responsibility among them, and on the availability of a mitigation process for impacts to existing legal uses (Part B, January 2022, Secs. 3.9.4.5 to 3.9.4.8, the edition Rule 40D-2.091, F.A.C., incorporates). They were adopted in 2011 after crop protection pumping during the January 2010 freeze "caused more than 750 temporarily dry wells" (the District's notice of December 2010). The District, not the well owner, attributes each complaint. It models each permittee's drawdown and assigns the complaint to "the Permittee that caused the greatest drawdown at a particular site," unless that permittee's existing legal use date precedes the complainant's well, it has used up its allocation ratio, or it was not withdrawing groundwater (Sec. 3.9.4.5.1). A complaint is not assigned at all for a well constructed after 9 April 2002, or later repaired, in the Original Dover Area, or constructed or repaired after 17 August 2010 in the Expanded Dover Area (Sec. 3.9.4.5.3). The assigned permittee must evaluate the well within 24 hours and supply temporary water, and "If the evaluation indicates that groundwater pumping for crop protection resulted in loss of the complainant's water service, the Permittee shall pay for the work necessary to restore water service to the complainant." The District decides disputes, determining "the appropriate reimbursement based on the cause of the well complaint and the appropriate remedy," and it "shall require additional action by the Permittee if the District determines that the complaint has not been fully mitigated" (Sec. 3.9.4.6). An owner must report "within 14 days of the water use Permittee's pumping that resulted in the interference" (Sec. 3.9.4.8). Under s. 70.45(4) "the governmental entity has the burden of proving that the challenged exaction has an essential nexus to a legitimate public purpose and is roughly proportionate to the impacts of the proposed use," which a presumption covering every documented impact in the cone strains, most of all in a regional drought. The Release 2026.4 sentences crediting district mitigation and stating that the process "does not limit, condition, or authorize any withdrawal" help, but a court will look at substance. (d) **Mostly yes** for the reclaimed water rule of Sec. 7(a)(2), for every Covered Facility, on the reuse statutes: "A local government shall require a developer, as a condition for obtaining a development order, to comply with the local reuse program" (s. 403.064(13)); "Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prohibit or preempt such local reuse programs" (s. 403.064(9)); and "A water management district may not require a permit for the use of reclaimed water" (s. 373.250(3)(b)). The rule is strongest where it carries out a local reuse program. A reuse program requirement that a Covered Facility use reclaimed water in place of groundwater it or a third party withdraws under a district permit, rather than in place of potable water, goes a step further: **Open, leaning yes** (confirm). Section 403.064(13) is a specific mandate, and the permitting agency "shall consider the local reuse program" (s. 403.064(12)), but the use it displaces is one Part II permits. For the groundwater rule of Sec. 7(a)(1), **Mostly yes** as applied to groundwater a large-scale data center itself applies to withdraw. A large-scale data center is "a single location, with a data center on site, that has an anticipated monthly peak load of 50 megawatts or more" (s. 373.203(4)), and since 1 July 2026 a district "may not issue a permit to a large-scale data center applicant for an allocation of water if the proposed use of the water is harmful to the water resources of the area or is prohibited by the applicable local government zoning regulations and comprehensive plan" (s. 373.262(2), created by Chapter 2026-65). For these applicants that narrows the 2009 Fifth District decision: a district must now refuse a permit for a use local zoning and the plan prohibit, though it still need not wait for a discretionary local approval, and the County still may not make the district permit a condition of its own approval (s. 125.022(4)). A data center's "environmental impacts" are among the considerations to be "addressed through local comprehensive planning and land development regulations" (s. 163.326(1)), but subsection (2) maintains only the powers "granted by law," so s. 163.326 does not itself lift s. 373.217(4). Two counterarguments keep this short of Settled: s. 373.262(2) opens "Consistent with other provisions of this part," which include s. 373.217(4), and "the proposed use of the water" may mean its purpose rather than its source. Against both, s. 373.262 sits in Part II (ss. 373.203 to 373.262 in the 2026 statutes), so the Part to which s. 373.217(4) gives preemptive force now itself bars these permits where local law prohibits the use; s. 373.262(1) states the aim of a permitting framework that ensures the state's water resources are used "consistent with local government zoning regulations and comprehensive plans"; and s. 373.262(3) speaks of "a proposed use of surface water or groundwater," tying a use to its source. Subsections (2) and (3) of s. 373.217 still describe Part II "as set forth in ss. 373.203-373.249," a range that leaves out s. 373.262 and a point a challenger could raise. But subsections (2) to (4) all describe Part II "as amended"; subsection (4), which gives the preemptive force, names no range; and s. 373.262 itself refers to "this part" (s. 373.262(2), (4)). The staff analyses only restate s. 373.262(2) and do not discuss s. 373.217. Section 373.262(2) gives no support where someone else holds the permit. Groundwater a third party withdraws for the facility is **Open, leaning no**, because where a district authorizes carrying water "beyond overlying land," "no local government shall adopt or enforce any law, ordinance, rule, regulation, or order to the contrary" (s. 373.223(2)). Where s. 373.262(2) does not apply, the First District's statement that district permitting "is all that is required to obtain approval for consumptive use of water in this state" also cuts against the rule (2009, 7 So. 3d 1129, 1131). The 2009 Fifth District decision applied s. 373.223(2), rather than the transport factors of s. 373.223(3), to water withdrawn for bottling, but decided no question of preemption. Potable water from a public system is safest left outside Sec. 7(a)(1), as Exhibit "S," Section S-7.1 already leaves it, and a Covered Facility outside s. 373.203(4) is **Open, leaning no**, because the First District's 2009 statement cuts against the rule there too. Section 373.262(2) does not reach a limit on the rate or timing of a withdrawal (**Mostly no**): it bars a permit only for a use local law has "prohibited," and the quantity of a withdrawal is what Part II reserves (see (b)); the Standards no longer depend on the point. Whether the prohibition must appear in both the code and the plan is **Open, leaning that a prohibition in the zoning regulations is enough**. The words "zoning regulations and comprehensive plan" are the same in every version of the bill, and the Senate staff analyses repeat them, but the House final bill analysis describes a use "prohibited by applicable local zoning regulations or comprehensive plans," which is legislative history, not law. A use the zoning code prohibits is also not "consistent with local government zoning regulations and comprehensive plans" (s. 373.262(1)), and plans rarely prohibit a specific use, so requiring both would leave the bar little work. Adopting the prohibition in both, as Kit Part G proposes, removes the question once Section 28 of Chapter 2025-190 no longer reaches the plan amendment. (e) **Mostly yes** for the studies, monitoring and baseline testing of Sec. 8(b) to (d), which serve the County's own findings (land development regulations must "Provide for protection of potable water wellfields," s. 163.3202(2)(c)), and for Exhibit "S," Parts S-7 and S-8, as terms the County sets as landowner in a Lease. As covenants in a voluntary Agreement they are **Open, leaning yes**: no Part II provision requires anyone to use groundwater, and no decision was found on such a covenant. A like promise in a private agreement to which the County is not a party, such as the form for CBA Section 8.7 in the CBA Clause Bank, is **Mostly yes** (confirm): s. 373.217 preempts regulation, and a promise between private parties is not regulation; no decision was found. Whether it binds a later owner is Question 26. Sec. 8 also binds the Developer as a covenant through Exhibit "O" (Agreement Section 3.6(a); Lease Section 6.2(a)(1)). Under a Lease, the passby floor and the claims process bind as the County's terms as landowner (**Mostly yes**), but the burden shift is **Open, leaning yes**: whether s. 70.45 reaches the Lease's use covenants is itself open, and they are its weaker spot (Question 22; Counsel 22.1). Under an Agreement, the floor and the process are **Open, leaning yes**, and the burden shift stands as in (c): the Agreement's Section 10.5 itself applies s. 70.45 to the Developer's mitigation obligations and Exhibit "S" covenants. A provision that conditions a County approval, such as Sec. 8(f)(3), applies under a Lease only in the County's regulatory capacity (Lease Section 6.2(d)), and under an Agreement the County official applies it on the terms Exhibit "O" states (Agreement Section 3.6(d)); either way (b) governs it. (f) **Mostly yes**, a procedural point: no local "rule, regulation, or order affecting the waters in the state," other than one on water quality, may be enforced "until such special act, rule, regulation, or order has been filed with the department" (s. 373.023(2)). (g) The other water rules. Reporting under Sec. 7(a)(3) is **Mostly yes**. A cap is **Open, leaning no** where the facility withdraws its own water, **Open** on utility water, and **Open, leaning yes** where the cooling water is reclaimed, because no district permit covers that use (s. 373.250(3)(b)); s. 373.262(4)(a)2. already requires a water conservation plan in a large-scale data center's application for 100,000 gallons a day or more. The optional sentence of Sec. 7(a)(2), which bars potable water for evaporative or adiabatic heat rejection even where reclaimed water is not available, stands where a cap on utility water stands: **Open**. Sec. 7(f)(1) allocates no water and has the operator curtail on the same or an earlier schedule than its supplier applies to residential and agricultural customers: **Mostly yes** where the County supplies the water and **Open, leaning yes** where another entity does. Release 2026.4 adds that it does not apply to water withdrawn under the operator's or owner's own consumptive use permit, which that permit and the district's water shortage plan and orders govern (ss. 373.175, 373.246). Section 373.246 sets no priority among users; whether the Public Service Commission's jurisdiction over a private utility's service terms (chapter 367) bears on it was not researched. Sec. 8(h) is lawful as a sentence (**Mostly yes**) but reads as a parallel County water regime. No Attorney General opinion construing s. 373.217 or s. 373.262 was found. AGO 94-102 (5 December 1994) found that s. 373.414(1)(b), in Part IV of chapter 373, "does not preempt the ability of a local government to prohibit development of wetland areas under the county comprehensive growth management plan" where the Department or a district has permitted the development with mitigation, because s. 373.414 has no preemptive language and does not occupy the field; it noted that some Part IV provisions are preemptive. Part II, by contrast, carries the express preemption of s. 373.217(4). *Instruments.* Standards Secs. 1(e)(1), (2), 4(a)(6), 7(a), 7(f), 8, 14(b)(1), (4) and (5), 15(c)(3), 18(c); Technical Manual Sec. B-4.1 and Part B-8; Agreement Recital B and Sections 3.6, 3.7, 10.5, 10.12; Lease Sections 6.2, 15.1; Exhibit "S," Parts S-7 and S-8; Kit Parts A, C, E and G. Because Sec. 7(a)(1) bars groundwater for cooling, Sec. 8 reaches only other groundwater uses and surface water withdrawals. Release 2026.4 adds to Sec. 8(e) that mitigation the permittee provides for the same impact under a water management district permit condition or rule satisfies the claim to that extent, and that the claims process does not limit, condition or authorize any withdrawal. In answer to this question it also: (1) deletes "reduction of the withdrawal rate" from Sec. 8(f)(3), adds that the subsection does not set or condition the rate of any withdrawal and that the findings are made on the rate the application states, which the applicant may amend, and has the County send its Sec. 8(f) findings to the district (Sec. 8(f)(4)); (2) replaces the Sec. 8(g) passby floor with a showing of each minimum flow or level the district has adopted for the source under s. 373.042 and each permit condition that stops or reduces the withdrawal at low flow (Sec. 4(a)(6); Technical Manual Sec. B-4.1, item 7), makes clause (F) of Sec. 15(c)(3) a finding sent to the district rather than a ground for a condition, and carries the floor into Exhibit "S" as Section S-8.2, where a study the Operator funds sets the flow if no gauge record is adequate and any district minimum also applies; (3) excludes a withdrawal of water from curtailment under Sec. 18(c); (4) in Sec. 8(e), defines an adverse impact in terms drawn from the districts' rules, presumes attribution only where baseline testing of a well under Sec. 8(d) was accepted not less than [thirty (30)] days before the later of the withdrawal's start and the latest start date a repeated offer stated (an owner to whom the applicant did not repeat the offer as Sec. 8(d) requires counting as having accepted on the last day for the repeat), and the test was completed before the withdrawal began or was not completed before it began for a reason other than a failure of the well's owner at the time to make the well available for testing on reasonable notice, rebuttable by proof of another cause, such as a regional condition the district has documented, has the owner of any other well show attribution, with the applicant producing its monitoring data and model results, and adds a chapter 373 fallback on the pattern of Sec. 10(e) that also covers a holding against the presumption alone (Sec. 8(e)(4)); and, in Sec. 8(d), has the applicant repeat the testing offer in writing not less than [sixty (60)] days before the withdrawal begins, stating the expected start date and the window for the presumption, has each accepted test completed within [thirty (30)] days after the acceptance or, if later, the well's availability, conditions no withdrawal on testing, and, for an application that would increase a withdrawal, has the withdrawal begin, for Sec. 8(d) and (e), when the increase begins; (5) limits Sec. 7(a)(1) to groundwater withdrawn by or for the facility, leaving potable water from a public water system to Sec. 7(a)(2), which opens with a bracketed reference to the County's local reuse program under s. 403.064; (6) reads Sec. 8(a) as reaching an application to the County for a development order that would increase a withdrawal, rewrites Sec. 8(h) to say that the Section does not grant, deny, modify or condition any consumptive use permit or permitted withdrawal, adds to Sec. 1(e)(2) a disclaimer of regulating the consumptive use of water that s. 373.217 reserves to Part II, and measures Sec. 7(f)(2) against the permitted or applied-for withdrawal; (7) defines the cone of depression as the area within the [one (1) foot] drawdown contour in each affected aquifer at the proposed rate, under the drought condition the district uses for permitting (Technical Manual Sec. B-8.3); (8) excepts from Section S-8.1 a recovery well a federal or state agency requires for remediation and equipment used temporarily for construction dewatering (compare s. 373.306), and opens Section S-7.3(e) "Where the Facility is a large-scale data center as defined in s. 373.203(4), Florida Statutes," for use under a Lease; and (9) adds to the Kit the filing with the Department of Environmental Protection that s. 373.023(2) requires (Table E-4), a record of the district's hearing (Part A, Section 6) and a model plan policy (Part G); the Kit's resolution already carried the permit condition s. 125.022(5) requires (Part C, Section 3). Release 2026.4 also widens the Sec. 8(e)(4) notice to "each condition of its consumptive use permit, and each requirement of the water management district's rules, that requires it to mitigate, or makes the permit subject to revocation unless it mitigates, an adverse impact on, harm to, or interference with an existing legal use," because the St. Johns River condition is framed as revocation, the South Florida and Suwannee River conditions speak of interference, and the Northwest Florida handbook states a duty to mitigate harm among its permitting requirements (Sec. 3.7). It also offers a bracketed alternative to the presumption of Sec. 8(e)(2): an impact is reasonably attributable where the withdrawal caused it in whole or in part, as the owner shows, the test of the South Florida, Suwannee River and Northwest Florida handbooks now in force, with the claim limited to the share of the remedy that corresponds to the withdrawal's part in the impact, since s. 70.45(4) asks whether an exaction "is roughly proportionate to the impacts of the proposed use." Release 2026.4 also lifts Sec. 7(a)(1) only for a facility or withdrawal as to which a court holds, or the Board determines on the County Attorney's written advice, that chapter 373 prevents its application, with nothing in its place; adds to Sec. 7(a)(2) an optional sentence that bars potable water for evaporative or adiabatic heat rejection even where reclaimed water is not available, without reaching the fill or top-up of a closed loop, and a bracketed sentence that, where the County's local reuse program so provides, has a Covered Facility, when the program's lines reach the property boundary, connect at its own cost on its own site and use reclaimed water for cooling makeup, with no extension of lines required; brackets a limit keeping emergency potable backup to times the primary heat rejection equipment or the reclaimed water supply is out of service, and keeps the fill and top-up of a closed circuit outside the whole of Sec. 7(a)(2); states in Sec. 1(f) that a utility rate or charge of general application is not a payment the Chapter imposes; has the Lease leave out Exhibit "S," Sections S-7.1 to S-7.3 or S-8.1 only by a finding stated on the record; adds a water term to the CBA Clause Bank (a form for CBA Section 8.7); and adds to Kit Part A, Section 6 the reclaimed water facts the County sends the district and the water supply consultation that s. 163.3180(2) requires before a building permit. It also adds to Sec. 14(b) a claims amount, the cost the applicant's own hydrogeologic study states for the remedy most likely to be needed at each well within the projected cone of depression at which the study projects an adverse impact, restated with each study, limited to claims already made once Sec. 8(e)(4) ends the process, and never a condition on, or a ground to curtail, a permitted withdrawal (Sec. 14(b)(1), (5); Technical Manual Sec. B-8.5), and has the assurance restored within [thirty (30)] days after any draw, less drawn funds still held unspent (Sec. 14(b)(4); Agreement Section 7.2(d)). *Left open.* Counsel 52.1 and 52.2, both narrowed. Counsel 52.1 now asks whether the claims process is regulation of the consumptive use of water, whether its presumption may stand or the district's own attribution test must be used, and whether either answer changes where Sec. 8(e) binds as a covenant of an Agreement or Lease; the conflict question under s. 373.217(3) and the working of the Sec. 8(e)(4) fallback no longer need counsel. Counsel 52.2 no longer asks about the rate or timing of a withdrawal, and it now asks whether, where s. 373.262(2) does not apply, s. 373.217, as the First District read it in 2009, displaces the Sec. 7(a)(1) rule. The model plan policy in Kit Part G, which would bring a large-scale data center's own application to withdraw squarely within s. 373.262(2), is itself an amendment that Section 28 of Chapter 2025-190 reaches until 1 October 2027 (Question 3). Chapter 2026-65 also orders an independent study of data center siting and water use, due 1 July 2027 (Section 7), so the Legislature may return to s. 373.262. Where the County is the water supplier, whether its utility's service terms may limit potable water for evaporative cooling was not researched. The reporter of the 2013 Second District decision and the 2011 amendment of Rule 40D-2.381 were not confirmed. **54. Complaints that give no name.** *Answers.* (a) **Settled**: the bar reaches a county's or municipality's code enforcement officers and code inspectors, whether employees or agents, and not the operator. Since 1 July 2021 (Chapter 2021-167, Laws of Florida), "A code enforcement officer may not initiate an investigation of a potential violation of a duly enacted code or ordinance by way of an anonymous complaint," and "A person who reports a potential violation of a code or an ordinance must provide his or her name and address to the respective local government before an investigation may occur" (s. 162.21(3)(b)). A code enforcement officer is "any designated employee or agent of a county or municipality whose duty it is to enforce codes and ordinances enacted by the county or municipality" (s. 162.21(1)). Section 162.06(1)(b) puts the same bar on a code inspector initiating "enforcement proceedings," and a code inspector is "any authorized agent or employee of the county or municipality whose duty it is to assure code compliance" (s. 162.04(2)). For a county, s. 125.69(4)(b), added by the same act, also bars "[a] person designated as a code inspector" by the board of county commissioners under s. 125.69(4)(a) from initiating an investigation by way of an anonymous complaint, and the person who reports must give a name and address "to the governing body of the respective board of county commissioners before an investigation occurs." None of the bars applies where the officer or inspector "has reason to believe that the violation presents an imminent threat to public health, safety, or welfare or imminent destruction of habitat or sensitive resources." An operator that accepts and logs complaints without a name, as Sec. 17(c) and (d) require, is neither. A third party the County retains to monitor or inspect, such as a monitor under Agreement Section 6.2(e), can be its agent within either definition. (b) **Open, leaning yes**: the County's code enforcement official, to whom Sec. 17(e) forwards complaints, may not start an investigation or enforcement proceedings by way of a forwarded complaint that lacks the complainant's name and address, outside the exception. Against the lean, the operator that forwards the complaint is itself "[a] person who reports a potential violation" and gives its own name and address to the County, so a court could hold that the forwarded complaint is not anonymous. For it, the operator does not make the allegation and forwards it because Sec. 17(e) requires it, so the person who complains stays unknown to the County. No decision applying any of the three paragraphs was found. A county that assigned data center inspections to staff it has designated neither as code enforcement officers under s. 162.21(2) nor as code inspectors under s. 125.69(4) could argue that neither s. 162.21(3)(b) nor s. 125.69(4)(b) reaches them; s. 162.06(1)(b) would still bar those staff, as code inspectors, from initiating enforcement proceedings by way of the complaint, though not from investigating it, and the model does not rely on that argument. (c) **Open**: whether an anonymous report may prompt the County's monitoring of the Agreement where the covenant monitored is one of the Standards, and whether code enforcement may rest on what that monitoring finds. Checking compliance with a contract is not, in form, an investigation of a potential violation of "a duly enacted code or ordinance." But the Standards form part of the Agreement as Exhibit "O" and bind the Developer as covenants (Agreement Sections 3.6(a) and 10.27); the monitoring under Section 6.2 covers compliance "with this Agreement and with the Standards," including periodic inspection (Section 6.2(a)); and Section 6.1(e) gives entry to inspect for compliance with Exhibit "O." Where the Standards also apply to the Project by their own terms (Section 3.6(c)), a court could treat that monitoring, if a code enforcement officer or a code inspector designated under s. 125.69(4) does it, as the investigation s. 162.21(3)(b) or s. 125.69(4)(b) bars, and a code enforcement case that rests on what it found as one initiated by way of the anonymous complaint. Code enforcement under chapter 162 is itself one of the Agreement's remedies (Section 8.2(d)), and Section 6.3(c) leaves it to the statutes. The other remedies of Article 8 are not proceedings under chapter 162, but s. 162.13 excepts s. 162.06(1)(b) from the rule that nothing in ss. 162.01 to 162.12 shall "prohibit a local governing body from enforcing its codes by any other means," so a court could also apply the bar where a code inspector initiates such a remedy, for a covenant that is one of the Standards, by way of an anonymous complaint. Sections 162.21(8) and 125.69(4)(k), as amended by the same act, make the same exception for the investigation bars ("Except as provided in paragraph (3)(b), nothing contained in this section shall prohibit a county or municipality from enforcing its codes or ordinances by any other means"; "Except as provided in paragraphs (b) and (j), nothing in this subsection shall prohibit a county from enforcing its codes or ordinances by any other means"), so a court could likewise treat monitoring for such a remedy, if a code enforcement officer or a code inspector designated under s. 125.69(4) does it, as an investigation those paragraphs bar. *Instruments.* Standards Sec. 17(c) to (e) and Sec. 18(a); Agreement Sections 3.6, 6.1(e), 6.2, 6.3 and 8.2(d). Release 2026.4 replaces the Sec. 17(e) sentence that let an anonymous complaint "support inspection under Sec. 18(a)" with: "Under ss. 125.69(4)(b), 162.06(1)(b), and 162.21(3)(b), Florida Statutes, a code inspector may not initiate enforcement proceedings, and a code enforcement officer or a code inspector designated under s. 125.69(4) may not initiate an investigation, by way of an anonymous complaint, unless the inspector or officer has reason to believe that the violation presents an imminent threat to public health, safety, or welfare or imminent destruction of habitat or sensitive resources." It replaces the second sentence of Agreement Section 6.3(c) with: "Sections 125.69(4)(b), 162.06(1)(b), and 162.21(3)(b), Florida Statutes, and not this Agreement, govern whether an anonymous report may initiate a code enforcement investigation or proceedings, including monitoring under Section 6.2 that is such an investigation." An anonymous report may still prompt the County's monitoring of the Agreement under Section 6.2, but the statutes, and not the Agreement, govern monitoring that is itself an investigation they bar (point (c)). Inspections under Sec. 18(a) that no anonymous complaint prompted, what County staff observe for themselves, and complaints that give a name and address are unaffected. Where a suspicion of an unsafe condition under Sec. 18(a) rests on an anonymous complaint, a code enforcement officer, or a code inspector designated under s. 125.69(4), may act on it only on reason to believe in an imminent threat. *Left open.* Counsel 54.1. **56. Homes that come after a facility.** *Answers.* Until subsection (7) expires on 1 October 2033, unless extended (s. 125.01055(7)(p); confirm the letter), Florida requires a county to allow qualifying affordable multifamily housing "in any area zoned for commercial, industrial, or mixed use" (s. 125.01055(7)(a)1., as amended by chapter 2026-179, in force 1 July 2026), so homes can come after a facility. (a) **Mostly yes**: the County may measure the setbacks, the facade rule, the berm and the battery and fuel separations from the property lines, residential structures and Sensitive Receptors that exist when the first site plan showing an improvement is approved, while the sound, light trespass and construction hour limits protect every home whenever it comes; that is the County's own choice for its own approvals, and no statute was found that requires a county to measure setbacks from homes approved after a site plan (confirm). (b) **Open, leaning yes**: a county may likely require an applicant for homes inside a Sound Contour (the mapped area outside a facility's site where its predicted night sound comes within a set margin of a night limit, or exceeds it) to show how the layout addresses the facility's sound, where the requirement is among its "land development regulations for multifamily developments in areas zoned for such use" (s. 125.01055(7)(e)1.) and applies in every district (confirm). Paragraph (e)3. lets a county require architectural design rules on parcels with a qualifying historic structure, which could be read to exclude them, and a layout rule, elsewhere; and any such rule is subject to Section 28 of Chapter 2025-190 and s. 252.422. (c) **Open**: whether a county may require sound-rated construction, an interior sound level or a noise level reduction in such homes. A local technical amendment to the Florida Building Code "may not introduce a new subject not addressed in the Florida Building Code" (s. 553.73(4)(b)3.). The Code's sound transmission rules address assemblies between units, and the Code has carried airport noise sections adopting federal guidelines, with s. 553.73(7)(b) calling for the annual review of "codes regarding noise contour lines" (confirm the 2023 edition). Whether construction against another outdoor source is a new subject, and whether a zoning rule setting an interior level or a noise level reduction is a building code matter, was not found decided; some Florida zoning codes require noise level reduction in airport noise zones (confirm). *Instruments.* Standards Secs. 2, 3(d), 5(h), 6(b) and (c), 9(a), (c) and (e), 12(a) and (b)(2), 15(g), and 19(b) and (c); Technical Manual Sec. B-9.4(d); Exhibit "S," Sections S-1.3, S-5.1(a), S-9.1(a) and (c), and S-9.3(b); Agreement Sections 1.1 and 3.8(c) and (d). *Left open.* Counsel 56.1 and 56.2. Before release, confirm the 2026 compilation of s. 125.01055(7), including the letter of the expiration paragraph and the text of chapter 2026-163. **57. Battery energy storage and the uniform firesafety standards.** *Answers.* (a) **Settled**: "energy storage systems" are among the facilities for which the State Fire Marshal sets uniform firesafety standards (s. 633.206(1)(b)), and "A local authority may not require more stringent uniform firesafety standards with respect to buildings or structures subject to such standards except as provided in paragraph (c)" (s. 633.206(2)(b)); paragraph (c) allows more stringent sprinkler standards only, on three ordinances. A uniform firesafety standard "is not weakened or exceeded by law, rule, or ordinance of any other state agency or political subdivision or county, municipality, or special district with firesafety responsibilities" (s. 633.102(33)), and the minimum firesafety codes "do not apply to buildings and structures subject to the uniform firesafety standards" (s. 633.208(1)), so a local amendment of the Florida Fire Prevention Code under ss. 633.202 and 633.208(3) does not reach them. The standards are Chapter 69A-73, F.A.C., effective 24 August 2025. Rule 69A-73.002(1), as proposed, requires energy storage systems "as defined in" NFPA 855, 2023 Edition, to "comply with all requirements of the NFPA 855, 2023 Edition, and the Florida Fire Prevention Code," with one section amended (Florida Administrative Register, Vol. 51, No. 62, 31 March 2025, p. 1155; the adopted rule is published only as a Word file, and no notice of change is listed: confirm). The bar binds the county, a municipality and a special district with firesafety responsibilities, and the fire official who acts for any of them; it does not bind an owner who builds beyond the standards by choice. (b) **Mostly yes** for rules whose subject is not fire (flood, karst, decommissioning, insurance, mitigation payments, and the information an applicant files): they are not firesafety standards. **Open** for a setback that covers the same ground as a fire separation distance; it is safest where the record rests it on compatibility with the neighboring uses. The 300 feet of Standards Sec. 12(a) follows Michigan's 2023 siting law; its 100 feet from any property line has no recorded basis yet. (c) **Open, leaning yes** for a covenant of a development agreement: the agreement states the requirements "determined to be necessary by the local government for the public health, safety, or welfare of its citizens" (s. 163.3227(1)(h)), but a covenant is not literally a law, rule or ordinance, and the developer signs it. **Open** for a term of a County ground lease, where the County acts as landowner. (d) **Mostly no**: a local authority may "authorize equivalent alternative standards" case by case, with a floor of equal protection, but the first sentence of s. 633.206(2)(b) bars more stringent requirements, and for the minimum codes the Legislature let a county "establish alternative requirements" (s. 633.208(3)), while s. 633.206(2)(b) gives a local authority only the power to "authorize equivalent alternative standards," and speaks of "the alternative requirements" only to set their floor of protection. *Instruments.* Technical Manual Sec. B-12.1; Standards Secs. 1(e)(2), 1(j), 5(a), 11(a) and (e), and 12(a) and (c); Exhibit "S," Sections S-12.1, S-12.2(c) and S-24.1(c); Agreement Section 10.24(a); Lease Section 15.17. Release 2026.4 cites the uniform firesafety standards in each battery firesafety rule, narrows four Exhibit "S" covenants to what those standards require (central uninterruptible power supply systems, fire test data, gas detection and explosion control, and fire department access to the BESS yard), makes Section S-12.1(b) an optional covenant that binds the Operator only to an alternative it seeks, and keeps a frozen edition of a named standard from adding a firesafety requirement for an energy storage system. *Left open.* Counsel 57.1 and 57.2. Before release, confirm the adopted text of Rule 69A-73.002 and NFPA 855's separation distances. ### C. Impact Fee Ordinance **9. What a fee may fund, including shelters.** Chapter 2026-161 rewrites s. 163.31801 effective 1 January 2027; until then the 2025 text is in force. It opens subsection (4) with "For impact fees adopted or increased after July 1, 2026," requires "a demonstrated-need study that is plan-based," and creates subsection (15). Subsections (5)(a), (8) and (10) are unchanged. The Fee Ordinance tracks the 2027 text; Section 28 (Question 3) and the Ordinance's 90-day delay (Sec. 7.3) put any effective date after 1 January 2027. *Answers.* (a) **Mostly yes**, the s. 163.3164 list is illustrative ("'Public facilities' means major capital improvements, including transportation, sanitary sewer, solid waste, drainage, potable water, educational, parks and recreational facilities"), but little here depends on it, because s. 163.31801(3)(c) adds "emergency medical, fire, and law enforcement facilities" expressly; an emergency communications (911) center, which the model fee ordinance names, is named in neither list, so it rests on this reading unless it counts as one of the facilities subsection (3)(c) names. (b) **Mostly yes**: generation and storage installed as fixed capital at County fire, emergency medical, law enforcement, potable water and wastewater facilities (the model fee ordinance names an emergency communications (911) center, not law enforcement facilities) is "infrastructure," "a fixed capital expenditure or fixed capital outlay ... associated with the construction, reconstruction, or improvement of public facilities that have a life expectancy of at least 5 years" (s. 163.31801(3)(b)), limited to the share new demand creates. The Attorney General treated generators and related work at a municipal complex as infrastructure under nearly identical surtax wording (AGO 2016-02). Water and sewer emergency power may be funded by connection charge or by impact fee, not both, since the section "does not apply to water and sewer connection fees" (s. 163.31801(12)). (c) **Mostly yes** in principle that a County fee may fund equipment at a school board's school used as a County shelter, by agreement with the owner: a county fee funded school board facilities in *St. Johns County v. Northeast Florida Builders Ass'n*, 583 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1991), and schools suitable as shelters "shall be made available at the request of the local emergency management agencies" (s. 252.385(4)(a)). **Open, leaning no** that a data center fee can meet the need and benefit tests: a data center houses no residents (compare *Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P.*, 760 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 2000)), so a shelter fee needs a demand the facility itself creates and a benefit "accruing to the new ... nonresidential construction." That is for the Technical Study, tied to Question 20. *Instruments.* Fee Ordinance Sec. 1.2 admits a shelter only "where the Technical Study identifies it and supports its inclusion"; Secs. 2.2(c), 2.2(i), 2.4, 4.2 and 5.2; M2.1(a)(3) keeps shelters the fee does not reach under M2. Release 2026.4, in Sec. 5.2, requires the agreement with a shelter's owner to state who holds title to the Capital Facilities and, from 1 January 2027, to comport with s. 163.3177(6)(h), and requires the Sec. 4.2 agreement for in-kind delivery at such a shelter to comport with s. 163.3177(6)(h) as well; in Sec. 2.2(a), states that for a public shelter the study identifies only the shelter demand Covered Facilities themselves create, measured as the persons the County's emergency management plan would shelter after evacuation of the area the fire official assigns to a battery, fuel or hazardous materials incident at a Covered Facility (the measure M2.1(a)(1) also uses), and not countywide shelter demand or shelter demand from a hurricane or other area-wide event; and in Sec. 6.7 and its row of the division table, cites "s. 163.31801(15), Florida Statutes, as created by Chapter 2026-161, Laws of Florida." M2.1(c)(2), (c)(3) and Exhibit "I," paragraph 1, require the same owner terms at a public shelter the County does not own. *Left open.* The Technical Study, which must also convert shelter demand in persons into a Fee Unit (Sec. 3.2); a facility whose incident area reaches no homes pays the shelter rate unless an independent fee calculation shows otherwise (Sec. 6.3). Counsel 9.1. **10. "Increase," pending applications and *Sheetz*.** *Answers.* (a) **Open, leaning no**: a category with its own Fee Unit, funding capital facilities the general rate does not fund, reads as a "new" fee under s. 163.31801(4)(d), outside subsection (6), which governs "An increase to a current impact fee rate" and caps it at "50 percent of the current impact fee rate"; a new category has no current rate. The risk is real where Sec. 3.4's "in place of" mode charges data centers more for the same facilities. The extraordinary-circumstances route is narrow: it is unavailable where the government "has not increased the impact fee within the past 5 years" (subsection (6)(g)3.a.), from 2027 it caps any such increase at "100 percent divided equally over a 4-year period" (subsection (6)(g)3.d.), and the Attorney General has warned that a loose reading lets "the statutory exception ... swallow the statutory rule" (AGO 2026-01). (b) **Open**: new or increased fees "may not apply to current or pending permit applications submitted before the effective date" (s. 163.31801(4)(d)). "Development permit" includes "any building permit, zoning permit, subdivision approval, rezoning" (s. 163.3164(16)), but the fee attaches at "the building permit for the property that is subject to the fee" (s. 163.31801(4)(e)), which supports the narrower reading. No case decides it. (c) **Mostly no**: *Sheetz* holds that "The Takings Clause does not distinguish between legislative and administrative permit conditions" and leaves open how closely a condition on "a class of properties" must be tailored. Florida already requires proportionality to need and spending, earmarking, and proof "by a preponderance of the evidence" with no deferential standard (s. 163.31801(4)(f) to (h), (9)). *Sheetz* adds a federal claim that s. 70.45 cannot reach, since that section "does not apply to impact fees adopted under s. 163.31801." On remand the California Court of Appeal upheld the fee at the class level, but the California Supreme Court ordered that decision depublished on 12 November 2025, and certiorari was denied on 15 June 2026, so no citable answer on tailoring exists. *Instruments.* Fee Ordinance Sec. 3.4 makes the study say whether each rate replaces or adds to a general rate and bars charging demand twice; Secs. 2.1, 2.3 apply the 12-month rule and subsection (6) where the ordinance increases a fee; Sec. 6.3's facility-specific calculation answers a tailoring argument; Sec. 1.3 exempts pending applications. Release 2026.4 adds to Sec. 3.4 that an increment funds only Capital Facilities the general rate's study does not include, and is otherwise an increase subject to Sec. 2.3, and that a rate charged in place of a general rate is an increase to the extent it exceeds that rate for the same facilities; applies the 12-month rule in Sec. 2.1 in every case; and, because Sec. 1.3 keyed the fee to a "complete application" submitted on or after the effective date, keys it instead to an application first submitted on or after that date, whether or not then complete, and exempts a permit application submitted before that date, whether or not then complete. *Left open.* Counsel 10.1. Whether the extraordinary route is open turns on each county's fee history. **11. Credits for in-kind contributions.** *Answers.* (a) **Open, leaning yes**: leased or utility-owned capability must be credited where the County required it. The government "that requires any improvement or contribution must credit against the collection of the impact fee any contribution ... related to public facilities or infrastructure, including monetary contributions, land dedication, site planning and design, or construction," "on a dollar-for-dollar basis at fair market value" (s. 163.31801(5)(a)). The trigger is a required contribution, not only conveyed capital, and nothing excepts contributions made before the fee existed. Under the instruments this arises mainly in transition, when M2 capability is in service as Category C takes effect, because M2.1(a)(3) stops requiring leased or utility capability once the fee covers a facility. Agreement Section 10.8(c) already promises the credit ("Obligations already performed under Sections 4.2 and 4.3 and Module M2 in a fee category are credited under s. 163.31801(5)(a)"), which conflicts with Fee Ordinance Sec. 4.2 ("Equipment the applicant keeps, whether leased to the County or owned by a utility, earns no credit"). (b) **Open**: the statute is silent on when fair market value is fixed; acceptance fits the text best, and the county may choose. (c) **Open, leaning yes**: the credit reduces "any impact fee collected for the general category or class of public facilities," which describes the type of facility, so either fee that funds the same class may absorb it; the ordinance should set the order. No appellate decision on valuation date, leased equipment or pre-fee contributions under subsection (5)(a) was found. *Instruments.* Fee Ordinance Secs. 3.4, 4.1, 4.2, 4.4 (value fixed in the credit agreement, credit applied on acceptance), 4.6 (a credit stays in its own category); M2.1(a)(3), (c); Agreement Sections 4.7(c), (e), 10.8(c); In-Kind Test 5.1, 8.2. Release 2026.4 adds to Sec. 4.2 that capability a development agreement required at a County Emergency Facility before the Category C fee took effect is credited as s. 163.31801(5)(a) requires, at the fair market value of the capability for the period it is provided; values credits as of acceptance, as an independent professional engineer or, for land, an appraiser certifies, the credit agreement stating the basis of value rather than the value itself (Sec. 4.4); adds to Sec. 4.6 that where a general rate and an increment fund the same class, a credit applies first against the increment, then the general rate; and adds to M2.1(a)(3) that capability in service under form (1) or (2) when the fee takes effect continues until the Developer conveys equipment to the County, or pays the fee, under the fee provisions. It also has the County accept Capital Facilities it requires once they meet the acceptance standards (Sec. 4.4(a); M2.1(g)), and gives work on public land for credit, and the Developer's work at a County facility under M2's second and third forms, the award and bond terms of Lease Section 4.7A(a) to (c) (Sec. 4.8; M2.1(i)). *Left open.* Counsel 11.1 and 11.2. Each item's value is an appraisal question. ### D. Development Agreement **12. Consideration for the recorded covenants.** *Answers.* (a) **Mostly no**, Florida law does not require *recited* consideration to enforce the declaration against a successor, or the Agreement under ss. 163.3239 and 163.3243. A deed needs only the written form of s. 689.01(1) ("No seal shall be necessary"); a covenant runs on a covenant that touches and involves the land, an intent that it run, and notice, with no privity required (*Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Dolgencorp, Inc.*, 964 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (confirm the reporter citation)); and the Act binds "all successors in interest to the parties" (s. 163.3239). (b) **Open, leaning yes** that *actual* consideration is needed. The Supreme Court held that a deed conveys title "regardless of whether he receives a contractual consideration," but that its opinion does not affect the law "under which consideration is required to support contractual undertakings of any kind whether characterized as contracts, covenants, promises, agreements, or the like" (Florida Supreme Court, 1985, 479 So. 2d 90, 101, a deed given without consideration). The County's own promises supply consideration (for example, Sections 4.5(b), 9.5(a), 10.17 and 10.20 to 10.22), but Section 10.4(b) says no obligation of the Developer is given in exchange for any "approval, assurance, vesting, phase release, Campus Development Envelope, or Term," which is a successor's best argument. A recital of the Developer's own reasons is a motive, not consideration, though it helps the declaration stand as a voluntary grant. *Instruments.* Sections 9.5 (Chapter 712 notices), 10.4(b), 10.11(a) (void if the Approvals are denied, which a court may read as the real bargain), (c) (independent declaration), 10.13 (intent, touch and concern, s. 163.3239); the signature block calls for witnesses. Release 2026.4 strikes "assurance," from Section 10.4(b) and makes it one operative statement: no obligation of the Developer is given in exchange for any approval, vesting, phase release, Campus Development Envelope or Term; each mitigation obligation rests on the impact Exhibit "B-1" quantifies for it; and the Parties' mutual promises, including the County's promises in Sections 4.5(b), 9.5(a), 10.17 and 10.20 to 10.22, are consideration for each other. It adds no recital of the Developer's reasons, which would not be operative and could state the real bargain; Sections 10.11(c) and 10.13 carry the voluntary grant. *Left open.* Counsel 12.1. **13. Phase review within an envelope.** *Answer.* **Mostly yes**: conformity-only review of a later Phase confirms a decision already made, provided the Board actually decides the Envelope, and every discretionary permit it needs, at the Agreement's hearings, and later review applies only objective standards to permits the County's code lets staff issue. Vesting under s. 163.3233 answers the 1956 decision below as to the freeze, which the Act authorizes for a limited term, but not as to a promise to decide a future discretionary matter a particular way. The three cases, now confirmed from the opinions: - The Florida Supreme Court's 1956 decision on zoning by contract, 93 So. 2d 86, 89 (Fla. 1956): "A municipality has no authority to enter into a private contract with a property owner for the amendment of a zoning ordinance subject to various covenants and restrictions in a collateral deed or agreement to be executed between the city and the property owner"; "a city cannot legislate by contract." The rezoning was conditioned on contracts to be made later. - *Morgran Co. v. Orange County*, 818 So. 2d 640, 642 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002): a county that "has already contracted to support Morgran's request for rezoning ... has invalidly contracted away its discretionary legislative power," and estoppel "cannot be applied against a governmental entity to accomplish an illegal result"; but "Development agreements are expressly permitted by the Florida Statutes." Affirmed on the contract and estoppel counts, reversed to allow one more amendment, and remanded. - *Lee County v. Captiva Civic Ass'n, Inc.*, No. 6D2025-0335 (Fla. 6th DCA May 22, 2026): a 2003 settlement capping density "at any time" was "an ultra vires contracting away of the exercise of the County's police power and unenforceable as a matter of law"; the Act "authorizes local governments to temporarily freeze zoning regulations," but the settlement "does not purport to be a statutorily authorized agreement." Reversed. The association sought panel rehearing, rehearing en banc and certification; no ruling on that motion was found, so the opinion is not yet final (check the docket). An Envelope decided at the s. 163.3225 hearings and ending with the Term is none of these. The weak point is procedure: if the County's code makes a later-phase permit quasi-judicial, the Agreement cannot make it ministerial, and Section 10.6 waives no hearing "required by law." *Instruments.* Section 3.2(b) requires a full build-out Exhibit "B-1"; Section 3.2(c) has the Board decide the Envelope at the Agreement's hearings, held with the hearings on the permits in Exhibit "J," Part J-1, and makes later review ministerial; Sections 3.4(c), 10.6, 10.9(b). Nothing binds the County's regulatory choices past the Term, which matters after *Captiva*. Release 2026.4 adds to Section 3.2(c) that Exhibit "J," Part J-1 states, for each later Phase, each discretionary permit decided at the s. 163.3225 hearings and each permit the County's land development regulations in effect at execution allow to be issued administratively, and that a later Phase relies on conformity review only for permits so stated. *Left open.* Counsel 13.1. **14. Later standards, revalidations and fees.** *Answers.* (a) **Open, leaning no** that Section 10.8(a) is specific enough as to item (3). Section 163.3233(2)(c) lets the County apply later laws only if they "are specifically anticipated and provided for in the development agreement." Item (1) names its subject precisely; item (2) names a body of law but no subjects; and item (3), "each impact fee ordinance," reaches every fee of every category, which invites a court to reject a catch-all that would swallow the freeze. No decision construing paragraph (2)(c) was found. (b) **Mostly yes**, one hearing may serve every agreement: the statute requires "a public hearing" and a determination, not one per agreement, and the determination should name each agreement. (c) **Mostly yes**, a revalidated rate is a term in force at execution, since Sections 4.1(c), (d) and 4.2(e) fix its method and bounds; item (1) names it anyway. (d) **Mostly yes**, the Section 10.8(b) waiver binds the Developer and its successors for Phases not begun: a person may waive a right that rests in the individual and is "intended for his sole benefit" (AGO 78-29, quoting AGO 77-41, the Attorney General's statement of the rule, which cites a 1945 Florida Supreme Court decision, 22 So. 2d 263), and a recorded promise that later standards apply defeats the good-faith reliance estoppel requires (*Hollywood Beach Hotel Co. v. City of Hollywood*, 329 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1976)). It is **Open** for Phases already begun under a standard that applies "whenever approved," and it covers standards only, not rates or fees. (e) The gap between execution and the Effective Date is covered in substance, but the compliance wording needs repair: an unchallenged amendment under the expedited process simply takes effect "31 days after the state land planning agency notifies the local government that the plan amendment package is complete," and only a challenged one receives a final order "determining the adopted amendment to be in compliance" (s. 163.3184(3)(c)4.), so its effective date is the only evidence. An amendment under the state coordinated review process, which s. 163.3184(2)(c) requires for a development subject to s. 380.06 (Question 20), goes into effect "pursuant to the state land planning agency's notice of intent" (s. 163.3184(4)(e)5.). (f) **Open, leaning enforceable**: Section 9.2 binds the owners among themselves, since s. 163.3237 is permissive and s. 163.3239 passes Section 9.2's benefit to the other owners, but Section 9.2 can itself be amended by the same route. Later ordinances reach the Project only through Section 10.8 and the statutory hearing: "Standards" means Exhibit "O" (Section 1.1), fixed by Section 3.6(b). *Instruments.* Sections 2.2(c), 3.6(b), 9.2, 10.7, 10.8, 10.24(a); Standards Sec. 1(d). Release 2026.4, in Section 10.8(a), names in item (2) the subjects of Standards Secs. 4 to 18 and, in item (3), a bracketed list of every fee category the County charges or expects to adopt, and lets the determination be made at the adopting hearing "or at any later public hearing, naming each development agreement to which the determination applies"; extends the Section 10.8(b) waiver to each rate under item (1) and each impact fee under item (3); in Section 2.2(c), replaces "are in compliance under s. 163.3184" with wording that the amendment has become effective under s. 163.3184 or s. 163.3187 or, if timely challenged, has been determined in compliance by final order; and adds to Section 10.17(b) a covenant by each owner, for the benefit of the others, not to seek, without the others' written consent, an amendment that Section 9.2 bars or any amendment of Section 9.2 or of that covenant. *Left open.* Counsel 14.1. Executing the Agreement after the plan amendment takes effect avoids the second half. **15. The waiver, and the measure of an in-kind item.** *Answers.* (a) **Mostly yes**, narrowly. The Harris Act has no non-waiver clause (s. 70.001 uses "waives" only for sovereign immunity) and lets a government "implement the settlement offer by appropriate development agreement" (s. 70.001(4)(c)); Florida lets an owner waive rights that protect only it (the waiver rule as the Attorney General states it, Question 14); and the Ninth Circuit treats a voluntary promise "supported by consideration" as no taking (*Leroy Land Development v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency*, 939 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1991) (confirm); a 2008 Ninth Circuit decision, 548 F.3d 1219, whose exemption of legislative conditions did not survive *Sheetz*). The limit is coercion (*Koontz*). The waiver is strongest for commitments stated at execution, weaker for standards adopted later under Section 10.8 (not a "known right"), and it depends on the alternative pathway being real and on consideration (Question 12). Because "The right to bring an action under this section may not be waived" (s. 70.45(2)) and that claim covers the same ground, little rides on it. (b) **Open, leaning cost** for items other than land: land at fair market value; construction, equipment and money at the grantor's cost; a share of output at cost plus forgone sales. *Dolan* compares "the degree of the exactions demanded" with "the projected impact" (512 U.S. at 388); compensation "is measured by the property owner's loss rather than the government's gain" (U.S. Supreme Court, 2003, 538 U.S. 216, 235-36, just compensation); and s. 70.45(1)(a) measures damages by "the reduction in fair market value of the real property or the amount of the fee or infrastructure cost that exceeds what would be permitted." No case decides it, and *Sheetz* says nothing on valuation (certiorari in the remand case was denied on 15 June 2026). *Instruments.* Section 10.1 waives claims "as to the commitments it makes in this Agreement and the conditions it accepts by executing it"; Sections 10.2, 10.3 supply voluntariness; Section 10.5; In-Kind Test 5.4 tests each item other than land at the higher of its burden value and its market value, so the record holds under either answer. Release 2026.4 confines the Section 10.1 waiver to commitments and conditions stated in the Agreement at execution, and states that the waiver does not reach any regulation, condition or requirement imposed after execution, including one Section 10.8 anticipates. *Left open.* Counsel 15.1, which the higher-of rule makes immaterial to the record. **16. The Qualified Fiscal Agent.** *Answers.* (a) **Mostly no**, the Agent's independence does not by itself keep the payments outside the Impact Fee Act. Subsection (8) requires an affidavit that fees "were collected and expended by the local government ... or were collected and expended on its behalf," and an Agent that pays only for items a County department specifies, with title vesting "in the County on its delivery and acceptance" (Exhibit "Q," paragraph (i)), spends in substance for the County. "[A] change in the method of collection will not convert a prohibited tax into a valid fee" (*Collier County v. State*, 733 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 1999); confirm). If anything keeps them outside the Act, it is that they are optional, project-specific agreement obligations rather than a charge the County imposes: from 2027 an "impact fee" is "a one-time charge imposed by a local government on new development" (s. 163.3164(23)), and s. 163.31801(5)(a) treats contributions under a "proportionate share agreement, or any form of exaction" as credits against fees, not as fees. They are then exactions under s. 70.45. (b) **Open, leaning no**: a community foundation can hold them only outside its component funds, because the governing body must have the power "[t]o modify any restriction or condition on the distribution of funds for any specified charitable purposes" (26 C.F.R. 1.170A-9(f)(11)(v)(B)(1)), which Section 4.6(d) ("No such funds may be applied to any other purpose") forbids; that is for the foundation's tax counsel (see Question 25). (c) **Mostly yes**, money held with no spending period weakens the record: the Act presumes a "spending period provision" (s. 163.31801(8)), the fee cases assume refunds of unspent funds (*St. Johns County*), and under s. 70.45 money never applied mitigates nothing. (d) **Mostly yes**, an agent fee paid on top is part of the mitigation cost Exhibit "B-1" must carry, by analogy to the Act's limit of administrative charges "to actual costs" (subsection (4)(c)). *Instruments.* Agreement Sections 4.2, 4.3, 4.6, 4.7(b), 10.4(a), 10.12(c); M2.1(c)(3), (e). Release 2026.4 replaces the Agent with a restricted County account, the Mitigation Account (Section 4.6): on answer (a) the Agent's independence did not keep the payments outside the Act, and it cost a fee and left the County unable to draw its own security. Payments under Sections 4.2 and 4.3(a) and M2.1(c)(3) and (e), draws on the security for them and disposal proceeds go into the account, which is separate from the general fund and never transferred to it. Each payment is applied only to the line of Exhibit "B-1" it answers, on the responsible County department's written specification, and its earnings stay in the account; funds not applied within [__] years go to another line answering the same impact, and none reverts to the Developer. The County publishes a yearly ledger by payee and line and has the account audited each year at the Developer's cost, and the Developer may enforce these limits. The County is the beneficiary of the letter of credit under Section 4.2(f). Answers (b) and (d) no longer arise. The Drafter's Notes advise keeping the account to the Act's accounting standards (a separate fund, a spending period and the subsection (8) affidavit), which works under either answer to Counsel 16.1. *Left open.* Counsel 16.1, which applies to payments into the Mitigation Account as it did to payments to the Agent. **17. Operating obligations and remedies.** *Answers.* (a) **Mostly no**: in-kind maintenance and fuel, a maintenance account held by the Agent (in Release 2026.4, a mitigation payment into the Mitigation Account instead, which this answer does not reach; see Question 16 and Counsel 16.1), and reimbursement of documented monitoring costs the Project causes are not an unauthorized tax under *Collier County v. State*, 733 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 1999), which held a fee on newly completed improvements "an impermissible tax" (at 1014) because it funded what the county admitted were "the exact services funded through the general revenue fund from ad valorem taxes" (at 1016). In-kind work, including replacing equipment at the end of its life, is not money paid to the County (replacement was not separately researched), and a documented cost reimbursement kept out of the general fund is a charge for a service to the payer. Training reimbursement funds a general service's operations and is closest to the line (**Open, leaning no**), limited to the share "attributable to the Project." The Court's objection in *Collier County* was that the fee would "defray the operating costs for the County to exercise its sovereign functions" (at 1019). (b) **Mostly yes** for withholding further development approvals during an uncured default as a remedy the Agreement provides; **Open** for the same withholding under Standards Sec. 18(d) alone, since nothing read supports withholding without the owner's agreement (certificates of occupancy, which Sec. 18(d) also withholds, were not researched); and **Mostly no** for withholding a building permit on code-compliant plans, because "The enforcing agency shall issue a permit ... when the plans and specifications for such proposal comply with the Florida Building Code and the Florida Fire Prevention Code and the Life Safety Code" (s. 553.79(2)(a)4.). The Legislature has itself barred some grounds other than code compliance for denying a building permit (s. 553.79(17)), and no decision was found on denying a building permit for an owner's uncured default. The Act's own remedies are revocation or modification where the County "finds, on the basis of substantial competent evidence, that there has been a failure to comply with the terms of the development agreement" (s. 163.3235), after the hearings s. 163.3225(1) requires, and an action for injunctive relief "to enforce the terms of a development agreement" (s. 163.3243). A federal court has upheld a contract term letting a county withhold further approvals: on 13 September 2024 it granted St. Johns County summary judgment declaring that, under the remedies section of a 2018 concurrency and impact fee credit agreement for a developer's widening of State Road 16 (see s. 163.3180), the County "may (1) halt approval of additional plats and construction plans within the Grand Oaks PUD until and unless" the developer complies (*Southeast Development Partners, LLC v. St. Johns County*, No. 3:23-cv-00846 (M.D. Fla.), slip op. 38), and in an unpublished opinion the Eleventh Circuit held those remedies "consistent with the County's rights to enforce the Agreement upon a breach" (No. 24-13385 (11th Cir. 7 August 2026), slip op. 41 n.22). Both courts rested the County's authority on the agreement's own terms; neither, as read, addressed withholding under an ordinance alone, building permits or certificates of occupancy. Neither decision binds a Florida court, and neither treated the agreement as one made under ss. 163.3220 to 163.3243. Whatever the remedy, s. 125.022 still requires a timely decision. The County "must approve, approve with conditions, or deny" a complete application within 120 days, or within 180 days where final action requires a quasi-judicial or public hearing, unless both parties agree to an extension, and the decision "must include written findings supporting the county's decision" (s. 125.022(2)(b)2. to 4.). A denial must cite "an ordinance, rule, statute, or other legal authority" (s. 125.022(2)(e)), and an application filed through a county's preapplication program is "deemed approved by operation of law without conditions" if the County does not act within 45 days and then fails to respond within 10 days after the applicant's written notice (s. 125.022(1)(d)2.; see Question 5). A withholding of a development permit or development order therefore works only as a timely written denial, with findings, that cites the provision relied on, unless both parties agree to extend the period. Section 125.022 does not reach building permits (s. 125.022(3)). (c) **Open, leaning no** as drafted in Release 2026.3, and **Open** with the Release 2026.4 change: liquidated damages require that "the damages consequent upon a breach must not be readily ascertainable," judged "at the time of the drawing of the contract," and that the sum not be "grossly disproportionate," and an option "either to choose liquidated damages or to sue for actual damages" makes the clause a penalty as a matter of law (Florida Supreme Court, 1991, 573 So. 2d 326, 328 to 330, restating its 1954 test, 73 So. 2d 393, liquidated damages). The Court did not "imply that a liquidated damages clause which merely provided the option of pursuing equitable remedies would be unenforceable" (id. at 330 n.5), which supports reserving equitable relief. No Florida decision was found on whether a county may liquidate the loss its residents suffer. Courts elsewhere, as the Ninth Circuit described "the cases generally," have let a public body liquidate its inhabitants' loss from delay in a public improvement. Applying California's statute, the Ninth Circuit upheld $500 a day for delay in completing a highway tunnel, holding that "Although a municipality, in its corporate capacity, may suffer no damage from delay in the completion of a public improvement, it may validly contract for liquidated damages for delay in contemplation of the inconvenience and loss which will flow to its inhabitants for whose benefit the improvement is intended and at whose cost it is to be built" (*Six Companies of California v. Joint Highway District No. 13*, 110 F.2d 620, 625 (9th Cir. 1940), reversed on another ground, 311 U.S. 180 (1940)). The Eleventh Circuit, applying Florida law in 2000, distinguished that decision because the contract before it involved no public entity, its beneficiaries were "not paying for the improvements," and the plaintiff claimed no loss (No. 99-13156, slip op. 8). The County's own monitoring and enforcement costs avoid the question of whose loss is liquidated, but costs the County documents and recovers under Section 6.2 may be readily ascertainable, which weakens the first prong of the test: the Ninth Circuit held a public body's own added overhead "neither impracticable nor extremely difficult of ascertainment," so that it did "not of itself remove the cause from the ban of the statute," and upheld the clause on the inhabitants' loss instead (110 F.2d 620). Residents protected by a sound limit do not pay for the Project, so that rule fits the Agreement imperfectly. Code enforcement fines for the same violation remain cumulative, and no decision was found on whether a court would weigh them against the County. Indexing to the consumer price index is not itself a problem. *Instruments.* Agreement Sections 4.3(c), 6.2 (reimbursements capped at documented costs and the Exhibit "B-1" figure, paid after the fact into restricted accounts), 4.6(c), 8.2(b), (c), 9.5(c), 10.4(a); M2.1(c); Standards Sec. 18(d). Release 2026.4 adds to Section 8.2(c) that each liquidated amount is the County's sole monetary recovery for the damages it liquidates, without limiting equitable relief, code enforcement or recovery under Section 10.26; no longer applies liquidated amounts to Section 9.5 notices, in Section 8.2(c) or the last sentence of Section 9.5(c), since the County can record the notice itself; and excludes from Section 8.2(b) a building permit whose plans comply with the codes s. 553.79(2)(a)4. names. It also holds the M2.1(c)(3) maintenance funding in the Mitigation Account, a restricted County account, in place of the Agent (Question 16); the funding is then a mitigation payment for the measured impact, as the Section 4.2 Payment is, and Counsel 16.1 applies to it. Release 2026.4 also excepts from Standards Sec. 18(d) a building permit whose plans comply with the codes s. 553.79(2)(a)4. names, and a development order to the extent it issues one, as Agreement Section 8.2(b) does. Release 2026.4 also states in Section 8.2(b) and Sec. 18(d) that a development permit or development order applied for, as s. 125.022(3) defines those terms, is withheld only by a written denial within the periods s. 125.022 allows, that the denial states its findings and cites the provision, and that it is without prejudice to a new application once the default is cured or compliance is restored. Release 2026.4 also adds Standards Sec. 16(e): where a development agreement to which the County is a party provides for a written denial of an application for the development it governs as a remedy for the other party's uncured default, under that agreement, in an obligation that mitigates an impact of that development, subsection (b) of Sec. 16 does not bar consideration of that default, or of the agreement's terms that state the obligation and the remedy, in deciding whether to make the denial or in the denial, subsection (c) does not apply to that consideration, and both otherwise apply to the denial and to the decision whether to make it; Section 8.2(b) applies only to such a default; and later-Phase conformity review under Section 3.2(c) is subject to Section 8.2(b). Kit Part A, Sections 10 to 13, and Part C carry the finding, the certifications and a denial form. *Left open.* Counsel 17.1, narrowed to the liquidated damages question, to withholding under Standards Sec. 18(d) alone and to certificates of occupancy. The official copy of the district court's order of 13 September 2024 was not read. Before the question goes out, read chapter 553 and the Building Code on certificates of occupancy, which may settle that point without counsel. **18. Records the Developer files.** *Answers.* (a) **Mostly yes**, security and firesafety plans are confidential and exempt when a County office or another agency holds them. A "security or firesafety system plan" includes records "relating directly to the physical security or firesafety of the facility or revealing security or firesafety systems," "Threat response plans" and "Emergency evacuation plans," and a plan for "Any privately owned or leased property held by an agency is confidential and exempt," the Legislature intending it to "apply to security or firesafety system plans held by an agency" (s. 119.071(3)(a)1., 2.). "Held by an agency" describes the plan, so the exemption reaches a private data center's plans; no decision on the point was read. The custodian redacts the exempt portion and "shall produce the remainder of such record" (s. 119.07(1)(d)); site plans, drill summaries and contact lists are outside the exemption. Federal law makes chemical inventories public and lets only the state commission and local committee withhold a chemical's location (42 U.S.C. 11044(a)), so the County's copy of the S-12.4 storage locations is protected only as part of a firesafety plan (Open); battery fire test data under S-12.1 needs the trade secret exemption. Another agency that receives a plan for emergency response is not bound by Section 10.18(c). (b) **Open, leaning yes** for internal layout drawings. Paragraph (3)(b) covers only a structure "owned or operated by an agency," but (3)(c) exempts drawings of "the internal layout or structural elements of an ... industrial complex," defined as "any industrial, manufacturing, processing, distribution, warehousing, or wholesale facility or plant ... under common ownership" with more than 250 parking spaces, "500,000 square feet or more of gross floor area," or "a site of 100 acres or more" (s. 119.071(3)(c)4.c.). A data center uses equipment "to process, store, and transmit digital information" (s. 373.203(3)), which supports reading it as a "processing" facility, though exemptions are read narrowly (confirm) and no decision on point was found. The paragraph "does not apply to comprehensive plans or site plans ... which are submitted for approval," and its drawings are only "exempt," so the County may release them. (c) **Open** for information technology and operational technology security: s. 119.0725(2), rewritten by Chapter 2026-120, makes confidential and exempt "information held by an agency" relating to "critical infrastructure," which by its text is not limited to an agency's own systems, but the section's title begins "Agency cybersecurity information." (d) **Settled** as to the trade secret exemption: "A trade secret held by an agency is confidential and exempt" (s. 119.0715(2)), with the definition of s. 688.002(4), and Chapter 2026-52 deleted the exemption's scheduled repeal of 2 October 2026. Section 815.045 is only a legislative finding. Section 119.0715 protects any trade secret the County holds, including a third party's, such as a cooperative's costs or a battery maker's test data. Whether a figure qualifies is a fact question: customer-specific dollar amounts, contract demand and negotiated rates can qualify if kept secret; the Section 10.18(d) summary terms cannot. (e) **Settled** that ss. 366.093 and 425.045 do not reach a County record: s. 366.093 protects records "received by the commission" and found confidential by it, and s. 425.045 limits a member's inspection of a cooperative's own records. The municipal bid exemption "no longer applies after the contract ... is executed" (s. 119.0713(3)). In the County's copy, only s. 119.0715 protects customer-specific terms, and a municipal utility's prices make a weak trade secret claim (**Open, leaning no**), since they are a public body's revenue terms obtainable from it by request. (f) **Mostly no** for s. 288.075: it protects only what an "economic development agency" holds, and since Chapter 2026-65 a data center's location information is confidential for at most 12 months, with no extension. (g) **Settled** that the County's own duties govern: the custodian must "respond to such requests in good faith," "shall state the basis of the exemption ... including the statutory citation," and on request must state the reasons "in writing and with particularity" (s. 119.07(1)(c), (e), (f)); fees follow an unlawful refusal (s. 119.12(1)(a)), unless the court finds the request or the suit was for an improper purpose (s. 119.12(3)), and only if the requester gave the custodian written notice identifying the request at least 5 business days before suing, a notice excused where the agency does not prominently post its custodian's contact information in its primary administrative building and on its website (s. 119.12(1)(b), (2)). **Mostly yes** on two points that rest on cases: fees do not turn on the agency's good faith (Florida Supreme Court, 2016, 189 So. 3d 120, fees in a public records case (confirm)), and an automatic waiting period is unlawful (Florida Supreme Court, 1984, 458 So. 2d 1075, a waiting period before inspection of records (confirm)). The Section 10.18(c) notice is a contractual duty that cannot delay the response. (h) **Mostly yes**, the County may exclude its liability to the Developer for both. No statute requires notice to a submitter before release, so the duty exists only by contract; a contract claim against the County would otherwise lie (*Pan-Am Tobacco Corp. v. Department of Corrections*, 471 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1984) (confirm)), and a clear limit on a party's own liability is enforceable, though read strictly (Florida Supreme Court, 2015, 157 So. 3d 256, a limit on a party's own liability (confirm)). The good-faith disclosure clause fits s. 119.0715(4) ("An agency employee who, while acting in good faith ... releases a record containing a trade secret ... is not liable, civilly or criminally") and the limits of s. 768.28. It binds only the parties, not a utility, vendor or end user whose information sits in a submittal, and it covers only disclosure "in responding to a public records request," not the publication the Agreement and the Standards require. (i) **Open** whether the County's live copy of sound data is confidential and exempt while their publication on the dashboard is delayed. As Release 2026.4 revises them for reasons outside this question, Technical Manual Sec. B-9.3(b) and Exhibit "S," Section S-9.3(c) give the County a live feed at all times and let the Operator delay or aggregate publication on the dashboard only where the County finds in writing that real-time publication "would disclose security-sensitive operating information," and Section S-9.3(d) makes data delivered to the County public records. The exemption in s. 119.071(3) that could reach such data is the one for a security or firesafety system plan, which includes records "relating directly to the physical security or firesafety of the facility or revealing security or firesafety systems" and is confidential and exempt for property owned by or leased to a political subdivision, which likely includes County land under a ground lease, and for privately owned or leased property held by an agency (s. 119.071(3)(a)1.a., 2.a., 2.b.). Whether sound levels and spectra that would disclose security-sensitive operating information are such records is unsettled, and no decision on the point was read; if they are not, and s. 119.0725(2)(a) does not reach them either (see (c); Counsel 18.2), a request to the County reaches what the delay keeps off the dashboard. No court opinion could be opened for this answer; the 2016, 1984 and 2015 decisions and *Pan-Am Tobacco* are cited without a reading of the opinions, and each should be confirmed before any reliance. *Instruments.* Agreement Sections 5.2, 5.6(b), 10.14(d), 10.16, 10.18(a) to (d); Exhibit "S," Sections S-9.3(c), (d), S-12.1, S-12.2(a), S-12.4, S-24.1(d); Technical Manual B-4.2(e), B-4.3 ("A marking is a claim, not an exemption"), B-9.3(b); Standards Sec. 4(c)(3), (5); Kit Part A Section 9 (a confidentiality agreement "does not itself make any County record confidential; only a statutory exemption does"). The 2026.3 fallback of accepting a redacted utility contract with an affidavit of its cost terms is supported and is now the rule; striking the liability exclusion is not supported. Release 2026.4 provides in Section 5.2 that each utility agreement delivered under Section 5.2(a) or 5.6(b) comes with each customer-specific dollar amount, contract demand and rate redacted (conforming Section 10.18(d)), with the Section 5.2(b) affidavit and, for a cooperative or municipal utility, a new Exhibit "G" paragraph stating that the agreement makes the Developer bear all of the Section 5.6(a) costs; in Section 10.18(b), cites s. 119.0715 for trade secrets and s. 119.0725(2) for critical infrastructure and technology security information, and requires the Developer to state, for each portion marked as a trade secret, why it qualifies, including the value of secrecy and the steps taken to keep it secret; in Section 10.18(c), requires the notice promptly "without delaying its response," and has the Developer reimburse any judgment, settlement or award on another person's claim arising from a good-faith response to a request for information it delivered, marked or not; extends Section 10.14(d) to good-faith publication the Agreement or the Standards require; has the Section 6.1 annual report state, without including either plan, that the Exhibit "S" emergency operations plan was updated and resubmitted and the security plan updated; states in Technical Manual B-4.2(e) that for a data center as s. 373.203 defines it, confidentiality under s. 288.075(2)(a) ends no later than 12 months after the agency receives the request, and is not extended; makes the Technical Manual B-4.3(b) notice prompt, without delaying the response; and attaches Sections 10.14 and 10.18 to the Lease, so the Lease matches the Agreement, with Lease Exhibit "F" reading a section number in the attached Exhibit "G" affidavit as that section of the Agreement. Release 2026.4 also has the annual compliance report state the facility's annual information-technology equipment energy and total facility energy (Technical Manual B-7.5), which the County publishes with the report (Standards Sec. 17(a)); whether either is a trade secret under s. 119.0715 is the fact question of (d). *Left open.* Counsel 18.1 to 18.5. Whether a tort lies for a good-faith release matters for third parties; the reimbursement under Section 10.18(c) shifts that risk to the Developer. County facts: which offices hold the plans, and whether the County has an economic development agency. ### E. Emergency power at County facilities (Module M2) **19. Leased equipment and utility service.** *Answers.* (a) **Mostly no**: M2's second form is likely not utility service. A "public utility" is a person "supplying electricity or gas ... to or for the public within this state" (s. 366.02(8)). In the Commission's declaratory statements on leased solar equipment (Sunrun, Order No. PSC-2018-0251-DS-EQ; Vivint, Order No. PSC-2018-0413-DS-EQ; Tesla, Order No. PSC-2019-0065-DS-EQ), a lease whose payments are "independent of electric generation, production rates, or any other operational variable" "does not constitute a sale of electricity." Sunrun follows an earlier order on a fixed-payment cogeneration lease (Monsanto, Order No. 17009 (1986), known only as Sunrun describes it; confirm), which rested on "the fixed nature of the lease payments rather than who has the obligation for maintenance." Under the second form nothing is sold, the rent is fixed and nominal, the equipment serves only the facility's own load, and the County decides its use, so the County generates its own power. No order yet covers non-renewable or storage equipment with lessor-paid fuel. (b) **Open**, but not decisive: whether *PW Ventures* (Florida Supreme Court, 1988, 533 So. 2d 281) would survive de novo review after *Sun Gas Marketing & Petroleum, LLC v. BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc.*, No. 4D2023-0075 (Fla. 4th DCA 21 February 2024) (reporter citation to confirm), is unsettled. *Sun Gas* found *PW Ventures* "distinguishable" and observed that "the deferential standard accorded the PSC by the supreme court no longer exists," but it construed another statute and could not overrule the Supreme Court, whose decision still binds. If no electricity is supplied, the number of customers does not matter. (c) **Mostly no**: successive nominal-rent leases raise no debt or pledge question. For a lease over 60 months, "the rental shall be payable only from funds arising from sources other than ad valorem taxation" (s. 125.031), and Exhibit "I" has no pledge, no non-substitution clause and no default if a later lease is declined, so nothing compels appropriation (Florida Supreme Court, 2000, 769 So. 2d 1012: on its facts, a nonsubstitution clause "implicates article VII, section 12 of the Florida Constitution, notwithstanding the attempted disclaimer" of ad valorem taxation, because the county had not kept "full budgetary flexibility"). *Instruments.* M2.1(c)(2) is the lease form; M2.1(c)(3) moves to conveyance on a Commission or court determination or the County Attorney's advice; M2.2(a) bars any sale; M2.2(b) moves to the next form without default; M2.2(d) is the constitutional savings clause. Release 2026.4 adds M2.1(j), which has an engineer count every emissions unit at the facility, leaves the applicant's name to the Department, and assigns the owner or operator duties. Release 2026.4 adds to Exhibit "I," paragraph 3, that the rent does not vary with the electricity the equipment produces, the hours it runs, or the Developer's costs. It also has the Developer petition the Commission, at its cost, within [__] days after the second form applies, for a declaratory statement under s. 120.565 that its lease, maintenance and fuel delivery under that form do not make it a public utility (the question of Agency 19.1); the form applies meanwhile, and a statement that they do is a determination under M2.2(b). It also starts each later form when the one before it lapses or fails, including when the utility's contract ends or its equipment has not passed the readiness test by the Readiness Date (M2.1(c)(4)). *Left open.* Agencies 19.1 and 19.2. **20. The measured impact behind emergency power.** *Answers.* (a) **Not a legal research question**: which impact supports a contribution depends on the Technical Study and the utility's data. A condition must have "an essential nexus" and be "roughly proportionate to the impacts of the proposed use," and the government bears "the burden of proving" both (s. 70.45(1)(d), (4)); a fee needs a study using "the most recent and localized data available" and, from 1 January 2027, "a demonstrated-need study that is plan-based" (s. 163.31801(4)(a)). A data center adds no shelter population, so this is the weakest nexus in the set. The plausible links are readiness for battery and fuel incidents, shelter demand if neighbors are evacuated, and utility-measured local effects, each of which needs local data. (b) **Mostly yes**: a county may use its own method. A development above the statewide thresholds is now approved "pursuant to s. 163.3184(4) in lieu of proceeding in accordance with this section" (s. 380.06(12)(a)), so no regional method governs, within the limits of ss. 163.31801(4) and 70.45. (c) **Open, leaning yes** that Chapter 2026-65 forecloses a grid-reliability nexus in practice, though it does not preempt one. Tariffs "must reasonably ensure that each large load customer bears its own full cost of service and that such cost is not shifted to the general body of ratepayers" (s. 366.043(3)(a)), and grid reliability belongs to the Commission (s. 366.04(5)). A finding that the project degrades service at County facilities would contradict that scheme; it could stand only on utility-documented residual effects. *Instruments.* M2.1(a)(1) and (2) require "measured impacts on emergency response" and impose nothing the findings do not support; Agreement Sections 4.1(c), 4.2(a) (excluding costs Chapter 2026-65 places on tariffs) and 5.1; Fee Ordinance Secs. 1.5, 2.2, 2.4 and Category C. Release 2026.4 states in M2.1(a)(1) that the measure is not the reliability or cost of electric service, which the Interconnecting Utility's tariff under s. 366.043 or, for a cooperative or municipal utility, its rates and service terms address, with the same note for the emergency power row of the impacts table in Kit Part A, Section 7. It also measures a public shelter's demand in M2.1(a)(1) as Fee Ordinance Sec. 2.2(a) does: the persons the County's emergency management plan would shelter after evacuation of the area the fire official assigns to a battery, fuel or hazardous materials incident at the Facility, never demand from a hurricane or other area-wide event. *Left open.* The Technical Study. Nothing remains for counsel, now that M2 disclaims a grid-reliability nexus. ### F. County land (Ground Lease) **21. Rent in kind and fair value.** *Answer.* **Mostly yes**, the Board may credit rent in kind. Section 125.35(1)(a) lets the Board lease County land "whenever the board determines that it is to the best interest of the county to do so, to the highest and best bidder for the particular use the board deems to be the highest and best, for such length of term and such conditions as the governing body may in its discretion determine." It sets no cash requirement and no fair value floor; its discipline is the competitive award (AGO 88-34), and rent in kind published as a minimum term is the same for every bidder, so bids still compare on cash. Article VII, Section 10 of the Florida Constitution bars a county from becoming "a joint owner with, or stockholder of," or giving, lending or using "its taxing power or credit to aid any corporation, association, partnership or person." Because "a lease by a public entity to a private entity is not per se invalid," a public body "does not become a joint owner with a private entity merely by entering into a lease"; the Florida Supreme Court looks to "the nature of the relationship that will arise under the agreement," and held that a public body whose rent would be the greater of a fixed sum or half the tenant's net revenue was not a joint owner where it had "no responsibility for the financing, promotion, or development of the proposed project," its title was not encumbered by loans to the tenant, and it was not obligated to the tenant's creditors (*Jackson-Shaw Co. v. Jacksonville Aviation Authority*, 8 So. 3d 1076, 1092-94 (Fla. 2008)). A lease with rent in kind should likewise not make the County a joint owner where it takes on no part of the project's costs or debts. Rent in kind pledges no credit, so only a public purpose is required: without a gift, loan or use of credit "a project must merely serve a public purpose" (id. at 1095); the Florida Supreme Court's 1983 decision on public purpose, 443 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1983), gives legislative public purpose findings great weight (AGO 94-53; confirm). The Legislature contemplates below-market county leases (s. 125.38 permits a nominal price to a community nonprofit; s. 125.045(5)(a)4. treats "Below-market rate leases" as reportable incentives). The record needs a Board finding of a concrete public purpose and of the controls that secure it. The weak point is directing rent value to a nonprofit Recipient: a transfer of public value to a private entity needs "some clearly identified and concrete public purpose as the primary objective" and "some control retained by the public authority to avoid frustration of the public purpose" (Florida Supreme Court, 1967, 198 So. 2d 1, 4, public purpose and public control, as quoted in AGOs 98-33 and 75-71; confirm). A public college or university Recipient meets that easily; a nonprofit host, over which the Module gives the County almost no control (Module Sections 1.3(a), 2.6(b)), is **Open, leaning yes**. Adding a County control would raise the public records risk in Question 30. *Instruments.* Lease Recitals A, C; Sections 3.2(b), 4.1, 4.4; Module Sections 2.2(b), (c), 2.4 (Base Rent alone meets fair value in cash; the rent in kind is consideration in addition to it and is never credited against it; a cash true-up while a reset cap holds Base Rent below the appraised value), 2.7(b) (the County recovers no money for rent in kind), 2.12(16). Release 2026.4 removes the optional credit and the fallback if a court voids it, so no rent the County does not receive in cash counts toward fair value. It also widens the list of controls in Module Section 2.12(16), which named Sections 1.5 and 2.7 and paragraph D-6, to add the use limits of Section 1.6, the dedication of Recipient-Owned Hardware under Section 1.6(d) (enforceable by the Developer and the Recipient then serving), audit and publication under Section 1.22, and succession under Section 2.9(c), keeping the County's enforcement as landlord under Section 2.7. It adds no County control over a nonprofit Recipient. Release 2026.4 also extends the direction in Module Section 2.2(c), and the finding in Section 2.12(16), to the payments Section 1.5(g)(iv) provides for Access Institutions at a governmental host; Counsel 21.1 applies to those payments as it does to a nonprofit Recipient. If counsel wants a County control, the narrowest is a landlord's right to give notice under paragraph T-23(b) that a Recipient has used the Allocation outside Section 1.5(a), with a neutral deciding whether it ceases to serve. *Left open.* Counsel 21.1. **22. Section 70.45 and lease terms.** *Answer.* **Open, leaning no.** Section 70.45 reaches "any condition imposed by a governmental entity on a property owner's proposed use of real property," actionable when imposed "in writing ... as a final condition of approval for the requested use." Rent bargained in a competitive award for a County leasehold is the price of an estate the tenant did not own, set before it held any title, not a condition of approval of a use; and *Koontz* addresses demands on a permit applicant, while a landlord charging for its own land demands nothing the tenant owned. A tenant that owns the improvements may hold "legal title" to "improvements to the land" (s. 70.001(3)(f), (g), which s. 70.45(1)(e), (f) adopt), so it may be a "property owner" for later regulatory conditions on them, but not for rent fixed in the solicitation. There is no proprietary-capacity exception in the statute, and no case applying s. 70.45 or the Harris Act to a public lessee's rent was found. The weaker spot is the Lease's use covenants, which look more like conditions on use than rent does. *Instruments.* Lease Section 15.1(a) makes every County act under the Lease a landowner's act that "replaces no regulatory permit"; 15.1(b) calls the rents "bargained-for consideration for the leasehold and not conditions on any permit" (a stipulation that cannot waive a claim if one exists); Section 6.2(d); Exhibit "B," Part 2 sizes attached mitigation by impact findings, kept apart from rent by Exhibit "C," paragraph 2(d); Module Sections 2.2(b), 2.4. In Release 2026.4, Exhibit "B," Part 2 states the impact each attached Exhibit "S" covenant answers. *Left open.* Counsel 22.1. **23. Airport land and the County's right to cure.** *Answers.* (a) **Mostly yes**, rent in kind to a recipient other than the airport on grant-obligated airport property is unlawful use of airport revenue. "[T]he revenues generated by an airport that is the subject of Federal assistance may not be expended for any purpose other than the capital or operating costs of" the airport, the local airport system or related facilities (49 U.S.C. 47133(a); the matching grant assurance is 47107(b)(1)). Airport revenue includes "rents, or other payments received by or accruing to the sponsor from ... tenants, concessionaires, lessees" for the right "to use or occupy airport property," "fair market fees for use of the airport are the required minimum for nonaeronautical use," and "using airport property for community purposes is a prohibited use of airport revenue" except as the Revenue Use Policy permits (FAA Order 5190.6C, paras. 15.6.a, 15.12.l, 17.11). State law, including the airport lease negotiation power of s. 125.35(1)(b)1., cannot relax a grant assurance. (b) **Mostly yes** on the cure point, but the exposure comes from ownership, not from Section 14.4. As fee owner the County is already an "owner" under CERCLA (42 U.S.C. 9607(a)) and Chapter 403 (s. 403.727(4)(a)), and the lease defeats the third-party defense, which excludes acts "in connection with a contractual relationship" including leases (42 U.S.C. 9607(b)(3), 9601(35)(A); s. 403.727(5)(d)). Doing the work can add "operator" status, since an operator is one who "manage[s], direct[s], or conduct[s] operations specifically related to pollution" or "decisions about compliance with environmental regulations" (*United States v. Bestfoods*, 524 U.S. 51, 66-67 (1998)), which matters most for permits and tank rules. CERCLA spares a local government acting "in response to an emergency created by the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance generated by or from a facility owned by another person," absent gross negligence or intentional misconduct (42 U.S.C. 9607(d)(2)); Sections 403.727 and 376.308 have no such shield. Section 768.28 "waives sovereign immunity for liability for torts" within its limits and is no defense to statutory cleanup cost recovery; for a negligent cure the caps apply, but a government that undertakes a task may owe a duty of care (Florida Supreme Court, 2009, 3 So. 3d 1035, a duty of care on undertaking a task (confirm)). *Instruments.* Release 2026.4 adds Lease Section 4.10, which takes rent on airport property subject to 49 U.S.C. 47107(b) or 47133 only in cash, at not less than fair market rental value, as airport revenue, and takes no rent in kind there, a Section 4.7A facility included; Lease Sections 8.2, 9.2 (environmental risk on the Tenant), 14.4 (a right, not a duty), 15.4; Module Sections 2.3, 2.12(13). Release 2026.4 adds to Module Section 2.1(a) and Options Section 2.5 that no Board elects the Module, or Section 2.5, for Premises that are airport property subject to 49 U.S.C. 47107(b) or 47133; and limits Lease Section 14.4 self-help for Article 8 obligations and hazardous systems to emergency containment, the County otherwise drawing on security or seeking specific performance or a receiver. *Left open.* Whether a parcel is still airport property, or was released and on what terms, is for the Federal Aviation Administration (Agency 23.1). Whether a tenant's payment in lieu of taxes on airport property is airport revenue, and whether a lower appraised rent that reflects a lease covenant to provide emergency power, as impact mitigation, to County facilities that are not airport facilities is a use of airport revenue, are **Open**. Counsel 23.1 to 23.3. ### G. Community Benefits Agreement **24. Support letters from a charity, and the Community Payment.** *Answers.* (a) **Mostly yes**: a letter asking the county commission to adopt an ordinance or resolution (a rezoning, plan amendment or development agreement) is a lobbying communication, whatever Florida calls the proceeding; a letter to a planning or zoning board or a hearing officer is not. "Legislation" includes action on "Acts, bills, resolutions, or similar items by ... any local council, or similar governing body" (26 U.S.C. 4911(e)(2)), but "'Legislative body' does not include executive, judicial, or administrative bodies," and administrative bodies include "zoning boards" (26 C.F.R. 56.4911-2(d)(3), (4)); the rule for organizations that have not elected s. 501(h) is the same (26 C.F.R. 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii)). IRS training text puts it plainly: the test "is not the legal effect of the action, but whether it is an item voted upon by a legislative body" (EO CPE Text FY1997, not precedent). The cost of a few letters is small, and an insubstantial amount of lobbying is permitted. (b) **Open, leaning no** on private benefit and unrelated business income. Under the account form the Community Payment is the organization's own restricted receipt, received in an exchange: Section 3.3 makes the letters a duty and Section 3.9(a) makes a missing letter a ground to terminate, and "The sine qua non of a charitable contribution is a transfer of money or property without adequate consideration" (*United States v. American Bar Endowment*, 477 U.S. 105, 118 (1986)). The organization certifies disbursements and picks grantees (Sections 5.9(a), 5.11) and the Developer keeps no interest, so the organization is not a conduit. A few letters are not a commercial service under 26 U.S.C. 513(a). The Developer's benefit is the price of benefits for a charitable class and should be incidental private benefit under *American Campaign Academy v. Commissioner*, 92 T.C. 1053 (1989) (confirm), unless support work grows into a large share of what the organization does. No ruling covers the arrangement. *Instruments.* CBA Sections 2.4(b), 3.2, 3.4, 3.6, 3.7, 3.10; Sections 5.8 and 5.12 (the Community Fund form, under which the organization receives nothing). Release 2026.4 adds to Section 3.10 that no Party treats any payment under the Agreement as a charitable contribution, and that no receipt the Community Party, a Fund Holder or a Recipient gives for one states that no goods or services were provided. *Left open.* Counsel 24.1, 24.2. The public support effect is Question 42. **25. A community foundation fund.** *Answers.* (a) **Mostly no**, it is not a donor-advised fund. That term requires a fund "with respect to which a donor (or any person appointed or designated by such donor) has, or reasonably expects to have, advisory privileges" (26 U.S.C. 4966(d)(2)(A)). No Developer, affiliate or Community Party person appoints, instructs or serves on the committee, and the Fund Holder's board decides grants (Section 5.12(b)). Fixing the purposes and the committee's size at signing is earmarking, which the 2023 proposed regulations (still proposed) say does not by itself create an advisory privilege (proposed 26 C.F.R. 53.4966-3(c)). The Community Party is a counterparty, not the Developer's designee, with "no role in any grant beyond public comment" (Section 5.12(g)). (b) **Mostly yes**: fixed purposes and a notice term coexist with the variance power, which lets the governing body modify a restriction that "becomes, in effect, unnecessary, incapable of fulfillment, or inconsistent with the charitable needs of the community," "without the necessity of the approval of any participating trustee" (26 C.F.R. 1.170A-9(f)(11)(v)(B)(1)), so long as notice never becomes consent. One soft spot: Section 5.12(f) diverts later payments whenever the Fund Holder "applies any part of the Community Fund outside the Permitted Purposes," which a lawful use of the variance power would do. (c) **Mostly yes**, the payments are not "contributions": the Developer receives organizational support, and a quid pro quo may come "from the charity or a third party" (IRS Pub. 5464 (Rev. 9-2026)). The Developer would likely deduct them as business expenses (26 C.F.R. 1.162-15(a)(1)), except any part paid "in connection with ... influencing legislation," which reaches local councils now that the local-legislation exception has been repealed (26 U.S.C. 162(e)(1)(A); confirm the 2017 repeal). *Instruments.* CBA Sections 2.5(d) (no deduction claim for a Community Payment), 5.8(a)(ii) (a non-advised field-of-interest fund of a public charity), 5.12(b) to (g). Release 2026.4 does not change Section 5.12(f). If a Fund Holder asks, a carve-out for the variance power is available: in Section 5.12(f), after "outside the Permitted Purposes," add "other than by an exercise of the variance power published under subsection (e)." *Left open.* Nothing for the instruments. How much of the payments s. 162(e)(1)(A) disallows is the Developer's own tax question. **26. Binding later owners.** *Answer.* **Open, leaning no** for a successor who does not assume. Without s. 163.3239, the CBA binds a later holder only by its own written assumption (Section 12.3) or as a covenant running with the land, which requires "(1) the existence of a covenant that touches and involves the land;" "(2) an intention that the covenant run with the land;" and "(3) notice of the restriction on the part of the party against whom enforcement is sought" (Florida Supreme Court, 2022, 336 So. 3d 207, covenants running with the land). The recorded memorandum supplies notice and, with Section 12.1 and the fee owner's joinder, intent; it cannot supply touch and concern, which requires performance that "tends necessarily to enhance the value of the property or renders it more convenient and beneficial to the owner" (*Palm Beach County v. Cove Club Investors Ltd.*, 734 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 1999)). In-kind delivery from equipment on the Project Site, sized by capacity installed there, has a fair argument as a burden on the land's use. The Community Payment, the Administration Payment and cloud-form delivery are money or off-site duties owed to a holder of no land, and are likely personal. Release 2026.4 also declares that the Developer's duties supporting the commitments declared to run (reporting, the annual meeting, Monitoring Fund and custody payments, business interruption cover, the assumptions it must obtain from later ground lessees and operators, the no-subsidy terms and any Legacy Reserve) run with the Project Site; most are money or service duties owed to holders of no land, and the same lean applies to them (Counsel 26.2). The Eleventh Circuit has certified to the Florida Supreme Court whether a fee provision is "a real covenant such that it runs with the land," finding "both interpretations are reasonable under extant Florida law" (*RJ's International Trading, LLC v. Crown Castle South, LLC* (11th Cir. Apr. 15, 2024) (confirm the docket number); answer pending in No. SC2024-0547, no decision found, confirm), and the answer will govern terms that do not regulate physical use. A purchaser at foreclosure of a mortgage recorded before the memorandum will likely take free, because recording order sets priority (s. 695.11). A ground lessee is bound only if the covenants run; an "operator" holding no estate is not bound by property law at all. Section 12.5 estoppel statements bind "only the person making it." The Replacement Approval terms define when the duty revives but bind a non-party only if the covenants run. *Instruments.* CBA Sections 12.1 to 12.5, 13.2, 13.3, Article IX security, and the fee owner's joinder. Unlike Agreement Sections 9.5, 10.13 and 10.17(c), the CBA has no running-covenant declaration, no Chapter 712 preservation duty and no lessee acknowledgment. Release 2026.4 adds three sections to Article XII: Section 12.6 makes the obligations of Articles V to IX, and the Developer's other obligations as they concern those obligations (among them those of Sections 2.5, 4.1(b) to (d), 4.3, 4.5, 10.1, 10.2, 11.5(d) and 12.7, and of any Section 13.5), as they apply to capacity installed at the Project Site, covenants running with the Project Site that bind each successor in title and ground lessee while it holds its interest; Section 12.7 has the Developer cause each ground lessee and operator, before it occupies, develops or operates its premises, to sign an acknowledgment of the recorded memorandum and an assumption of the obligations as they apply to those premises; and Section 12.8 requires the Developer to record, in the form ss. 712.05 and 712.06 prescribe and at least once every [twenty-five (25)] years, a notice preserving the memorandum, which the Community Party or the Recipient may record if the Developer does not. CBA Exhibit A item 2B names the state approvals that could replace each county approval, as possible Replacement Approvals that are not Approvals and become Replacement Approvals only when that definition applies to them, so the Approvals Date does not wait on them; item 2A lists the other permits described in Part 4. The security remains the backstop. *Left open.* Counsel 26.1 and 26.2. **27. No credit against public charges.** *Answers.* (a) **Mostly yes**, the covenant is enforceable between the private parties, including against a credit a later statute grants, unless that statute voids contrary agreements. A party "may waive any right to which he is legally entitled, whether secured by contract, conferred by statute" (Florida Supreme Court, 1936, 168 So. 625, on waiver of rights), where "such rights and privileges rest in the individual, are intended for his sole benefit" (AGO 78-29, quoting AGO 77-41, the Attorney General's statement of the rule, which cites a 1945 Florida Supreme Court decision, 22 So. 2d 263). No s. 163.31801(5)(a) credit arises for CBA benefits, because the credit duty falls on the government "that requires any improvement or contribution," and the County requires nothing under the CBA (CBA Sections 2.1, 2.2; Standards Sec. 16). Under a Lease, rent in kind is landowner consideration, not a contribution in a fee category (Lease Section 15.1(b)); if a court held otherwise, the statute's "Notwithstanding any ... development order ... or resolution" clause would likely override Module Section 2.11(a) as to that credit. Module Section 2.11(a) cannot bind a property appraiser or the Department of Revenue; it works only as the Tenant's covenant. Release 2026.4 narrows it to leave to the Lease any treatment that would be available on the same terms without rent in kind (Module Section 2.11(a); Lease Section 5.2(e)). (b) **Open, leaning no** that the pay-over is a penalty: it equals the reduction received, less any repayment, so it restores the gain rather than multiplying it, and the Community Party's loss from a public subsidy of its bargain is not readily measured (compare the Florida Supreme Court's 1954 decision on a deposit held as security, 73 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 1954)). The risk is a court treating it as damages where the Community Party lost nothing; no Florida case on gain-measured clauses was found. Recasting it as a price term reduces the risk. (c) Two related points about easements given under the CBA. Section 2.5(b) saves any exemption "available to the Developer on the same terms if this Agreement did not exist," and the conservation land exemption of s. 196.26 asks nothing about why an easement exists, so as drafted the Developer could claim it for a conservation easement granted under the CBA (Mostly yes). A federal deduction for such an easement is barred or reduced, because the support letters are consideration and a benefit from a third party counts (26 C.F.R. 1.170A-14(h)(3)(i); IRS Pub. 5464 (Rev. 9-2026)) (Mostly yes). *Instruments.* CBA Section 2.5(a) to (e), Section 11.6; Module Section 2.11(a); Lease Sections 5.2(b), (c), (e), 5.3(f); Agreement Section 10.8(c) honors statutory credits for Agreement items. Release 2026.4 recasts CBA Section 2.5(e) as a price term, so that the Community Payment for the year in which the Developer or an affiliate receives a barred reduction or payment increases by its amount, less any part repaid to the public body, or, under a capacity Election, the amount is paid into the Restricted Account; adds a matching payment into the Restricted Account in Module Section 2.11(a) for reductions Lease Section 5.3(f) does not catch; adds to Section 2.5(b) that it does not reach an exemption, classification or assessment, including under s. 196.26 or s. 193.501, of land subject to an easement or other interest granted under the CBA, which Section 2.5(a) bars; and widens Section 2.5(d) to every payment, capacity, easement and other property provided under the CBA, including an Instruction Share, and to the Developer's affiliates. *Left open.* Nothing now. When a credit statute is enacted, check whether it voids contrary agreements. **28. The Instruction Share.** *Answer.* **Mostly no** risk on each point as drafted. It never reaches the Community Party, but it is part of the Developer's bargain, so it is no gift, and CBA Section 2.5(d) should say so. No student works for the Developer, so there is no employment to share: the Eleventh Circuit's "primary beneficiary" test for students asks whether training is "tied to the intern's formal education program" and "complements, rather than displaces, the work of paid employees" (803 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2015)), and the Developer controls none of the terms the 2026 federal joint employer standards name (confirm). Each kind of public host has the authority: a Florida College System board "may when acting as a body make contracts" (s. 1001.64(25)); a university board of trustees may "contract and be contracted with" and "give and receive donations" (s. 1001.72(1)); and a district school board may "Contract, sue, and be sued" (s. 1001.41(4)). The share pays institutional costs, not student aid, so it does not count as "grant or scholarship assistance from non-Federal sources" under the May 2026 Workforce Pell rule (34 C.F.R. 690.90 to 690.97); WIOA training funds "supplement other sources of training grants" (20 C.F.R. 680.230); and the Open Door grant covers costs "after all other federal and state financial aid is applied" (s. 1009.895(3)). Program approval should be unaffected too: the Developer supplies capacity or, on the payment path, money, and not instruction, so the limit on written arrangements with ineligible organizations should not apply (confirm; Agency 28.1). Options Section 3.6(c) bars any payment "to or for a person as a student," and 3.6(d) bars work on the Project Site, unpaid work for the Developer, reserved seats and Developer-designed courses. *Instruments.* Options Section 3.6(a) to (g); CBA Sections 3.4(b)(iii), 5.10(b), 6.2(b)(iv), 7.5; In-Kind Test 4.1. Release 2026.4 extends CBA Section 2.5(d) to the Instruction Share (the same change as the easement point under Question 27), and adds Options Section 3.6(h), which extends the Instruction Share to a share paid as the Community Payment, for instruction that uses computing bought with that payment's grants. *Left open.* Acceptance is each board's own decision. Agency 28.1. **53. The automation transition term.** *Answer.* **Mostly yes** for the terms drafted; **open** for severance. Notice longer than federal notice is what the federal statute contemplates: its rights "are in addition to, and not in lieu of, any other contractual or statutory rights and remedies" (29 U.S.C. 2105), and its rules "do not supersede any laws or collective bargaining agreements that provide for additional notice" (20 C.F.R. 639.1(g)). Retraining paid at regular wages is wages, and a tuition program "under which payments are made solely from the general assets of an employer" is not an ERISA plan (29 C.F.R. 2510.3-1(k)). A first right to new roles, a monitoring notice and human review before an automated discharge are ordinary terms a private employer may promise. Section 218.077 does not reach the term, because no political subdivision imposes or enforces it (CBA Section 11.3(c)). Severance is the open point: a one-time severance by formula on a single event is not an ERISA plan (Supreme Court, 1987, 482 U.S. 1), but a duty applied to each elimination over a long term, with the employer deciding each time whether automation was a cause, moves toward one (First Circuit, 1993, 6 F.3d 849), and the Community Party's right to enforce raises a question of its own. *Instruments.* Clause Bank Section 7.7(a), drafted in Release 2026.4 from the Model Incentive Conditions Agreement, sections 6 and 6A, with its severance item bracketed; CBA Sections 11.3(c), 11.4. *Left open.* Counsel 53.1 and 53.2. ### H. The computing allocation (Module M3) **29. A public college, university or school board as host.** *Answer.* **Mostly yes, with one adverse point.** Authority: a Florida College System board "constitutes the contracting agent" and "may when acting as a body make contracts, sue, and be sued" (s. 1001.64(25)); a university board of trustees may "contract and be contracted with," "sue and be sued" and "give and receive donations" (s. 1001.72(1)), and its president may "negotiate, enter into, and execute research contracts" (s. 1004.22(3)). Rates: the federal Uniform Guidance governs only federal awards ("Negotiated indirect cost rates must be accepted by all Federal agencies"; 2 C.F.R. 200.101(a)(1), 200.414), so a negotiated or de minimis rate applies to private payments as a contract term; CBA Section 5.17(c) and Options Section 3.6(c) supply one, but the Readiness disbursements of CBA Section 6.2(b)(ii) and (iv) do not. Immunity: s. 768.28(2) names "state university boards of trustees" among state agencies (college boards are not named). Indemnity, the adverse point: for a state agency, indemnity agreements are impermissible "in the absence of statutory authorization" (AGO 90-21), so a state university may not indemnify a cloud provider; for a college the answer is open, because a local body "is bound by its contractual agreement to indemnify private parties" (*American Home Assurance Co. v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.*, 908 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 2005) (confirm)). Accepting a provider's cap on its own liability is a business decision no statute found forbids. Foreign countries of concern: s. 287.138 reaches any "public or private agency ... acting on behalf of any public agency," bars contracts giving a covered entity access to personal identifying information, and requires the entity's affidavit before the contract ((2), (4)); s. 288.860(2)(a) separately bars agreements with a foreign country of concern (Chapter 2026-3 reenacted s. 287.138(5) in 2026 without change, and Chapter 2026-66 amended s. 288.860; Question 58 reads the amended s. 288.860). Procurement: Chapter 287's purchasing rules do not apply, because "'Agency' does not include the university and college boards of trustees" (s. 287.012(1)); each host follows its own rules (college boards use state term contracts or consortia under s. 1001.64(48); universities follow Board of Governors Regulation 18.001), and the Module yields to them. A district school board may also be a host (Module Section 1.11(a)); it "shall constitute the contracting agent for the district school system" (s. 1001.41(4)), and, like every public host, it gives no indemnity under the Module (Section 1.8(c); paragraph T-13(f)(x)). Procurement: its purchases and leases "shall comply with the requirements of law and rules of the State Board of Education" (s. 1010.04(1)(a)), and it adopts its own purchasing rules (s. 1010.04(2)) within Rule 6A-1.012, F.A.C., which requires competitive solicitations from three or more sources for commodities or contractual services over $50,000, or a lower amount the board sets (Rule 6A-1.012(7)), lets it buy under other public bodies' contracts (Rule 6A-1.012(6)), and excepts, among others, a single source found after public posting for at least 7 business days and notice under s. 120.57(3) (Rule 6A-1.012(12)(d)); before buying nonacademic commodities or contractual services it reviews the state term contracts under s. 287.056 (s. 1010.04(1)(b)), and it may not consider a vendor's social, political or ideological interests (s. 1010.04(5)). Immunity: s. 768.28(2) does not name district school boards, each of which is "a body corporate" (s. 1001.40); that a school board is a subdivision of the state within the waiver, liable in tort only up to $200,000 a person and $300,000 an occurrence (s. 768.28(5)(a)), rests on case law (confirm); a contract between it and another agency or subdivision "must not contain any provision that requires one party to indemnify or insure the other party for the other party's negligence," though it may require a nongovernmental entity to give that indemnity or insurance (s. 768.28(19)); and whether it may indemnify a private party is the question of Counsel 29.1. Disposal: it may dispose of land it determines "unnecessary for educational purposes" subject to State Board of Education rules (s. 1013.28(1)(a)), and disposes of surplus tangible personal property "in accordance with the procedure established by chapter 274" (s. 1013.28(2)(a)): it may offer surplus property by sale or donation to other governmental units in the county or district or to private nonprofit agencies as defined in s. 273.01(3) (s. 274.05), or, under the alternative procedure, dispose of it for value to any person or without bids to the state, a governmental unit or a political subdivision, and donate, destroy or abandon property without commercial value, though under that procedure a sale of property it values at $5,000 or more is made only to the highest responsible bidder or by public auction after published notice (s. 274.06), and the authority is recorded in its minutes (s. 274.07). Surplus, marked-for-disposal or otherwise unused property is provided for a charter school's use on the same basis as for other public schools in the district (s. 1013.28(2)(a)) (Module Section 1.3(d); Counsel 29.2). *Instruments.* Module Sections 1.3(d), 1.8(c) (indemnity "only to the extent Section 768.28, Florida Statutes, permits"), 1.11, 1.23(a), paragraphs T-13(k), T-21(d); CBA Sections 2.3, 5.16, 5.17(c), Exhibit C items 3 and 5; Options Section 3.6(c). Release 2026.4 provides in Module Section 1.8(c) that a Recipient that is a public body gives no indemnity, and that one that is a state agency or subdivision under s. 768.28(2) is liable only as that section provides; states in CBA Section 6.2(b)(ii) and (iv) the indirect cost rate that applies (Section 5.17(c) for preparation, Options Section 3.6(c) for instruction); and requires in CBA Exhibit C, item 5, that the Developer deliver "the affidavit s. 287.138(4), Florida Statutes, requires" to an institution that is a governmental entity before it signs its acceptance. *Left open.* Counsel 29.1; Counsel 29.2, on the dedication and transfer of hardware a public host acquires under the Instrument (Module Sections 1.6(d), 3.5(d)). Board authority and each host's procurement rules are its own facts. **30. Public records and resident data.** *Answers.* (a) **Mostly no**: a nonprofit host the County did not create, does not control and funds only by directing rent (and, under a private agreement, a Qualified Operator, which the County does not fund at all) is unlikely to be "acting on behalf of any public agency" (s. 119.011(2)). *News and Sun-Sentinel Co. v. Schwab, Twitty & Hanser Architectural Group, Inc.*, 596 So. 2d 1029, 1031 (Fla. 1992), weighs public funding, commingling, public property, integration in the agency's decisions, a governmental function, the agency's "control over the private entity," creation by the agency, its financial interest, and "for whose benefit the private entity is functioning" (as quoted by the Attorney General; confirm); merely contracting is not enough (AGO 92-37). Creation, control, financial interest and separate accounts point away; the risks are "funding" (the rent is the County's to direct) and delegation, though the County has no statutory computing function to delegate. Enforcing delivery against the Tenant is not control over the Recipient, but a County control added under Question 21 would raise the risk. (b) **Mostly no**: at a public host, a user's own project data is not a public record merely because the host stores it ("private documents cannot be deemed public records solely by virtue of their placement on an agency-owned computer"; *State v. City of Clearwater*, 863 So. 2d 149, 154 (Fla. 2003) (confirm)); the host's operating records are. (c) A retention schedule governs records that exist ("A public record may be destroyed or otherwise disposed of only in accordance with retention schedules," s. 257.36(6)); computer logs may be kept "30 days or until review of logs is complete, whichever occurs first" (General Records Schedule GS1-SL, Item 391), so Schedule 2's rules on not creating and deleting content stand. (d) **Mostly yes**, a provider comparison a public host makes is open when made, unless it is a sealed bid, proposal or reply still within s. 119.071(1)(b) or, as to a vendor's cost data, the data is a trade secret under s. 119.0715 (a designation is a claim, not an exemption; Question 18); delivery "in confidence" creates no exemption. (e) **Mostly no**: s. 257.261 protects "circulation records," information "that identifies the patrons who borrow particular books and other materials," and names no computers or sessions; only a library's own terminal records are arguably within it. (f) **Open, leaning no**: s. 119.0701 reaches a contractor that "enters into a contract for services with a public agency and is acting on behalf of the public agency"; a ground lease is not a contract for services, though the County Share is a service paid as rent. County data on the County Share stays a County record wherever it is stored. *Instruments.* Module Sections 1.3(a), (b), 1.11(d)(5) (each host states its Chapter 119 status), paragraphs T-11(e), T-21(e); Schedule 2, paragraphs D-2 to D-4, D-7; CBA Section 5.16(b); Options Section 2.5(d) (a bracketed s. 119.0701(2)(b) covenant). Release 2026.4 unbrackets the Options Section 2.5(d) covenant and adds the s. 119.0701(2)(a) custodian statement, to be set in at least 14-point boldfaced type; and makes each delivery "in confidence" (paragraphs T-9, T-11(e) and T-21(e), and CBA Section 5.16(b)) yield to Chapter 119, Florida Statutes, where the purchaser, Recipient or grantee making it is subject to that chapter. *Left open.* Counsel 30.1. Retention of particular record series is for the Division of Library and Information Services. **31. Penalty rule, security and the Custodian.** *Answers.* (a) **Mostly yes**, the Conversion Payment is outside the penalty rule. The Floor applies only where the Developer has not defaulted. A sum due on an event other than breach is a price, and where the Developer chooses to convert it is alternative performance: under a liquidated damages clause "the parties are not taken to have fixed a price to be paid for the privilege not to perform," but parties may create "a true alternative performance" (Third District, 1997, 687 So. 2d 329, alternative performance). Default conversions use Replacement Cost, a market measure of what was not delivered, and Module Section 1.18(e)'s single money measure avoids the Florida Supreme Court's 1991 rule (573 So. 2d 326; Question 17) that an option "either to choose liquidated damages or to sue for actual damages" signals a penalty. The residual risk is a court recasting an infeasibility conversion as a default, which would expose the Floor's excess over Replacement Cost. (b) **Mostly yes**, a full draw held as returnable cash security is outside the penalty rule: a sum held as "an assurance fund, available for the payment of damages," and applied "pro tanto against his actual damages ... by its very terms negatives an intention to liquidate damages in advance" (Florida Supreme Court, 1954, 73 So. 2d 393, a deposit held as security). (c) **Mostly no**, a surety licensed only for surety business may not write a bond that pays the CBA's money duties on the Custodian's certificate. Surety insurance covers bonds for "the execution of a contract other than a contract of indebtedness or other monetary obligation" and excludes "Financial guaranty insurance, as defined in s. 627.971" (s. 624.606), which is "a surety bond, insurance policy, an indemnity contract issued by an insurer, or any similar guaranty, under which loss is payable upon proof of occurrence of financial loss" from a failure to pay a "monetary obligation" (s. 627.971(1)(a)) and may be written only by "a corporation licensed for such purpose" (s. 627.973(1)). The certificate feature itself is not barred. The Module Section 1.20 bond also secures in-kind delivery, and under a Lease the exclusion for "A lease ... surety bond" may apply; that classification belongs to the Office of Insurance Regulation. (d) **Mostly no**, s. 660.41 itself does not require trust powers: it bars only four capacities (personal representative; court-appointed receiver or trustee; assignee, receiver or trustee for creditors; "fiscal agent, transfer agent, or registrar"). But "Trust business" is "the business of acting as a fiduciary," and a fiduciary includes "a trustee; ... custodian" (s. 658.12(8), (21)); a national bank's fiduciary capacities include "trustee" (12 C.F.R. 9.2(e)). Module Section 1.14(a) has the Custodian hold the Continuity Escrow "in trust," so that role needs trust powers; a plain custody role without investment discretion likely would not. (e) **Open, leaning no**, money the Custodian holds is not public money under Chapter 129 or 280: a "Public deposit" is "the moneys of the state or of any state university, county" placed "on deposit in a bank," and a "Public depositor" is "the official custodian of funds for a governmental unit" (s. 280.02); the Custodian is no public depositor, and no public body owns or controls the accounts (Module Sections 1.3(b), 2.3; paragraph T-25(f)). Money held "in trust" for a state university Recipient has a real "moneys of" argument. The County never receives a Conversion Payment (Module Section 2.3), so s. 129.01(2)(c) does not reach it. *Instruments.* Module Sections 1.12 (bracketed trust powers), 1.17 to 1.20, 2.3; paragraph T-25(d); CBA Sections 9.1(e), 9.2, 9.3, 10.2, 11.6. Release 2026.4 makes the bracketed trust powers requirement in Module Section 1.12(a) operative; in CBA Section 9.2(a) and Module Section 1.20(c), requires that a bond securing a payment of money be issued by an insurer licensed to transact financial guaranty insurance in Florida; and adds to T-25(d) that while a public body is the Recipient, deposits are held only in a qualified public depository or through the Custodian's trust department. It also provides that the County recovers no money for rent in kind (Module Section 2.7(b)). *Left open.* Counsel 31.1; Agency 31.1. **32. Bankruptcy.** *Answers.* (a) **Mostly yes**, the receivership trigger in "Distress Event" is an unenforceable ipso facto clause after a filing. No executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor, and no right under one, "may ... be terminated or modified, at any time after the commencement of the case solely because of a provision ... conditioned on ... the appointment of or taking possession by a trustee in a case under this title or a custodian before such commencement" (11 U.S.C. 365(e)(1)(C)), and a "custodian" includes a receiver appointed outside bankruptcy and an agent "appointed or authorized to take charge of property of the debtor for the purpose of enforcing a lien" (101(11)). Executory status changes only the route: if the instrument is not executory, ss. 541(c)(1)(B) and 363(l) still reach property-affecting rights such as the Agreement Section 7.4 option, and the stay bars enforcement. Steps completed before a filing stand, and operational and payment triggers are not ipso facto terms. A lender's foreclosure receiver is a "custodian"; Lease Section 14.1(f) excludes one, but the CBA and Agreement do not. (b) **Open, leaning yes**, in-kind deliveries and Conversion Payments are "rent reserved" under 11 U.S.C. 502(b)(6): a charge must "be designated as 'rent' or 'additional rent' in the lease," "be related to the value of the property or the lease thereon," and be "fixed, regular or periodic" (Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, 1995, 184 B.R. 91, rent reserved, as applied in later cases, and overruled in part on another point by *El Toro* (Question 49); confirm), and Module Sections 2.2(a) and 2.3 call both rent, Sections 2.2(b) and 2.4(c) price them toward fair value, and they recur. Whether the Custodian's or the Recipient's claim is "the claim of a lessor" is open; if not, it is uncapped but unsecured. The CBA is not a lease. (c) **Open, leaning no**, a court will not likely compel delivery in kind under 11 U.S.C. 365(d)(3), though its text ("The trustee shall timely perform all the obligations of the debtor") reaches in-kind rent; no case ordering delivery of computing to a third party was found (the search was not complete), and an order to pay value, or an administrative claim, is likelier. Module Section 1.15(a) helps by turning an interruption into money. (d) **Open, leaning yes**, the cap limits the Custodian's net recovery from draws. Where the parties "intended the letter of credit to serve as a security deposit," draws reduced the capped claim (*In re PPI Enterprises (U.S.), Inc.*, 324 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2003)); the Ninth Circuit agrees (*In re AB Liquidating Corp.*, 416 F.3d 961 (9th Cir. 2005)); the Fifth Circuit applied the cap only where the lessor files a claim (*In re Stonebridge Technologies, Inc.*, 430 F.3d 260 (5th Cir. 2005)) (confirm each). No Eleventh Circuit case was found. Module Section 1.20(g) reads as a security deposit. (e) **Mostly yes**, the new-lease covenant to a leasehold lender survives rejection: rejection "constitutes a breach" (365(g)), and "A rejection breaches a contract but does not rescind it" (*Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC*, 587 U.S. 370 (2019) (confirm the page)). The County is not the debtor, and Lease Section 11.3 makes the covenant independent of the Lease; the County may need stay relief to terminate before granting the new lease. (f) **Mostly no**, a receiver will not honor a full draw made because of the issuer's own proceeding. The FDIC as receiver "may disaffirm or repudiate any contract or lease" it finds burdensome, with damages "limited to actual direct compensatory damages" determined as of its appointment (12 U.S.C. 1821(e)); "Letters of credit are repudiable contracts" under that section, and the beneficiary recovered nothing (*Lexon Insurance Co. v. FDIC*, No. 20-30173 (5th Cir. 2021)). A standby letter of credit backed only by a contingent note is not an insured "deposit" (*FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp.*, 476 U.S. 426 (1986)). For a surety, a delinquency petition "operates as a matter of law as an automatic stay" (s. 631.041(1)), and the guaranty association excludes "Fidelity or surety bonds" and financial guaranty (s. 631.52). A draw triggered by the proceeding becomes a claim; only a trigger that fires before failure protects. (g) **Mostly yes**, letter of credit draws are neither stayed nor preferential: "neither a letter of credit nor its proceeds are property of the debtor's estate" (*In re Air Conditioning, Inc. of Stuart*, 845 F.2d 293 (11th Cir. 1988)), and the stay of s. 362(a)(3) reaches only property of the estate. But "When a debtor pledges its assets to secure a letter of credit, a transfer of debtor's property has occurred" (quoting *Compton*), and security delivered within 90 days before a filing for duties that arose at signing secures an antecedent debt (11 U.S.C. 547(b)), so debtor-funded collateral and cash security are exposed. Drawn cash differs again: the Developer's right to the unapplied balance (CBA Section 9.3; Module Section 1.20(e); Agreement Section 7.2) is estate property, so applying it after a filing likely needs stay relief (confirm). A notice of default sent after a filing may itself violate the stay: for a claim that arose before the case it can be an "act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor" (11 U.S.C. 362(a)(6)), and commentators advise landlords against lease terms that require such a notice before a draw, the case law being "scant" (Patterson Belknap, "Tenants in Bankruptcy: Landlord's Ability to Draw on Letter of Credit May Turn on Notice Requirements in Lease," 2 July 2020). A county's notice to perform under its standards may be excepted, since the stay does not reach "the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit ... to enforce such governmental unit's or organization's police and regulatory power" (362(b)(4)), and financial assurance requirements have been held part of a state's regulatory and police powers (Fourth Circuit, 2001, 274 F.3d 846, financial assurance as a police power, read through a summary; confirm); a notice demanding payment of a well owner claim, or one given as landlord, is less likely to be. Because the stay arises on the filing, a debtor may also argue that a term letting a draw proceed without the barred notice modifies its rights "solely because of a provision ... conditioned on ... the commencement of a case" (365(e)(1)(B)); no case on the point was found (the search was not complete). *Instruments.* Agreement Section 7.3(c), as Release 2026.4 corrects it, states that the receivership trigger does not operate after a filing to the extent 11 U.S.C. 365(e)(1) bars it; Module Section 2.2(a) bars assuming the Lease without the Module; Module Section 2.11(c) and Lease Section 11.3 carry it into a new lease; CBA Section 9.2(f), Module Section 1.20(d), Agreement Sections 4.2(f) and 7.2(d), and Exhibits "H," "K" and "L" require replacement on a rating fall or receivership; CBA Exhibit D and paragraph T-24 limit draws to a certificate. Release 2026.4, in CBA Section 9.2(f), Module Section 1.20(d) and Agreement Sections 4.2(f) and 7.2(d), also requires replacement when the issuer is placed on watch for downgrade below the required rating or becomes subject to a public formal enforcement action or capital directive of its regulator, within a separate replacement period (the Drafter's Notes state what a shorter or a longer one does), with the same events in the drawing certificates (Annexes K-1(b) and H-1(b)) and in the note to Exhibit "H"; and in Agreement Section 4.2(f), CBA Section 11.1, Module Section 1.24(a) and Annexes K-1(a) and H-1(a), runs each draw from the due date, inside or outside bankruptcy: notice is given where the law permits it, but is not a condition of the draw. A CBA or Module default with no fixed due date keeps notice and cure. A county may also consider requiring the security at signing. For the decommissioning security, Standards Sec. 14(b)(4), Agreement Section 7.2(d), Lease Section 13.3(b) and Annex L-1(a) and (c) do the same (under the Standards, [sixty (60)] days after unfinished decommissioning was due and [thirty (30)] days after a well owner claim was due). Release 2026.4 also prices only Base Rent toward fair value (Module Section 2.4), though Module Section 2.2(b) still makes the rent in kind consideration for the leasehold estate; answer (b) stays open. *Left open.* Counsel 32.1 to 32.4. Counsel 32.3 and 32.4 no longer decide whether a draw can be made, because draws now run from the due date, inside or outside bankruptcy. **33. Third-party beneficiaries and neutral decisions.** *Answers.* (a) **Mostly yes** as designated. Florida requires "the clear or manifest intent of the contracting parties that the contract primarily and directly benefit the third party" (Florida Supreme Court, 2016, 203 So. 3d 146, third-party beneficiaries (confirm the reporter citation), quoting *Foundation Health v. Westside EKG Associates*, 944 So. 2d 188, 194-95 (Fla. 2006)), and an express designation is the clearest evidence of that intent. The test reaches a described class (confirm), and Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 308 provides that a beneficiary need not be "identified when a contract containing the promise is made" (confirm); no Florida decision citing it was found. Most designees also become parties by acceptance or assignment, so the point matters most under a Lease, where an institution added under the open call becomes the Recipient by its acceptance and a neutral's confirmation (Module Section 2.9(d)(ii)). Two drafting gaps leave some takers without standing: the last-tier taker under CBA Section 6.4(c) and the end-of-term taker under Options Section 3.6(g) are not "Host Institutions," so Section 11.4 omits them; and Module Section 1.9(b) ("No user of the Allocation, and no other person, is a third-party beneficiary of this Module") could be argued, through Module Section 1.1(b), to cut off rights CBA Section 11.4 gives. (b) **Mostly yes**: the disclaimer bars residents' and grantees' contract claims, since an express negation leaves a person at most an incidental beneficiary (Fourth District, 2010, 45 So. 3d 554, an express negation of third-party benefit (confirm the reporter citation)). It cannot remove standing the law confers. A grantee keeps its rights under its own grant agreement, and if a court treated a Custodian-held Account as a charitable trust, the Attorney General would have "exclusive authority to represent the general public, unnamed charitable beneficiaries, and any person other than a named charitable beneficiary having a special interest" (s. 736.0110(3)). (c) **Open, leaning arbitration**: a document-only qualification decision under paragraph T-23 decides the dispute itself, not an amount, so it falls outside Florida's appraisal model (Florida Supreme Court, 2002, 833 So. 2d 762, appraisal and arbitration), and because the text does not call it arbitration it invites relitigation. Chapter 682 allows an arbitrator to proceed "in such manner as the arbitrator considers appropriate," with a hearing only "If an arbitrator orders a hearing" (s. 682.06), and limits vacatur to the grounds and the 90-day period of s. 682.13. Framed that way, the decision is enforceable. A paragraph V-9 figure "as to amount" fits the 2002 decision and will likely be enforced as an appraisal. *Instruments.* CBA Section 11.4; Module Sections 1.9(b), 2.9(d), paragraph T-23; Lease Section 4.4(i), which already makes the neutral's selection "an award in an arbitration under the Revised Florida Arbitration Code." Release 2026.4 adds to CBA Section 11.4 each institution or Fund Holder to which a balance passes under Section 6.4(c) or Options Section 3.6(g), as to that balance; begins the last sentence of Module Section 1.9(b) with "Except as the Instrument expressly provides,"; frames T-23(a) and T-10(c) as arbitration under Chapter 682 on the Lease 4.4(i) model, limited to whether the stated criteria are met, with the disclosure duty of Lease 4.4(g) for the T-23 neutral; and has each acceptance, including one under CBA Section 6.4(c) or Options Section 3.6(g), state that the entity agrees to arbitrate under T-23. On the same model, a dispute about a host's administration budget or statement, or an Access Institution's, goes to a neutral cost accountant whose decision is an award under Chapter 682 (Module paragraph T-26; CBA Section 5.17(c), (d)); the questions there are whether a cost is permitted, whether an amount was paid and the amount due or to be credited, which arbitration under Chapter 682 can decide, though only the amount would fit the 2002 decision; and each Recipient's acceptance and each Access Institution's agreement state that it agrees to arbitrate under T-26. *Left open.* Counsel 33.1, 33.2. **34. Export controls.** *The law in October 2026.* Remote use of computing is not an export of hardware: an export is a shipment or transmission out of the United States, or a release of technology or source code to a foreign person (15 C.F.R. 734.13). The Bureau of Industry and Security's 2009 advisory opinion said that providing computational capacity "would not be subject to the EAR," but the "support" rules still apply to "Performing any contract, service, or employment you know may assist or benefit" listed weapons and military-intelligence end uses and users (15 C.F.R. 744.6(b)(6)). Bureau guidance of May 2025 warns that cloud capacity used to train AI models for parties headquartered in Country Group D:5 or Macau can need a license where there is knowledge of such an end use (confirm). The AI Diffusion rule's license exception (15 C.F.R. 740.27) remains codified, though the Bureau said in May 2025 that it would not enforce the rule's new compliance requirements; the cloud customer identification rule under Executive Order 13984 is not final; and the rule extending the Entity List to entities "owned 50 percent or more" by listed entities is "stayed, effective until Nov. 9, 2026" (15 C.F.R. 744.11(a)(1)). Office of Foreign Assets Control prohibitions need no knowledge (for example, 31 C.F.R. 560.204), and an entity 50 percent owned by blocked persons is blocked though unlisted. *Answers.* (a) **Mostly no**: receiving capacity as a service does not make the Recipient an exporter of hardware. But as a United States person serving others, it is bound by the knowledge-based rules of 15 C.F.R. 744.6 and by the strict-liability sanctions rules, and it is the exporter of any controlled software or technology it releases, including to foreign nationals in the County. Screening is how it avoids "knowledge" and sanctions violations. The contract can divide the work (paragraph T-7(a)(ii) gives controlled portions to the Developer) but not each party's own liability. (b) **Not a legal research question**: the lists are a policy choice above a legal floor of the sanctions lists, the 50 Percent Rule and the Commerce and State Department lists. The Consolidated Screening List bundles them but calls itself "an aid" and misses unlisted owned entities. Federal advanced computing rules key on entities "headquartered in, or whose ultimate parent company is headquartered in, either Macau" or Country Group D:5 (15 C.F.R. 744.23(a)(3)(i)(A)); the seven foreign countries of concern in s. 287.138(1)(c) are all in D:5. Paragraph T-7(c) speaks of "research-security lists," but Module Section 1.5(a)(iii) names none. (c) **Open, leaning no** as drafted. For the export rules the screen is enough: no license is needed to provide capacity, and a documented screen with a red-flag response defeats "knowledge." For sanctions it falls short: T-7(c) checks only "the person leading" a project and the access institution, not residents and small businesses provisioned directly (paragraph D-3(b)), other project members, where a session originates, or ownership. Limiting users to County residents and institutions lowers the risk but does not remove it. *Instruments.* Module Section 1.5(a)(ii)(A), (iii); paragraphs T-7(a) to (c), D-3(d), D-5(c). Release 2026.4 replaces the default bracketed lists in Module Section 1.5(a)(iii) with the Consolidated Screening List, entities owned 50 percent or more by persons on the Specially Designated Nationals List (and, while 15 C.F.R. 744.11(a)(1) is in effect, by entities on the Entity List), and, as the countries, Macau, Country Group D:5 and the countries listed in s. 287.138(1)(c); strikes "and research-security" from T-7(c), which no longer refers to research-security lists; extends the T-7(c) check to each person provisioned directly under D-3(b); and adds to Module Section 1.5(a) a new item (vii) barring access from a country or region subject to comprehensive sanctions administered by the Office of Foreign Assets Control. *Left open.* Counsel 34.1. Watch items: the Remote Access Security Act (H.R. 2683, passed by the House in January 2026, with no later Senate action found; confirm), the affiliates rule after 9 November 2026, and any final cloud customer identification rule. **35. Sales tax, the exemption, and "advanced service."** *Answers.* (a) **Mostly yes**, no tax on a transfer to the County. A gift is not a "sale," which requires a transfer "for a consideration" (s. 212.02(15)(a)), and a County purchase is exempt "when payment is made directly to the dealer by the governmental entity" (s. 212.08(6)(a)). Recapture under s. 212.08(5)(r)3.c. is unlikely for equipment that served at the data center and is then retired (Open, leaning no): the statute sets no holding period, and Rule 12A-1.108(6)(b), F.A.C., runs liability from the date the data center falls out of compliance. It is likely for items bought under the certificate and used elsewhere. M2 equipment is never data center property. (b) **Open, leaning no** tax on the County's use of a County Share: no sale occurs and the servers stay "used exclusively at a data center" (s. 212.08(5)(r)1.d.). The risk is that the Department of Revenue treats the County as an "owner or tenant" below 1 megawatt. (c) **Mostly yes**: hardware the Developer transfers to a recipient for a price is taxable unless the recipient is exempt, and buying it under the certificate for immediate transfer risks recapture. (d) **Open, leaning yes** that recipient-owned hardware housed at the facility makes the recipient an "owner or tenant" whose dedicated load must reach "a critical IT load of 1 megawatt or higher" (s. 212.08(5)(r)1.c.(III)). At the model's illustrative ratio of 0.5 percent the colocation entitlement stays below 1 megawatt until Installed IT Capacity reaches 200 megawatts, and failing the rule risks revocation of the facility's certificate. (e) **Mostly yes**, measured per "data center," which "Consists of one or more contiguous parcels in this state, along with the buildings, substations and other infrastructure," so a contiguous campus may be one data center. The Standards' one-mile Development Unit is a different test. (f) **Mostly yes**: capacity a governmental entity supplies to private parties "for a fee or other consideration" is an "advanced service" (s. 350.81(1)(a), (f); see Question 47), and a charge at cost is a fee. Use by the entity itself and by another "governmental entity" as (1)(e) defines it is not "provid[ing]," which excludes "service by an entity to itself or to any other governmental entity"; a nonprofit or a business is "a person," and a state or federal agency is outside the exception, which (1)(e) limits to political subdivisions and their instrumentalities. "Governmental entity" means "any political subdivision as defined in s. 1.01, including any county, municipality, special district, school district, utility authority or other authority or any instrumentality, agency, unit or department thereof" (s. 350.81(1)(e)), and s. 1.01(8) includes "all other districts in this state." A district school board host is one (**Settled**). A Florida College System institution most likely is one too (**Mostly yes**): each operates through a district that is "an independent, separate, legal entity" (s. 1004.65(2)(b)), and the colleges are "constituted as political subdivisions of the state" (s. 1004.67; see the Attorney General's informal opinion of 4 August 2015, addressed to the Federal Aviation Administration, concerning the Indian River State College District). The doubt is that the Eleventh Circuit holds a Florida college's district board of trustees an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment immunity (421 F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2005)), and that a college board's status for indemnity is open (Counsel 29.1). A state university is not (**Mostly no**): its board of trustees is one of "the independent establishments of the state" (s. 768.28(2); Florida Supreme Court, 2015, No. SC13-1872 (Fla. May 28, 2015), a state university under that section) and an arm of state government (*University of South Florida Board of Trustees v. CoMentis, Inc.*, No. 16-11341 (11th Cir. June 30, 2017)), not a local unit s. 1.01(8) lists. Nor is a nonprofit recipient. Free use by residents and small businesses carries no fee. Whether a payment to a host for administering that use, by the Developer or from the Monitoring Fund or the Restricted Account, a condition of use such as the optional model publication rule, or the promises an Access Institution makes to the host in its agreement, is "other consideration" is **Open, leaning no**: nothing is paid by or for the users, public libraries offer free internet, on conditions of use, that others pay for, and the statute's machinery (subscribers, a business plan that breaks even within four years) assumes paying users. The same doubt reaches a host's free service to its own students, who are persons rather than the host "itself," and, more faintly, capacity it furnishes to another governmental entity for that entity's own students and employees, though the contrary reading would make every college's campus network, paid for by tuition and a technology fee (s. 1009.23(10)), an advanced service (Counsel 35.2). Rule 12A-1.108 is out of date: it still states the former 15-megawatt threshold and a 2027 deadline, while the statute has required 100 megawatts since Chapter 2025-208 (confirm the chapter number). *Instruments.* Module Section 1.6(b) and (c) allow commitments and exchanges at cost; Section 1.6(b) lets a Recipient that is a governmental entity commit or exchange capacity for a fee or other consideration only with another governmental entity unless it first meets s. 350.81, and Section 1.5(g) has such a Recipient serve everyone other than itself, other governmental entities and their own people through Access Institutions that are not governmental entities, decide those users' requests under the Recipient's criteria and are paid their costs by the Developer through the Custodian; paragraph T-11 prices hardware "without any sales tax the seller collects"; T-12(d) lets the Developer decline a transfer that "would cause it to lose or repay a tax exemption"; T-15, T-17, T-18; Options 2.5(b), (c) deliver bare-metal servers with no private sale "except as s. 350.81 ... permits"; Agreement Section 2.3(b), note (4), and 2.3(d) (no County tax determination). Release 2026.4 adds a paragraph T-17(e) under which, while the Recipient's dedicated critical IT load at the Project Site would be below 1 megawatt and unless the Department of Revenue has advised the Developer in writing that the housing does not affect the exemption, the Recipient makes no vesting election under Section 1.13(a), houses no Recipient-Owned Hardware at the Project Site, and may house it elsewhere under T-18; states in Options 2.5(b) that the County Share is a service and gives the County no lease or license of space or equipment at the Premises; and cites s. 212.08(5)(r) in Standards Sec. 3(g). *Left open.* Counsel 35.2; Agency 35.1 to 35.4. **36. Communications providers.** *Answers.* (a) **Mostly yes**: County-paid conduit with a proportionate share of trenching avoids s. 337.401(3)(f), under which a county "may not require or solicit in-kind compensation, except as otherwise provided in s. 202.24(2)(c)8." Without the trench share, a provider would give the County a free shared trench tied to use of the right-of-way. (b) **Mostly no** risk for Agreement terms. An "imposition" includes "any amount or in-kind payment of property or services which is required by ordinance or agreement to be paid or furnished to a public body by or through a dealer of communications services in its capacity as a dealer of communications services" (s. 202.24(2)(b)); mitigation is given as landowner, not as a dealer, and colocation and cloud computing are information services outside Chapter 202 (s. 202.11). Cash rent for County land outside the right-of-way is excepted as "Amounts charged for the rental or other use of property owned by a public body which is not in the public rights-of-way to a dealer" (s. 202.24(2)(c)5.); rent paid in kind is arguable, leaning excepted. (c) **Open, leaning yes** that, under a lease, a fiber Substitute Benefit from a dealer tenant delivered to a public body (counties, school districts and other districts, but not the state; s. 202.24(3)) is an "imposition," because it fits subsection (2)(b) most closely. The same benefit delivered to a nonprofit or a state university does not fit subsection (2)(b), which reaches only what is paid or furnished to a public body. (d) **Mostly no**: a project entity that is not a dealer avoids the issue only for property it furnishes itself, because "by or through a dealer" catches service bought from a dealer affiliate. Chapter 2026-39 amended s. 337.401; whether it changed paragraph (3)(f) was not checked. *Instruments.* Agreement Section 4.5(b) (the trench-share bracket where the Developer or an affiliate is a provider), (c) (no service) and (d) (conduit "not mitigation or compensation in kind"); Lease Exhibit "C"; Module Section 1.17(d); paragraph T-13(l). Release 2026.4 adds to Module Section 1.17(d) that, under a Lease where the Developer (the Tenant) or an affiliate is a dealer of communications services, no Substitute Benefit consisting of communications services, fiber or conduit is delivered to a public body as defined in s. 202.24(3). *Left open.* Counsel 36.1, of low importance now that Module Section 1.17(d) bars such a Substitute Benefit. ### I. [Moved] **37 to 39.** *Moved.* These questions concerned the Model Articles of Incorporation, the Model Bylaws and the Trust Governance Rules, which are not part of Release 2026.4, and their answers stay with those documents. The tax point that remains for a nonprofit Recipient is the one in Question 42: payments from one Developer count as public support only up to 2 percent of total support (26 C.F.R. 1.170A-9(f)(6)). Release 2026.4 therefore lets an entity other than a host institution become the Recipient only if it is already classified as a public charity under s. 509(a)(1) or (2) and its board finds in writing, with tax advice, that the payments will not cause it to fail its public support test (Module Section 1.10(b)(i), (ii)); a host institution that is not a public body makes the same finding in its acceptance (Section 1.11(d)(9)). That advice includes whether the Administration Payment and the payments under Module Section 1.5(f) are contributions or receipts from performing services, which the two support tests count differently. ### J. Further questions, answered briefly **40.** *Answer.* **Settled, yes.** The Department of Revenue "may issue informal technical assistance advisements to persons, upon written request, as to the position of the department on the tax consequences of a stated transaction or event" (s. 213.22(1)), so the Developer, a recipient or the County may each request one on its own stated or proposed transactions. A request may come from "a taxpayer or his or her representative" on "the specific circumstances of an individual taxpayer," naming all interested parties and attaching the transaction's documents, or from "a taxpayer association or the association's representative" on "potential transaction(s)," with the association's agreement to send the advisement to all its members (Rule 12-11.003(2), (3), F.A.C.). The rule provides for no other kind of request, and the preparer of a model instrument, having no transaction of its own and not being a taxpayer association, does not ask. An advisement has "no precedential value except to the taxpayer who requests the advisement and then only for the specific transaction addressed" (s. 213.22(1)), and "A taxpayer may not rely on an advisement issued to another taxpayer" (Rule 12-11.007, F.A.C.). The request must describe the entire, integrated transaction, and none issues after a notice of proposed assessment (Rule 12-11.003). Because recapture falls on "the purchaser ... of those particular items" (s. 212.08(5)(r)3.c.), the Developer's advisement is the one that matters. With Rule 12A-1.108 out of date, an advisement or a declaratory statement under s. 120.565 is the only formal Department reading of the current text. *Instruments:* Agreement Section 2.3(d); paragraph T-12(d). Release 2026.4 adds a Drafter's Note to Agreement Section 2.3(b), note (4), that Rule 12A-1.108, F.A.C., still states the former 15-megawatt threshold, so a county relies on the statute and on a technical assistance advisement under s. 213.22 for any transfer the Module or Options provide. *Left open:* Agency 35.1 to 35.4 are the questions to ask. **41.** *Moved in part.* Release 2026.4 has no leasing of surplus capacity. Idle capacity goes to waiting users, may be exchanged at cost with another Recipient, or, where the Technical Schedule allows, is returned to the Developer for a payment into the Restricted Account (Module Section 1.6(c), (f)). The tax point remains, at cost, for a nonprofit Recipient, and for a public college or university, which pays tax on unrelated business income (26 U.S.C. 511(a)(2)(B)), that commits capacity of hardware it owns under Section 1.6(b) or exchanges capacity under Section 1.6(c): a commitment to small businesses is likely unrelated business, though at cost little or no tax results, and a commitment or exchange at cost with exempt and governmental users is arguably related (26 U.S.C. 513(a); *HCSC-Laundry v. United States*, 450 U.S. 1 (1981)). *Instruments:* Release 2026.4 adds to Module Section 1.6(b) that a Recipient exempt under Section 501(c)(3), or a college or university described in Section 511(a)(2)(B), obtains its own tax advice before committing or exchanging capacity for a fee with a user that is not an exempt organization or a governmental unit. *Left open:* Counsel 41.1. **42.** *Answer.* **Mostly yes**, under the account form. The Community Party chooses grantees and certifies disbursements, so the payment is its own restricted receipt, not a pass-through. Developer payments count in full in total support but only up to 2 percent as public support (26 C.F.R. 1.170A-9(f)(6)), and under s. 509(a)(2) a substantial contributor's receipts never count as public support. For example, a $2 million yearly Community Payment and $300,000 of other public support give public support of about 15 percent over five years, so most community organizations would fail the one-third test. The Community Fund form avoids this, because the Community Party receives nothing. The account agreement also does not say whose fund the account is. *Instruments:* CBA Section 5.8(b) defaults to the Community Fund form where a Fund Holder accepts in time; Sections 3.2, 5.9(a), 5.11, 10.2(b), (f), 14.6. Release 2026.4 adds to Section 5.8(a) that the Community Party chooses the account form only on its board's written finding, with tax advice, that the Community Payments will not cause it to fail the public support test, and that the account agreement states that the Custodian holds the Community Benefit Account as trustee, as the Community Party's restricted fund (with matching changes to Sections 3.2, 5.7(b) and 5.8(b)). *Left open:* Counsel 42.1. **43.** *Answer.* **Mostly no.** While the Custodian holds the Restricted Account as trustee for whichever Recipient is entitled, it is "[a] fund held for an institution by a trustee that is not an institution," which the definition of "institutional fund" excludes (s. 617.2104(2)(e)2.); the section governs amounts once a charitable Recipient holds them. The instruments create that trust for successive beneficiaries: the Restricted Account is held "for the next Recipient" (Module Sections 1.9(c), 1.19(d)). Section 518.11, as paragraphs T-22 and T-25(d) vary it, governs investment; an agency agreement with the current Recipient would bring s. 617.2104 back. **Open** on "donor," which the section does not define; it is likely the Developer, and the point has little effect, since a release made "[i]f the donor consents in a record" (s. 617.2104(6)(a)) cannot discharge terms the contract still requires. *Instruments:* paragraph T-22(a) bracket. Release 2026.4 replaces the T-22(a) bracket with a reference to s. 518.11, as T-22 and T-25(d) vary it, and adds that amounts disbursed to a Recipient that is an institution are held and spent as s. 617.2104 provides; and adds to Module Section 1.26(g) that the Developer gives no consent under s. 617.2104(6)(a). *Left open:* Counsel 43.1. **44.** *Answer.* **Mostly yes.** No Florida statute or rule requires a contractual stakeholder to use the court registry. Interpleader is permissive: "Persons having claims against the plaintiff may be joined as defendants and required to interplead" (Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.240; confirm against the official text). For bank accounts, notice of an adverse claim "does not obligate the institution to recognize the adverse claimant unless the adverse claimant also" obtains court process or posts a bond, after which "the institution shall hold the account pending agreement" or court order (s. 655.83). A fiduciary may seek a declaration to "Determine any question relating to the administration of the ... trust" (s. 86.041). *Instruments:* Module Sections 1.12(a) (hold; may seek instructions from the circuit court), 1.26(a) (no hold excuses the Developer); paragraphs T-25(a), (c); CBA Section 10.2. Release 2026.4 adds to Module Section 1.12(a) that if no instruction, decision or order is received within [__] days, the Custodian may, and on the written request of any person who gave a conflicting certificate shall, sue for interpleader or declaratory relief in the circuit court for the County, and pays any undisputed part. *Left open:* nothing beyond review of the account agreement form. **45.** *Answer.* **Mostly yes.** Contract rights are freely assignable unless the contract forbids it or the performance is personal (*Bioscience West, Inc. v. Gulfstream Property & Casualty Insurance Co.*, 185 So. 3d 638, 640 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (confirm)); the CBA does not bar the Community Party from assigning, and the Developer consents in Section 3.11. A dissolved corporation "continues its corporate existence" to wind up and distribute its property, and charitable property "may not be diverted" (s. 617.1405(1), (6)). Two gaps: "a promise to assign in the future is ineffective as an actual transfer" (*Trak Microwave Corp. v. Medaris Management*, 236 So. 2d 189, 194 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970) (confirm)), so a notice naming a future successor should be a present assignment effective on the event; and in a merger "every contract right ... vests in the survivor, without transfer" (s. 617.1106(1)(c), as amended by Chapter 2026-168), outside Section 3.11. An institution can hold rights "for enforcement only" because the CBA defines them and the Developer agreed; a state college or state university may accept that role by board action (ss. 1001.64(25), 1001.72(1)), but pays its own litigation costs (Module Section 1.21(e); CBA Section 11.3(b)). *Instruments:* CBA Sections 3.11(a) to (d), 11.4. Release 2026.4 makes each notice naming a successor "a present assignment, effective on a Succession Event, of the rights this Section passes," with the Developer's consent; and adds the Community Party's merger into another entity as a Succession Event, the survivor holding only the subsection (c) rights, for enforcement only, in place of an institution under that subsection, unless it meets and assumes under subsection (b). *Left open:* nothing for counsel; each institution decides whether to accept, whether to fund its own enforcement, and whether to take the Section 3.11(c)(ii) grant-making duties, whose records would then be public records. **46.** *Answers.* (a) **Mostly yes**, capacity the Developer buys in accounts a public host owns is contract performance, not a gift to the host: the Developer performs its own obligation (under a Lease, rent the County directs), the host accepts duties, and there is no donative intent. Section 112.3148 regulates gifts to individuals, not institutions, and a direct-support organization is optional (and its records largely confidential, s. 1004.28(5)(b), which would cut against the Module's publication duties). In its own accounts the host signs a no-cost services contract with the provider, which brings in s. 287.138, the indemnity limits of Question 29 and possibly s. 119.0701. (b) **Mostly no**, delivery is not a communications service: "Communications services" exclude "Information services" and "Internet access service, electronic mail service, electronic bulletin board service, or similar online computer services," and an information service is "the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, using, or making available information via communications services" (s. 202.11). The Department of Revenue has advised that remote compute, storage and data transfer fees are information services subject to neither the communications services tax nor sales tax (TAA 14A19-001, binding only on its facts); separately sold circuits or cross-connects could differ. (c) **Mostly yes**, the host can enforce the minimum cloud terms as an intended beneficiary if both signers name it, since "both contracting parties" must intend the benefit (*Caretta Trucking, Inc. v. Cheoy Lee Shipyards, Ltd.*, 647 So. 2d 1028, 1031 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)), provided the terms also displace the provider's standard no-beneficiary clause and bar amendment without the host's consent. Paragraph T-13(f) makes the terms prevail over standard terms but has no consent-to-amend term, and until a beneficiary's rights vest the signers may change the contract unless it says otherwise; Release 2026.4 adds both terms. *Instruments:* Module Section 1.9(b); paragraph T-13(e), (f), (k), (l) ("is not a gift, grant or donation"). Release 2026.4 adds to T-13(f) new items (ix) and (x): the provider and the Developer may not amend or end these terms so as to reduce the Recipient's rights without its written consent, and no standard term excluding third-party beneficiaries applies to the Recipient; and where the Recipient is a public body, it gives no indemnity and, for accounts it owns, the terms include what s. 119.0701 requires of a contract for services. *Left open:* nothing for counsel; how a host books the capacity is for its auditors. A Developer that is a registered dealer of communications services: see Question 36. **47.** *Answer.* **Mostly yes.** Section 350.81(1)(a) still brings in "information service," though its pin cite has been stale since 2010, when Pub. L. 111-260 reordered the definitions in 47 U.S.C. 153 alphabetically. Paragraph (20) now defines "exchange access," and "information service" is at paragraph (24), with the same text: "the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via telecommunications." Florida reads a reference to federal law as of its adoption, because adopting future federal acts "would be an unconstitutional delegation" (Attorney General letter, 2006, citing cases to confirm); subsection (1)(a) was last enacted when paragraph (20) defined the term; and the provision names the term. Computing capacity reached over the Internet fits. *Instruments:* Options 2.5(c) and Agreement Section 4.5(c) defer to s. 350.81. Release 2026.4 adds a Drafter's Note that the cross-reference is to 47 U.S.C. 153(20) as it read when s. 350.81(1)(a) was enacted, now 153(24). *Left open:* nothing; any fix is for the Legislature. **48.** *Answer.* **Mostly yes, it is barred.** "Rental of land to, or use of land by, the sponsor for nonaeronautical purposes at less than fair market value rent is considered a subsidy of local government or other entities and is a prohibited use of airport revenue" (FAA Order 5190.6C, para. 15.12.j). A credit lowers cash rent for airport land while the County's general government takes the computing. Even uncredited, the County Share is rent "accruing to the sponsor" for use of airport property (para. 15.6.a), so it would have to be used for airport purposes and booked as airport revenue (49 U.S.C. 47107(b)(1), 47133(a)). *Instruments:* Options Section 2.5(f) never credits the County Share against Base Rent; the Drafter's Notes state that the framework takes rent on such land in cash. Release 2026.4 covers it with the bar added under Question 23 to Module Section 2.1(a) and Options Section 2.5, and with Lease Section 4.10, which takes rent on such land only in cash. *Left open:* only a County Share used solely by the airport for its own operations, and booked as airport revenue, would need the Federal Aviation Administration's view. **49.** *Answer.* **Open, leaning yes.** The cap reaches only damages "resulting from the termination of a lease" (11 U.S.C. 502(b)(6)). The Ninth Circuit asks whether "the landlord [would] have the same claim against the tenant if the tenant were to assume the lease rather than rejecting it," holding that claims "for waste, nuisance and trespass do not result from the rejection of the lease" (*In re El Toro Materials Co.*, 504 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2007)); the Eighth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel and a Delaware bankruptcy court have applied the test (confirm). No Eleventh Circuit or Florida bankruptcy court decision was found, and the search was not complete. The remediation duty at surrender (Lease Section 8.2(b); Exhibit "S," Section S-12.6(d)) and the environmental indemnity (Lease Sections 8.2(c), 9.2) would exist whether the tenant assumed or rejected, so under *El Toro* they are uncapped; statutory environmental claims by the County as owner, or by the Department of Environmental Protection, are not a lessor's termination damages. *Instruments:* Lease Sections 8.2, 9.2, 13.2, 13.3, 14.4; Agreement Section 7.2(e). Release 2026.4 adds "for the remedies of Article 14 only" to Lease Section 14.4, which reimburses cure costs "as additional rent," so cleanup costs are not argued to be capped rent. *Left open:* Counsel 49.1. **50.** *Answer.* **Not a legal research question**: it turns on each county's ordinance. In the three ordinances read, written letters are usually covered; registration turns on whether the writer is paid, "retained" or "designated" by a principal; unpaid people speaking for themselves are exempt; and the quasi-judicial carve-outs fit a party's representative at a noticed hearing, not a side-agreement party's letter. Miami-Dade reaches a person "employed or retained by a principal" to influence an action of the County Commission, covers "all forms of communication, whether oral, written, or electronic," and requires nonprofit representatives to register without the fee (Code s. 2-11.1(s)(1), confirm current text; Commission on Ethics FAQ). Palm Beach reaches one who "contracts for economic consideration ... for the purpose of lobbying on behalf of a principal," with no nonprofit exclusion (Code s. 2-352). Orange reaches one who "receives compensation to lobby," and compensation excludes "direct reimbursement of actual out-of-pocket expenses" (Code s. 2-351, confirm current text). The Community Party writes on request under a contract that gives it economic rights, so the risk is highest in Miami-Dade, then Palm Beach, then Orange. *Instruments:* CBA Section 3.10 assigns each party "any local lobbyist registration rule"; Section 3.6 sends letters to the record; Section 2.4(b) bars payments that fund lobbying. Release 2026.4 adds to Section 3.3 that, before delivering a letter, the Community Party registers or reports under any local lobbyist rule that applies and discloses the Agreement as that rule requires. *Left open:* the county's ordinance; where the county ethics body gives advisory opinions, one settles it. **51.** *Answer.* **Settled.** Florida courts give the Commission's declaratory statements no deference: a court "may not defer to an administrative agency's interpretation of such statute or rule, and must instead interpret such statute or rule de novo" (Art. V, s. 21, Fla. Const.). *Sun Gas* (Fourth District Court of Appeal, 21 February 2024, No. 4D2023-0075; reporter citation to confirm) cited that section in finding *PW Ventures* "distinguishable," but it construed the motor fuel marketing statute in a suit between private parties, reviewed no Commission order, and could not overrule the Supreme Court (Question 19). A declaratory statement applies "to the petitioner's particular set of circumstances" (s. 120.565(1)) and persuades only by its reasoning. The Commission must explain a departure from its own statements (s. 120.68(7)(e)3.), and its orders say they are "limited to the facts described" in the petition. *Instruments:* M2.1(c)(3) and M2.2(b) move to the next form without default if the second form is held to be utility service. No change. *Left open:* nothing. --- ## Part 2. Questions for counsel These are the questions the sources leave open after the research above. Each is narrower than the question it came from, and each can be answered alone. The number before each question is its source question and its place in that entry (for example, 3.2 is the second question left from Question 3). The first tier lists the questions whose answer decides whether a provision works as drafted; for the second tier, the instruments already work under either answer, or the point is narrow. Counsel 5.1 was answered in the reading pass of 23 October 2026 (Question 5(b)) and is no longer listed, and 5.2, which arises only where a county designates site plans for a Covered Facility for administrative review, is now in the second tier. In the follow-up reading of 25 October 2026, Counsel 2.1 moved to the second tier because what is left of it is narrow, and Counsel 3.1 because the instruments work under either answer: the Kit already treats an emergency declaration as counting under s. 252.422(1). ### First tier: the answer decides whether a provision works as drafted **3.2** (Question 3). Where the holder of legal title joins the application as a co-applicant, does Section 28(2) of Chapter 2025-190 (or the like saving in s. 252.422(3)) let a covered county approve and enforce a development agreement whose covenants apply standards the county has not adopted, including covenants that add review steps to later site plan approvals, given that Section 28(2) names plan amendments, land development regulation amendments, site plans, development permits and development orders but not procedures? Does approval by resolution rather than by ordinance change the answer? **6.1** (Question 6). Does s. 366.032(2) bar a county rule that, for every stationary generator, turbine and engine regardless of fuel, confines non-emergency operation to set hours and days and caps the number of units tested at once, while letting every test the Florida Fire Prevention Code requires proceed (Standards Sec. 10), given that the clause has no fuel-discrimination element in its text but its legislative history addresses bans on gas appliances and all-electric building codes? Does the answer change where the same limits bind an operator as covenants of a development agreement or of a lease of County land, given that the clause reaches a county's decision to "take any action" that restricts use? **10.1** (Question 10). Is a new impact fee category with its own Fee Unit and capital list a "new" fee outside s. 163.31801(6), and does charging it "in place of" a general rate change that? Does "permit applications" in s. 163.31801(4)(d) mean only the building permit, or any pending development permit for the project? **12.1** (Question 12). Is an owner's recorded declaration of affirmative and restrictive covenants in favor of a county a conveyance that needs no consideration under the Florida Supreme Court's 1985 decision (479 So. 2d 90), or a "contractual undertaking" that does? If the statutory agreement fails, does a covenant whose benefit the County holds in gross, with no benefited parcel, still run with the land? **13.1** (Question 13). Where the County's code makes a later-phase site plan quasi-judicial, may a development agreement adopted after the s. 163.3225 hearings supply an administrative procedure for that permit for the agreement's term? **14.1** (Question 14). Does s. 163.3233(2)(c) require a development agreement to identify the regulated subject or fee category it anticipates? And does s. 163.3233(1) bind the County for permits issued between execution and the date the agreement takes effect under s. 163.3229? **16.1** (Question 16). Where a development agreement is optional (Sections 10.2, 10.3) and its payments are sized to a project-specific study, are the payments "impact fees" under s. 163.31801 or exactions under s. 70.45? **21.1** (Question 21). For a nonprofit Recipient only: are use limits enforceable by the Developer and a neutral, but not by the County, enough "control retained by the public authority" under the Florida Supreme Court's 1967 decision (198 So. 2d 1) for the County to direct rent value to that Recipient? The same question arises for a nonprofit Access Institution paid under Module Section 1.5(g)(iv), whose limits the host enforces under its agreement. **26.1** (Question 26). Under the Florida Supreme Court's 2022 decision on covenants running with the land (336 So. 3d 207) and the pending answer in *RJ's International Trading*, does a duty to deliver a share of a facility's installed computing capacity, from equipment on the land, to a holder of no land bind a successor in title who did not assume it? **29.2** (Question 29). May a public host institution (a state university, a Florida College System institution or a district school board) agree, under a private agreement or a county ground lease: to keep computing hardware it acquires under the instrument dedicated to the instrument's uses until the hardware is retired, including after the instrument ends; not to sell, pledge or transfer that hardware before it is retired except to another recipient, a public body or a 501(c)(3) organization that assumes the dedication; to transfer that hardware, with the part of its hardware refresh reserve held for it, at no cost to a successor recipient, including a private nonprofit, assign its rights to one (Module Section 3.5(d)), and pay the unspent balance of its administration payment to the custodian for one (CBA Section 5.17(e)); to dispose of retired hardware other than to the developer or an affiliate, where Chapter 274 (district school boards and Florida College System institutions) or Chapter 273 (state universities) governs the disposal of its surplus property (s. 1013.28(2)), and, for a school board, where s. 1013.28(2)(a) makes surplus, marked-for-disposal or otherwise unused property available to charter schools; and to apply itself, to the uses of the restricted account, any price it receives for that hardware, its net proceeds on retirement, insurance proceeds and awards for it not spent on replacement, and the net proceeds of recovered heat it sells (Module Sections 1.6(d), 3.7(a)), consistently with Article VII, Section 10 of the Florida Constitution? Release 2026.4 has a public host apply those proceeds itself rather than pay them into the restricted account, pay no damages or other money for a breach of the dedication, and keep hardware the law governing its property bars it from transferring; where the law governing its funds bars a transfer, it applies the reserve as net proceeds and refunds the administration payment balance to the developer (Module Section 1.6(d); CBA Section 5.17(e)). **35.2** (Question 35). Where a host is a governmental entity under s. 350.81: (a) is a payment to the host under the Instrument (the Administration Payment, a Readiness Payment, a payment under Module Section 1.5(f), which now includes the insurance cost of Section 1.23(a), a payment from the Monitoring Fund under Section 1.21(b) or a disbursement from the Restricted Account under Section 1.19(b), including for the host's own duties toward Access Institutions under Section 1.5(g)(iii) and any resident panel), a condition of use such as the optional model publication rule of Module Section 1.7(d), or a promise an Access Institution makes to the host in its agreement under Section 1.5(g)(ii), "other consideration" for free use of the Allocation by persons other than the host and other governmental entities, or for capacity the host makes available to an Access Institution, which is "a person," so that the host "provides" an advanced service under s. 350.81(1)(f); (b) is the host's free service to its own students, who are persons and not the host "itself," outside that definition, given that the contrary reading would make every college's campus network, paid for by tuition and a technology fee (s. 1009.23(10)), an advanced service, and is capacity it furnishes to another governmental entity for that entity's own students and employees "service ... to any other governmental entity"; and (c) does the host's role as the single customer of record and operator of the Allocation (Module paragraph T-5) make the Developer's payments to Access Institutions under Module Section 1.5(g)(iv) consideration to the host? Module Section 1.5(g) sends everyone but the host's own people through other governmental entities or Access Institutions, and keeps payments to the host away from the access of users an Access Institution serves, except for its own costs of dealing with Access Institutions and of any panel. The answer to (b) decides whether the host may serve its own students directly, and other governmental entities' people through those entities, and the answer to (c) whether Section 1.5(g) works; a "no" to (a) would make Section 1.5(g) unnecessary, as the opinion of counsel in Section 1.5(g)(i) allows. **52.1** (Question 52). Each water management district requires its permittee to mitigate impacts of the withdrawal on existing legal uses, including exempt domestic wells, as a condition of the consumptive use permit or of its issuance (Southwest Florida and St. Johns River by rule; South Florida, Suwannee River and Northwest Florida in their current handbooks). Each decides attribution under its own test: three use interference or harm "caused in whole or in part by" the withdrawal, and in the Dover/Plant City Water Use Caution Area Southwest Florida assigns each well complaint with its own drawdown model. None presumes attribution from baseline testing. (1) Is a county ordinance that requires an applicant for a development order to fund and secure a claims process for the same impact (Standards Sec. 8(e)), crediting mitigation a district permit or rule requires and stating that the process does not limit, condition or authorize any withdrawal, "the regulation of the consumptive use of water" that s. 373.217(4) reserves to Part II of chapter 373? (2) If not, may the process presume that an impact later testing shows at a well is attributable to the withdrawal, where baseline testing of the well was accepted in time under Sec. 8(d), rebuttable by proof of another cause, consistently with s. 373.217 and with the County's burden under s. 70.45(4), or must it apply the attribution test of the district's own rules (for example, interference "caused in whole or in part by the permittee's withdrawals")? (3) Does either answer change where Sec. 8(e) binds the Developer as a covenant of a development agreement (Agreement Section 3.6(a)) or of a lease of County land (Lease Section 6.2(a)(1); Counsel 22.1)? (4) If the process stands, may its security be sized to the cost of the likely remedy at the wells at which the applicant's study projects an adverse impact (Sec. 14(b)(5)), or at every well within the projected cone of depression, consistently with s. 70.45(4)? **52.2** (Question 52). For a large-scale data center as s. 373.203(4) defines it, does s. 373.262(2), read with its opening words "Consistent with other provisions of this part" and the intent stated in subsection (1), save from s. 373.217(4) a county rule that bars the use of groundwater withdrawn by or for the facility for heat rejection, makeup or blowdown (Standards Sec. 7(a)(1))? While Section 28 of Chapter 2025-190 reaches the plan amendment in Kit Part G, does a prohibition in the zoning regulations alone satisfy the words "zoning regulations and comprehensive plan"? Where s. 373.262(2) does not apply, because a third party withdraws the groundwater under its own permit (s. 373.223(2)) or the data center falls outside s. 373.203(4), does s. 373.217, as the First District read it in 2009 (7 So. 3d 1129) in holding that a state agency could not enforce a development of regional impact order's limits on wells the district intended to permit, displace the rule? And for any data center, may a county deny a special exception on the ground of subsidence risk from the proposed withdrawal where no land-side condition removes the risk (Sec. 8(f)(2), (3)), when the district's permit criteria already address harm to offsite land uses from the withdrawal? **53.1** (Question 53). Is the severance in Clause Bank Section 7.7(a)(v), a fixed formula paid on each automation-related elimination during the term, with the Developer applying the definition and presumption of item (i) to each elimination and the Community Party able to enforce it, an employee welfare benefit plan under 29 U.S.C. 1002(1)? If it is, does ERISA displace the Community Party's contract remedy? Would tying severance to a notice under item (ii) and a fixed schedule take it outside ERISA? **53.2** (Question 53). Where employees at the Project Site are represented, does item (viii) of Clause Bank Section 7.7(a) (a joint certification that the collective bargaining agreement gives equal or better terms meets the subsection, and no employer's duty to bargain is displaced) avoid conflict with the employer's duties under the National Labor Relations Act, including its duty not to change a mandatory subject of bargaining without bargaining? ### Second tier: the instruments work either way, or the point is narrow **1.1** (Question 1). Does a delay, or an informal staff or commissioner suggestion, that ends in approval with no written condition support a claim under *Koontz* or s. 70.45? **2.1** (Question 2). A county ordinance authorizes a timely request to vacate and rehear a quasi-judicial decision, states that every timely request is a motion for rehearing the ordinance authorizes whether or not it identifies evidence, and has the Board decide each request by a signed, written order filed with the Clerk of the Board (Standards Sec. 16(c); Fee Ordinance Sec. 1.4). Under Fla. R. App. P. 9.020(h), does rendition of the decision wait for that order where (a) the ordinance requires the Board to deny the request without rehearing because it identifies no evidence, or (b) the request is made by a person entitled to participate as a party who did not appear, and is such a person an "existing party" under rule 9.020(h)(2)(A)? **3.1** (Question 3). Does "a county listed in a federal disaster declaration" in s. 252.422(1) include a county listed only in an emergency declaration under 42 U.S.C. 5191, including one approved on or before the day of landfall and never followed by a major disaster declaration that lists the county? **4.1** (Question 4). Are Standards Sec. 13(a) (no disposal of Covered Equipment in any landfill, transfer station or municipal solid waste stream in the County and, as a condition of the development order, wherever located) and Sec. 12(d) (no firefighting foams or heat-transfer or dielectric fluids containing intentionally added PFAS where a commercially available alternative exists), adopted within a land development regulation under Part II of chapter 163, "adopted pursuant to part II of chapter 163" under s. 57.112(6) and "enacted to implement" Part II under s. 125.675(5)(g)1.? Does a court classify the ordinance as a whole, or each challenged provision by its own subject? **5.2** (Question 5). Where a county chooses Option B of Standards Sec. 15(g) and so designates later site plans for a Covered Facility for administrative review under s. 163.3169(1)(q), does a deemed approval under s. 125.022(1)(d)2., or the bar in s. 125.022(1)(d)1. on reviewing again plans precertified under subsection (1)(b)2., relieve the operator of a requirement the Standards apply to the site plan, such as the battery fire test data of Sec. 12(a), or of a condition of the earlier special exception, given the proviso preserving "all other applicable federal, state, and local laws, regulations, and ordinances" and the statement in Sec. 15(g) that approval relieves no requirement of the Standards? Release 2026.4 moves the acoustic update out of the site plan application (Sec. 9(e)), so the question no longer reaches it. **7.1** (Question 7). Is a county setback for a utility-owned electric substation, adopted under s. 163.3208(3) and greater than the subsection (4) fallback, tested as other legislative land development regulations are (the fairly debatable standard) or by a stricter statutory test of reasonableness? May such a setback rest on sound from transformers and other equipment at nearby residential property lines as an "aesthetic compatibility-based" standard, or only on visual and lighting compatibility? **8.1** (Question 8). Does a recorded covenant consenting to inspection entry bind a successor operator who later refuses, or does it only support an injunction against that operator? **9.1** (Question 9). Does s. 163.31801(4)(g) permit a fee on a nonresidential use to fund shelter capacity used by people evacuated because of that use? The answer decides whether Fee Ordinance Sec. 2.2(a) keeps public shelters in Category C, measured by the persons evacuated after an incident at a Covered Facility, or whether shelters are removed from Category C. **11.1** (Question 11). Is a nominal-rent lease, or a utility contract the Developer pays for, a "contribution" creditable under s. 163.31801(5)(a) at the fair market value of the use? Does subsection (5)(a) require credit for a contribution that answered the impacts of permits issued before the fee took effect, or only for any excess? **11.2** (Question 11). Does s. 255.20(1), which binds a county "seeking to construct or improve a public building, structure, or other public construction works", reach a developer that, at its own cost, installs equipment at a county facility as mitigation under a development agreement, or builds a facility on county land for an impact fee credit? If it does, does the developer's own award on the statute's terms satisfy it? Does s. 255.05(1) require a bond of the developer itself, as a person entering into a formal contract with the county for a public work, as well as of its contractor? **15.1** (Question 15). For an in-kind item other than land, does rough proportionality under s. 70.45 compare the impact with the grantor's cost or with the item's market value? **17.1** (Question 17). (1) Under the Florida Supreme Court's 1954 and 1991 tests, may a liquidated amount payable to a county under a development agreement for a verified sound violation pre-estimate the loss to the residents the limit protects, as courts elsewhere have let a public body liquidate its inhabitants' loss from delay in a public improvement built for their benefit and at their cost (Ninth Circuit, 1940, 110 F.2d 620), or only the County's own monitoring and enforcement costs, and are those costs, which the County documents and recovers, "readily ascertainable" so that a sum liquidating them fails the first prong of the test? Do code enforcement fines the County keeps for the same violation make the amount a penalty? (2) May a county ordinance, without the owner's agreement, withhold further development orders for land within the Development Unit during an uncured violation of the Standards, by a timely written denial that states its findings and cites the ordinance (Standards Sec. 18(d)), and may an ordinance or a development agreement withhold a certificate of occupancy for a building that complies with the codes s. 553.79(2)(a)4. names (Standards Sec. 18(d); Agreement Section 8.2(b))? **18.1** (Question 18). Is a data center campus over the thresholds an "industrial complex" under s. 119.071(3)(c)4.c., so that drawings of its internal layout are exempt? **18.2** (Question 18). Does s. 119.0725(2)(a) reach a county's records of a private operator's information technology and operational technology systems? **18.3** (Question 18). Can a municipal electric utility's executed price and demand terms be its customer's trade secret under s. 688.002(4)? **18.4** (Question 18). Does any tort lie against a county for a good-faith release of a record that is confidential and exempt? **18.5** (Question 18). While, on its written finding that real-time publication would disclose security-sensitive operating information, a county lets a private operator delay or aggregate the publication of its measured sound levels and spectra on a public dashboard, is the county's live copy of those data confidential and exempt, as a security or firesafety system plan or a portion of one, under s. 119.071(3)(a), Florida Statutes? **22.1** (Question 22). Does s. 70.45 reach a county's terms as landowner in a lease of county land, and is a ground tenant that owns the improvements a "property owner" under s. 70.001(3)(f) for terms fixed before it held its leasehold? **23.1** (Question 23). Is a facility on County-owned land with Tenant-owned improvements "owned by another person" under 42 U.S.C. 9607(d)(2), so that County emergency response there is shielded? **23.2** (Question 23). Is a payment in lieu of taxes that a tenant of airport property pays the sponsor under its lease, as additional rent, revenue of the airport under 49 U.S.C. 47107(b) and 47133, and if so may the sponsor remit the shares of other taxing authorities? **23.3** (Question 23). On airport property, where a lease covenant requires the tenant to provide emergency power to County facilities that are not airport facilities, as impact mitigation, and the appraisal of fair market rental value reflects that covenant, is the resulting reduction in rent a use of airport revenue for a non-airport purpose? **24.1** (Question 24). Is a 501(c)(3) organization's contractual duty to support a private project's approvals, given in exchange for benefits it administers for a charitable class, incidental private benefit? **24.2** (Question 24). Is a county commission acting quasi-judicially on a rezoning or development agreement still a "legislative body" under 26 C.F.R. 56.4911-2(d)(3)? **26.2** (Question 26). Under the Florida Supreme Court's 2022 decision on covenants running with the land (336 So. 3d 207) and its pending answer to the Eleventh Circuit's 2024 certified question (No. SC2024-0547; no decision found, confirm), does a developer's recorded covenant that supports a duty running with the land, owed to a holder of no land (to report on the duty, to hold an annual public meeting about it, to fund its monitoring and custody, to insure the payments it requires against business interruption, to fund a reserve that carries it on after operations end, to have later ground lessees and operators assume it, or to seek no tax benefit on account of it), touch and concern the land, so that it binds a successor in title who did not assume it? **29.1** (Question 29). When asked to indemnify a private party, is a Florida College System board treated as the state (AGO 90-21) or as a local body (*American Home Assurance*)? **30.1** (Question 30). Does a public host's use of a user's project data in official business, such as a misuse investigation, make that data a public record? **31.1** (Question 31). Is money an independent custodian holds for a public Recipient, before disbursement, that unit's "moneys" under s. 280.02? **32.1** (Question 32). Is the Custodian's or the Recipient's claim for unpaid in-kind rent under a County ground lease "the claim of a lessor" under 11 U.S.C. 502(b)(6)? **32.2** (Question 32). How would a court in the Eleventh Circuit apply *PPI Enterprises* to security under Module Section 1.20, and has any court there adopted or rejected compelled in-kind performance under 11 U.S.C. 365(d)(3)? **32.3** (Question 32). After a filing, does the stay bar a county's notice of default to an operator where a draw on its decommissioning security depends on the notice? If so, is a notice to perform decommissioning under the county's standards excepted by 11 U.S.C. 362(b)(4), and is a notice demanding payment of a well owner claim? Release 2026.4 makes no draw depend on the notice, so the answer bears only on whether the County may give it after a filing. **32.4** (Question 32). Where a stay bars a notice of default, is a term that runs the cure period from the due date and lets the security be drawn without the notice (Standards Sec. 14(b)(4); Agreement Sections 4.2(f) and 7.2(d); Lease Section 13.3(b); CBA Section 11.1; Module Section 1.24(a)) enforceable against the debtor, or is it a modification "conditioned on ... the commencement of a case" that 11 U.S.C. 365(e)(1) or 541(c)(1)(B) overrides? Release 2026.4 removes that term from each of these provisions, so the answer no longer decides whether a draw can be made. **33.1** (Question 33). Will a Florida court enforce, at the suit of an institution added after a county ground lease was signed, a term designating as an intended beneficiary any entity that later meets stated criteria and accepts in writing? **33.2** (Question 33). Is an Account the Custodian holds for Permitted Purposes a charitable trust under Chapter 736, so that s. 736.0110(3) applies to it? **34.1** (Question 34). May a Recipient rely on an institution's attestation under paragraph D-5(c) for users reached through that institution, or must it screen each individual against the sanctions lists itself? **36.1** (Question 36). Does s. 202.24(2)(c)5. except rent for County land outside the right-of-way that a dealer tenant pays in kind, and is property a tenant furnishes as rent furnished "in its capacity as a dealer of communications services" under s. 202.24(2)(b)? **41.1** (Question 41). Is a nonprofit Recipient's, or a public college's or university's, commitment of capacity of hardware it owns, at cost, to exempt organizations and governmental units under Module Section 1.6(b), or its exchange of capacity at cost with another Recipient under Section 1.6(c), substantially related to its exempt or educational purposes under 26 U.S.C. 513(a)? **42.1** (Question 42). If the Custodian holds the Community Benefit Account as trustee, as the Community Party's restricted fund, is the account a separate trust that 26 U.S.C. 4947(a)(1) could treat as a private foundation? **43.1** (Question 43). Is a bank that holds funds "for the Recipient then entitled" under the custody agreement a "trustee" within s. 617.2104(2)(e)2., rather than an agent? Does the same answer hold for the Community Benefit Account if the account agreement makes it the Community Party's restricted fund, held by the Custodian as trustee? **49.1** (Question 49). Has any court in the Eleventh Circuit adopted or rejected *In re El Toro Materials Co.* on whether waste and cleanup claims fall outside 11 U.S.C. 502(b)(6)? **54.1** (Question 54). Where a development agreement makes a county's data center standards covenants of the developer, and the standards also apply to the project as an ordinance, is a check of compliance with those covenants that an anonymous complaint prompts, if a code enforcement officer or a code inspector designated under s. 125.69(4), Florida Statutes, makes it, an investigation of a potential violation of a duly enacted code or ordinance initiated by way of an anonymous complaint under s. 162.21(3)(b) or s. 125.69(4)(b), read with ss. 162.21(8) and 125.69(4)(k)? Are code enforcement proceedings that rest on what the check found initiated by way of that complaint under s. 162.06(1)(b)? Does s. 162.13 carry the bar of s. 162.06(1)(b) to the agreement's own remedies for a breach of those covenants where a code inspector initiates them by way of an anonymous complaint? **56.1** (Question 56). Is a requirement in a county's land development regulations for multifamily developments, applying in every district, that an application for homes within a mapped area of an industrial facility's predicted sound show how the site layout addresses that sound, among the regulations s. 125.01055(7)(e)1., Florida Statutes, requires a qualifying development to satisfy, or a regulation of architectural design, which (7)(e)3. lets a county require on parcels with a qualifying historic structure and does not mention elsewhere? **56.2** (Question 56). For homes within such an area, may a county require construction that meets an interior sound level or a noise level reduction (1) by a local technical amendment under s. 553.73(4)(b), Florida Statutes, or is that "a new subject not addressed in the Florida Building Code"; or (2) by a land development regulation, consistently with the Florida Building Codes Act? **57.1** (Question 57). Does s. 633.206(2)(b), Florida Statutes, bar a county from including in (i) a development agreement under ss. 163.3220 to 163.3243, Florida Statutes, or (ii) a lease of county land under s. 125.35, Florida Statutes, a covenant that requires an energy storage system to meet firesafety requirements more stringent than the uniform firesafety standards? **57.2** (Question 57). Under s. 633.206(2)(b), Florida Statutes, may a local authority, on a case-by-case basis to meet special situations arising from historic, geographic, or unusual conditions, impose on an energy storage system an alternative standard its owner has not sought, if the alternative gives at least the protection of the uniform firesafety standards? **58.1** (Question 58). Does "any agreement" in s. 288.860(2)(a) reach a ground lease of county land and a development agreement under ss. 163.3220 to 163.3243? **58.2** (Question 58). If a tenant or developer, or its successor, comes under the control of a foreign country of concern after the agreement is signed, does s. 288.860(2)(a) bar the county from continuing to perform or enforce it, and what becomes of its recorded covenants? **58.3** (Question 58). What do "controlled by" and "under significant control of" mean in s. 288.860? **58.4** (Question 58). Does Part III of chapter 692 reach a ground leasehold as such, as distinct from improvements the tenant owns? **58.5** (Question 58). Where an entity that has entered into a colocation or similar agreement at a single location of 50 megawatts or more of anticipated monthly peak load is a foreign entity, does s. 366.043(7) bar the public utility from serving the whole location, or only that entity's load? **58.6** (Question 58). Has a public or nonprofit institution that leases cabinets, power and cooling at a data center to house its own hardware "entered into a colocation or similar agreement at a single location" under s. 366.043(2)(d)? **58.7** (Question 58). Has an entity that holds committed computing capacity on hardware another entity houses at a data center, and houses no equipment of its own there, "entered into a colocation or similar agreement" under s. 366.043(2)(d)? --- ## Part 3. Questions for agencies These questions belong to an agency rather than to a court or a lawyer. An agency's answer usually reaches only the person who asks and the facts stated. A technical assistance advisement under s. 213.22 binds the Department of Revenue only as to the taxpayer who requests it and the transaction it describes (Question 40); a declaratory statement under s. 120.565 applies to the petitioner's particular circumstances (Question 51). A county that uses the instruments, or a developer or recipient, would be the one to ask. | No. | Agency and route | Question | |---|---|---| | 19.1 (Question 19) | Public Service Commission, by petition for declaratory statement under s. 120.565 | Does a nominal fixed-rent lease of non-renewable or storage generating equipment behind a County facility's meter, with maintenance and fuel paid by the lessor, fall within the Monsanto and Sunrun orders, so that the lessor is not a public utility under s. 366.02(8)? | | 19.2 (Question 19) | Department of Environmental Protection, Division of Air Resource Management | Is an emergency engine that a developer owns and leases to a county at a county facility, run only at the county's direction, an emissions unit of the county's facility for the collective fuel limits of Rule 62-210.300(3)(a)35, F.A.C., and for any permit, and which of them signs an application or registration as owner or operator? | | 23.1 (Question 23) | Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Airport Compliance | Is a given County parcel airport property subject to 49 U.S.C. 47107(b) and 47133, or was it released, and on what terms? | | 28.1 (Question 28) | U.S. Department of Education | Where a Developer supplies computing capacity but no instruction, does the Workforce Pell limit on written arrangements with ineligible organizations (34 C.F.R. 690.90 to 690.97) reach a program that uses the capacity? | | 31.1 (Question 31) | Office of Insurance Regulation | Is a bond securing a tenant's in-kind delivery and payment duties under a county ground lease, payable on a custodian's certificate, surety insurance (including under the lease bond exclusion of s. 627.971(1)(b)) or financial guaranty insurance? | | 35.1 (Question 35) | Department of Revenue, by technical assistance advisement under s. 213.22 | Is a recipient that houses its own computing hardware at the facility an "owner" or "tenant" of the data center under s. 212.08(5)(r)1.c.(III)? | | 35.2 (Question 35) | Department of Revenue | Is a county that is the ground lessor and holds a County Share an "owner or tenant" for the 1-megawatt rule? | | 35.3 (Question 35) | Department of Revenue | Does the transfer or disposal of retired data center property at the end of its use trigger s. 212.08(5)(r)3.c.? | | 35.4 (Question 35) | Department of Revenue | Is a campus divided by a public road "one or more contiguous parcels" under s. 212.08(5)(r)1.c.(I)? | --- ## Part 4. Other findings The research turned up points outside the 51 questions that also call for changes. Each is stated briefly. - **Statutory tolling of development agreements.** A natural emergency declaration "tolls the period remaining to exercise the rights under a permit or other authorization for the duration of the emergency declaration" and extends it "for 24 months in addition to the tolled period," up to "48 months in total," and this applies to "The expiration of a development permit or development agreement" (s. 252.363(1)(a)6.), on written notice within 90 days after the declaration ends. The Agreement's caps on tolling cannot shorten that. Release 2026.4 states in Agreement Section 3.4(c) that it does not limit any tolling or extension s. 252.363 provides, and has the Developer deliver a copy of each notice to the County, which reports the extension under Section 9.1. Whether such an extension can carry an agreement past the 30-year limit of s. 163.3229, and whether it extends the Agreement's phase outside dates, is open. - **Permits that make an agency a "Public Approver."** A water management district that issues the project's environmental resource or consumptive use permit is a "special district" and a "regional body," so it is a Public Approver under Module Section 1.2 whenever its permit is an "Approval." Under a Lease every permit is an Approval; under a CBA, only a permit Exhibit A lists. Release 2026.4 lists in CBA Exhibit A, as item 2A, every state, regional and federal permit the Project requires that is not already an Approval, as an Approval only for the barred-recipient rules, and, where the parties keep the bracket, for the Developer's copies of filings under Section 4.4, so that the Approvals Date and the support letter duty do not move. - **Conservation easements given under a CBA.** Covered in Question 27. - **Protective gear and Fee Category A.** Agreement Section 4.7(d) calls all protective gear non-capital, which conflicts with Fee Ordinance Category A where gear stocked on a response vehicle is "the equipment necessary to outfit the vehicle ... for its official use" (s. 163.31801(3)(b), numbered (3)(a) until 1 January 2027). Personal gear issued to firefighters is not fixed capital. Release 2026.4 limits the Section 4.3 items in Section 4.7(d) to training and to items that are not capital facilities under an impact fee the County has adopted for that category. - **Equipment the County holds for its useful life.** Chapter 274 does not forbid a county to accept equipment on a use-and-proceeds covenant, but a sale of property worth "$5,000 or more" must go "to the highest responsible bidder, or by public auction" (s. 274.06), and a donation yields no proceeds. Release 2026.4, in Agreement Section 4.3(b) and M2.1(c)(3), allows early disposal, other than by replacement, only by sale under s. 274.06, by transfer to another governmental unit that assumes the covenant, or, for an item without commercial value, as s. 274.06 permits; and, in Fee Ordinance Sec. 4.4(b), includes the Sec. 4.7 terms in each credit agreement, so they bind by contract. - **A connection-ready installation at a County facility.** A transfer switch and connection point without a generator is not "emergency power capability" under M2.1(a), but it fits Fee Category C's "switchgear, and connections" and can be credited under Fee Ordinance Sec. 4.3 where the Technical Study or the capital improvements program identifies it. Release 2026.4 does not add a connection-ready form. One is available if a county asks: add a connection-ready form to M2.1(c) where the County owns, or holds a contract reserving, a generator dedicated to the facility, acquired or reserved at no cost to the County, which the readiness test runs at full critical load. - **The thermal corridor.** The keep-clear restriction in Exhibit "S," Section S-23.1(b) is not an exaction of an interest in land: no interest passes to the County or the public, and "This Part grants no person a right to thermal energy" (S-23.3). It still needs a nexus finding like any Exhibit "S" covenant. Release 2026.4 states in S-23.1(b) that the duty to grant the easement arises only under an agreement the Operator chooses to execute, which the County shall not require. - **Chapter 617 citations.** The 2026.4 working texts cite 40 sections of Chapter 617 (34 of them in the Release 2026.3 text), every one of them in the Trust documents, which are not part of Release 2026.4; the instruments of this release cite two of them (ss. 617.0204 and 617.2104). Each citation was checked against the 2026 text after Chapter 2026-168. Release 2026.4 conforms Module Section 1.9(f) to the new wording of s. 617.0204 ("knowing that there was no incorporation"). - **Security delivered after signing.** Covered in Question 32(g). - **Who pays if a dispute or a suit is needed.** A contract cannot give attorney's fees to the public side alone: where a contract contains "a provision allowing attorney's fees to a party when he or she is required to take any action to enforce the contract," the court "may also allow reasonable attorney's fees to the other party when that party prevails" (s. 57.105(7)). The statute turns a one-sided fee clause into a reciprocal one; it does not reach a mutual clause and adds no ground for recovery (Florida Supreme Court, 2021, No. SC20-1195, a mutual fee clause (confirm the reporter citation)). Each instrument therefore keeps one rule for each kind of suit: in the host's suits each side bears its own fees (Module Section 1.25(b); CBA Section 11.3(b)), and in the County's own suits the prevailing party recovers, both ways (Lease Section 15.12, which Module Section 2.6(e) keeps under a lease; Agreement Section 10.26). Any party may still recover under s. 57.105(1) against a claim or defense that the losing party or its lawyer knew or should have known the material facts or then-existing law did not support, and under s. 768.79 after a rejected offer of judgment, but s. 768.79 applies only in a civil action for damages: not in one seeking only equitable relief and, on a general offer to settle all claims, not in one seeking equitable relief with damages; an offer aimed only at a separate claim for damages was left open (Florida Supreme Court, 2013, 107 So. 3d 362). A clause under which the Developer pays a mediator's or a neutral's fee whoever prevails is not a provision allowing attorney's fees to a party, so s. 57.105(7) gives it no reciprocal effect (**Mostly no** that it could be made reciprocal; no decision on such a fee was found, and the search was not complete). After a decision under Module paragraph T-26, a court may add the prevailing party's reasonable attorney fees and other expenses of litigation to a judgment in a contested proceeding confirming, vacating without directing a rehearing, modifying or correcting it (s. 682.15(3)), whichever side prevails; neither s. 682.014(2) nor s. 682.014(3) bars the parties from varying that subsection, and T-26 has each side bear its own. Release 2026.4 has the Developer pay the mediator (Module Section 1.25(a); CBA Section 11.2; Agreement Section 10.26) and sends a dispute about a host's administration budget, statement or unpaid amount, and an Access Institution's, to a neutral cost accountant the Developer pays, who decides on documents (Module paragraph T-26; CBA Section 5.17(c), (d)). The host need not sue to fix the amount, and an amount found due and left unpaid is drawn from the security. A Developer-funded reserve for the host's lawyers is not used: in substance it would be a fee provision, which s. 57.105(7) could make reciprocal. --- *Prepared by Timothy Smith · Citizen-prepared working draft · Not legal advice.* *The author is not licensed to practice law and is not affiliated with, and does not write on behalf of, any university, law school, clinic, law firm, or governmental body. No attorney-client relationship is created by this document or by any use of it.*